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PREFACE 
The War of the Polish Succession has long been a part of the fur-
niture of European history courses. It must be mentioned if only 
to account for the period from 1715 to 1740 and because it was a 
general European war. But one usually gives it a few words of 
recognition and then passes on, presumably to bigger and better 
things. I was drawn to examine it more closely when it occurred 
to me that in a century noted for-sometimes applauded for-
limited warfare, this war was perhaps the best example of all and 
yet has been given the least attention by historians. I can find no 
work devoted to it in the major languages of Western Europe. I 
saw it also as a case where the two superpowers of their day, 
France and Austria, had come into conflict once again but, with 
unusual care on both sides, had managed the struggle so as to 
cause no mortal injury to either. This was accomplished despite 
the participation of almost all the continental powers great and 
small, including the emerging states of Russia and Prussia. I also 
became aware that particularly in English the events of the war 
were thinly treated in historical works, perhaps because England 
did not participate directly in the conflict. And some of the spe-
cific crises of the war-the French attempt to lift the siege of 
Danzig, for example-are little known. A European historian of 
very wide knowledge admitted that the story of Count Piela was 
unknown to him. 
Beyond the broader aspects of the war and its meaning to the 
eighteenth-century balance of power, the diplomatic and mili-
tary conventions of the time were significant, and they were ob-
served with great care in the War of the Polish Succession. These 
were restraints which, with some exceptions, kept the war with-
in bounds. The men who exercised these restraints-Cardinal 
Vl PREFACE 
Fleury, Prince Eugene, Horace Walpole, for example-were in-
teresting individuals and I sought to know what dialogue, official 
and unofficial, passed among them in the course of the fighting 
and the negotiations. 
In Paris, Vienna, and London (the sequence reflects the 
amount of time spent in each) the people of the archives, diplo-
matic and military, were unfailingly helpful. William H. McNeill 
and Owen Connelly read parts of the manuscript and encour-
aged me. The University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown granted me 
a semester's leave to finish the work. My wife and the editor of 
this volume picked out many inconsistencies and cloudy pas-
sages. For those which remain and for the work as a whole I 
must accept the responsibility. 
CHAPTER ONE 
A Problem of Succession 
On a day in the last week of August 1733, six horsemen left the 
great castle of Chambord in the Loire Valley of France and took 
the road to Brittany. Five of the men were obviously an escort for 
the sixth, whom they treated with great respect and addressed as 
"Your Majesty." The escorting riders understood the sensitivity 
and importance of their mission, for they had been told that 
they were to accompany Stanislas Leszczynski, the father-in-law 
of King Louis XV, from his estate at Chambord to a rendezvous 
with the French fleet which would take him to Poland. Stanislas 
was addressed as royalty because he was the former king of 
Poland, who had been hustled off his throne by the Russians 
some years before and replaced by a German prince. But on 1 
February that prince had died, and the elective Polish throne 
would be vacant until a king was chosen by the Polish nobility 
and gentry. All Europe waited to see whether France would back 
Stanislas as a candidate against the solemn warnings of the Rus-
sians and the Austrians. Frenchmen talked of the honor of the 
Bourbon house at stake. The Poles had called a Diet of Election 
to convene in late August. Could or would Stanislas present him-
self in Warsaw? 
There were many rumors. According to one, the exiled king 
was already secretly in Warsaw; another had it that he was cross-
ing Prussia by permission of the king of Prussia; a third that he 
was preparing to arrive at the port of Danzig with a French naval 
escort. The Russian ambassador in Warsaw reported the rumors 
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to his capital and recommended using any justification to arrest 
Stanislas on the Baltic Sea. 1 
In Paris the British ambassador, Lord Waldegrave, had been 
watching for any move that might indicate a French fleet moving 
into the Baltic with Stanislas. He was aware that the ships were 
ready at Brest, but in June thought it rather "remote" that the 
French would send Stanislas to Poland.2 Other observers in 
France were watching too and were promptly aware of a meet-
ing on 22 August between Stanislas and French Foreign Minister 
Chauvelin at Versailles. One of these observers noted in his 
diary that after the meeting Stanislas departed Versailles, dined 
at the chateau of Meudon nearby, and left for Brest.3 Some days 
and hours later Stanislas was seen embarking on the Brittany 
coast where a French fleet was at anchor. A salvo of cannon was 
fired. The fleet commander, the marquis de La Luzerne, 
welcomed him on board and the fleet sailed for the Baltic. The 
horsemen who had escorted him to Brittany must have felt satis-
fied that they had accomplished their mission. 
But all was not as it seemed. Stanislas did not sail away at high 
tide with the French fleet. It was not even Stanislas who went to 
Brittany and was seen boarding a ship. While the five horsemen 
were galloping westward toward Brittany with their charge, the 
real Stanislas was rolling rapidly eastward in a German-style 
vehicle with three trusted companions. 
Stanlislas had indeed met with Chauvelin on 22 August and 
had left for Chambord, possibly dining at Meudon as well. But 
on the way he was diverted to the estate of a Cardinal Bissi 
where a Commander Thianges appeared, a man similar in ap-
pearance to Stanislas. Thianges put on Stanislas's clothes and 
continued the trip to Chambord. It was he who, the next day or 
day after, left for Brittany with an escort who thought he was 
King Stanislas.4 
Chauvelin had arranged it all, perhaps with old Cardinal 
Fleury-the first minister of Louis XV -looking over his shoul-
der with some misgivings. As early as 22 March, Chauvelin 
wrote to the governor of Alsace, Marshal Du Bourg, asking that 
trusted officer and personal friend of Stanislas to look into ways 
by which Stanislas could leave the country in secret. Money for 
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secret expenses was set aside, and the special German-style vehi-
cle, a chaise a deux allemande, was procured by Du Bourg and 
sent to Paris; Chauvelin queried Du Bourg on the strictness of 
border inspections in the German states next to France and ad-
vised that two passports would be needed under the names of 
George Baur and Ernst Brauback, German businessmen travel-
ing with two domestics. 5 
Stanislas had lived through enough adventures when he lost 
his throne many years before and was unhappy about crossing 
Europe incognito. But there was no way out, and he was driven 
away acting the part of a private secretary to his traveling com-
panion, the chevalier d'Andlau, an Alsatian who spoke fluent 
German. Chauvelin was even afraid there might be some back-
sliding on the part of Stanislas when in cryptic terms he alerted 
the French ambassador in Warsaw, the marquis de Monti.6 
The journey began at ten o'clock this evening with one person accom-
panying and two valets de chambre for the principal traveler. They will 
avoid Mainz, Frankfurt, and Kassel, and expect to join the main high-
way from Wesel to Berlin at Munster. At Frankfurt on the Oder they will 
conform to the arrangements which you have made. The principal trav-
eler seems very hesitant about the possibility of learning at Frankfurt 
that the Russians may be in Poland. It is for you to determine his prog-
ress by the news you will give him. 
Stanislas arrived safely in Warsaw, and the secret of Com-
mander Thianges was kept until he reached Copenhagen with 
the fleet. Here La Luzerne learned that the real Stanislas had 
reached Warsaw. 7 It was an operatic finish when Stanislas on 
10 September revealed himself in Warsaw in the company of 
Monti, ready to be elected once again as king of Poland. 
The German prince whose death as king of Poland brought 
about the journey of Stanislas to Warsaw was Augustus II, elec-
tor of Saxony. The news of his death on 1 February 1 733 came 
to a Europe that had been largely at peace since the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713 and the death of Louix XIV in 1715. The 
workings of a system based on a balance of power had emerged 
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more clearly during the series of alliances and wars that had pre-
vented Louis XIV from achieving a French hegemony over Eu-
rope. Constantly shifting alliances and treaties, with a more 
limited form of conflict, would keep this balance until the French 
Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. 
The reaction of the great powers to the news from Poland 
varied. England was not greatly concerned. She had no candi-
date, and her ministers had said on more than one occasion that 
Poland was a faraway place. As the leader of the victorious coali-
tion against France that led up to Utrecht, she had since e~oyed 
the fruits of trade with the continent and maintained a naval and 
diplomatic presence from the Mediterranean to the Baltic to sta-
bilize her authority. Two sensitive and possibly vulnerable points 
remained, however, which suggested caution to the English Whig 
leadership. First the Stuart Pretender lived on the continent 
with his court and had contact with Tory supporters in Parlia-
ment. He could be thrown into the balance by the French if they 
wished to gamble on some form of intervention or an invasion of 
the British Isles. Could he be a candidate for election to the 
throne of Poland? James Stuart was a Catholic of royal blood 
with a Polish wife-he could not be ruled out. The second mat-
ter of sensitivity was the continental holding of the Hanoverian 
kings, namely the Electorate of Hanover. As hereditary elector 
of Hanover, George I had ruled as an autocrat in his German 
dominions-something he could not do in England-and he 
spent a large part of his time in Germany. His son, George II, 
king since 1728, was more reassuringly English. But Parliament 
had reason for disquiet at the thought of the English monarch 
and executive head of the government as possessor of a state 
that was an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire, and po-
tentially hostage to a strong military power on the continent. 
William Pitt, later in the century, would speak critically of the 
"Hanover rudder" in British foreign policy. As far as England 
was concerned, let the Baltic and the German states remain 
quiet, and the port of Danzig remain open, and the Poles might 
have any king they desired, excepting of course the Pretender, 
and if it did not unduly benefit the French. 
Austria, imperial Austria, was a more concerned observer of 
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the Polish scene. Austria had a border with Poland, and infor-
mation on the various contenders for the throne was carefully 
collected and analyzed in Vienna. The emperor had reestab-
lished leadership over the German states after Utrecht, although 
his influence over the larger states, such as Saxony, was dimin-
ishing as these took on more the character of modern sovereign 
states. Augustus II had been too friendly with France; his death 
promised a chance to bring Saxony back to a more subservient 
position. It was not to the advantage of the emperor to see any 
German prince enjoy the additional dignity of a Polish crown, 
although he had been forced to tolerate it up to this time. His 
control over even the hereditary lands of the Habsburg family-
as opposed to those states which recognized him only as a kind 
of overlord whose authority emerged during war-was admin-
istratively weak. The great nobles tended to live on their estates 
unmolested by the government in Vienna, a condition which be-
came crucial when the emperor found himself unable to raise 
funds for his army. And, perhaps not surprisingly in this cen-
tury of dynastic struggles, Austria too had a succession problem. 
Emperor Charles VI had no male heir and wished to guarantee 
the passing of his holdings in undivided form to his eldest 
daughter, Maria Theresa. There is something strangely naive in 
the effort, drawn out over many years, to exact written agree-
ments to what was known as the Pragmatic Sanction from the 
courts of Europe. Treaties were broken as readily in those days 
as today. But it was a single-minded policy of the emperor that 
continued until his death in 1740. 
So the emperor watched the Polish situation carefully, partly 
for fear of marauding bands entering his lands during the chaos 
of an interregnum, and partly because he wished to control, or 
at least approve, the succession. He must be assured that it did 
not favor his ancient enemy the house of Bourbon in France, 
and he had a tentative agreement with the Russians on a suc-
cessor prince. He wanted a foreign prince, a non-Pole, who 
would not provide too much leadership for the various Polish 
factions. 
Even faraway Spain and Portugal were not indifferent to the 
Polish succession. Spain resented the loss of her Italian appa-
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nages in the settlement of Utrecht and was probably the most 
dissatisfied of the major powers. To an extraordinary extent this 
discontent was centered in a single person, Elisabeth Farnese, 
queen of Spain as the second wife of Philip V. From the ruling 
house of Parma, Elisabeth had come to Spain in 1 714 and soon 
had three sons for whom she sought kingdoms. Philip's son 
by his first marriage was expected to succeed to the throne of 
Spain, and Elisabeth set out with great energy to reverse the dic-
tate of Utrecht and recover the Italian provinces for her sons. So 
at this time the appearance of a vacant throne could not be over-
looked as a possibility for the Spanish princes, and Spanish rep-
resentatives were ready to test the diplomatic waters in eastern 
Europe when the moment came. 
In Portugal there waited a prince who believed himself chosen 
by the major powers in the East to be the next king of Poland. 
The emperor had convinced the Russians during the previous 
year that a Portuguese prince was the best answer to the ex-
pected Polish succession problem, and the tentative agreement 
was in effect as Augustus II lay dying. Prince Emmanuel of Por-
tugal was ready to make his money contribution to the Polish 
magnates and accept the crown. 
Other states in Europe had played lesser roles in the active 
diplomacy of the first part of the eighteenth century, but they 
were alert as to how they might profit from the succession in 
Poland. Saxony would hope to keep the Polish throne in the 
hands of its ruling house and possibly make it hereditary. Prus-
sia, on the other hand, had no desire to see a rival German state 
increase itself and would block this as far as possible. 
Sweden had seen her client king of Poland, Stanislas Lesz-
czynski, driven from the throne by the Russians and replaced by 
Augustus II before the end of the Great Northern War in 1721. 
Sweden hoped for a restoration of influence in Poland but no 
longer had the will or resources to counter the growth of Russia, 
which was seeking, physically and spiritually, a way to the West. 
In the southeast, the Turkish Ottoman Empire, not yet the sick 
man of Europe, still held the Balkans and had a border with 
Poland. The Turks acted as a counterweight to policies the Aus-
trians undertook in the West, a fact that French diplomacy fre-
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quently exploited. At this time, however, the Turks were beset 
by the Persians and would be unable to act against either Russia 
or Austria. 
France had been keeping the closest watch on events in 
Poland, although seeking-not very successfully-to conceal 
her attention. Stanislas, living comfortably as the father-in-law 
of the king of France, had insisted more than once that he was 
content to forget his former kingship. But there were many in 
high positions in France who felt that his eventual restoration 
was necessary for the honor and glory of his daughter and for 
the house of Bourbon. It was assumed by all that France would 
make some move when the succession was open. 
France had emerged from the wars of Louis XIV somewhat 
chastened although not truly diminished in power. But the death 
of the Sun King had left a void in leadership, for he had acted as 
his own first minister, and his successor had been a five-year old 
child. His son, grandson, and one great-grandson in line for the 
throne had all died within a four-year period. The second great-
grandson, the infant Louis XV, survived, although he was des-
tined to remain an indifferent executive. This lack of strong 
political leadership was to be a mark of French policies for most 
of the century while the country went on to assume the unques-
tioned intellectual leadership of Europe. 
Since 1725 France had been allied with England against a 
strong Spanish-Austrian plan to reduce vastly her place in Eu-
rope. But Spain was shifting back toward an understanding with 
France. Cardinal Fleury, the young king's tutor, came to power 
in 1726 and carefully avoided antagonizing either England or 
Spain. Already over seventy years old, patient and pacific by na-
ture, he nevertheless possessed the shrewdness to cling to his 
position until his death in 17 43· 
The beginning of 1733 had seen a relatively quiet Europe. 
Dissatisfaction in Spain had been given some relief by provision 
for Spanish succession in several Italian duchies; British trade 
was unhampered; Cardinal Fleury and his counterpart in Brit-
ain, Robert Walpole, seemed to understand that neither sought 
war. But the death of Augustus would set some of the old ten-
sions in play once again. There were no heated exchanges, no 
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appeals to the masses, no patriotic statements, no undue haste; 
but the machinery of the sovereign states of Europe was in mo-
tion and some adjustments must be made. Eventually military 
action would ensue. 
When military force was applied to effect or hasten these ad-
justments, it tended to be a stylized and limited form of conflict. 
Scholars have commented on the decline of military violence 
after the religious wars of the seventeenth century and the re-
emergence of large-scale sanguinary conflicts in the French Rev-
olution. It can be argued that since the French Revolution, 
national wars on a great scale have become the standard. The 
unpleasantness of their ferocity and destruction has been bal-
anced by a more appealing justification of their objectives. Con-
trariwise, if one considers the limited conflicts of the eighteenth 
century, the terms "mercenary forces" and "dynastic wars" come 
to mind with mildly distasteful overtones. Neither the instru-
ments nor the objectives of such wars were truly admirable by 
nineteenth- or twentieth-century standards. War in these latter 
centuries became a matter too serious for mercenaries; everyone 
could and must participate in it. Nor was it fought for capricious 
sentiments of dynastic pride, but for reasons that governments 
tied closely to the national well-being and the interests of every 
citizen. 
The War of the Polish Succession may have been the most 
typical of eighteenth-century wars, a kind of model for the cau-
tious and restricted warfare of the time. It cannot be termed in-
significant, because it was a struggle among the great powers of 
Europe, with actions in Poland, the Rhineland, and Italy, and it 
resulted in significant changes in the political map of Europe. 
But military historians of recent decades have found it, by their 
standards, a spiritless conflict and have given it scant attention. 
Delbriick, for example, in his multivolume history of warfare, 
apparently found in it little relevance to his theory of military 
history and barely mentioned it. 8 
The mass citizen army is indeed the great military manifesta-
tion of the national state. The citizen of today is expected to ap-
prove it in principle and to feel a proprietary participation. It 
was not so in the first part of the eighteenth century. The army 
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was still the king's army, and an army commander writing to his 
sovereign did not speak of the victory or defeat of my army, nor 
of our army, but of your army, sire! This would change. Lee 
Kennett, in his study of the French army in the Seven Years' War 
(1756-1763), noted that from the mid-eighteenth century, 
officers spoke of service to "the state" or to "the nation." 9 
The War of the Polish Succession may have a meaning as a 
turning point, a kind of nadir of military activity, where an old 
formal system of warfare dominated aging players, who moved 
with increasing slowness, like gladiators in slow motion. 10 At the 
same time one could see in the background that new players 
were preparing for a more zealous exploitation of military con-
flict for the future. The War of the Austrian Succession, which 
began in 1740, and the Seven Years' War were taken far more 
seriously and were appropriate forerunners to the military ex-
plosion of the French Revolution and Napoleon. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Commitment to War 
The interest of France in the Polish throne was both dynastic 
and strategic; in addition it reflected a somewhat curious emo-
tional preoccupation for France during a period of more than a 
hundred years. At the end of the Jagellon dynasty in the six-
teenth century the kingship of Poland became elective, and its 
first elected king was a Frenchman, Henry of Valois, younger 
brother of King Charles IX of France, acclaimed by the Polish 
nobility and gentry in a mass electoral meeting in 1573. Henry 
stayed in Poland only a few uncertain months before he fled 
back to France to succeed his brother as Henry III. But a prece-
dent had been set, a sympathetic tie established. Whether this 
elective kingship (in contrast to the hereditary divine-right mon-
archies of most European states) and the representative ma-
chinery associated with it held any real attraction for the French 
is questionable, although one German historian asserts that the 
guarantee of a free election was an eternal bond with France. 1 
Whatever the cause, there does seem to have been a bond, for in 
1697 a serious attempt was made to place another Frenchman 
on the throne of Poland. The prince de Conti, supported by 
France and by a goodly outlay of money, sought success in an 
election, but this election went to the elector of Saxony, the same 
Augustus II of Poland whose death in 1733 set the diplomatic 
gears of Europe in accelerated motion. 
The strategic implications in the possession of the Polish 
crown by France may be more obvious now than in the eighteenth 
century. The geopolitical aspect, reinforced with accurate maps, 
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is very persuasive today, whereas the dynastic aspect is less easy to 
credit as a real motivation. The possibility of securing a sphere of 
influence geographically behind or above the core of Habsburg 
power in central Europe was well worth careful consideration. In 
their long conflict with the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire 
the kings of France were continually attempting to build power 
and influence among the German states between Paris and Vien-
na. If the Austrians could be occupied with matters farther east, 
so much the better for the French. The emperor would then have 
less time to give to his affairs in the Austrian Netherlands, in Italy, 
or even in the German states of the Empire. (By the "Empire" is 
meant the Holy Roman Empire; in effect the empire of the Ger-
man people in the German states, then numbering some three 
hundred, das heilige romische Reich deutscher Nation.) To press the 
Habsburgs back to the east was a conscious objective of French 
strategy. French statesmen in 1733 could hardly forget that 
Charles VI a few years earlier had thought of himself as the right-
ful king of Spain, a potential successor to the rule of Charles V 
whose lands had encircled France on three sides. The War of the 
Spanish Succession was on the whole a check to French aspira-
tions, but it forced Charles to give up the title of king of Spain. For 
whatever meaning one chooses to give it, the Spanish ceremonial 
customs prevailed at the court in Vienna despite the acceptance 
of German and French as the working languages, and a so-called 
Spanish party was identified in court circles.2 
Moreover, while French officials did not provide a clear view 
of long-term strategy in their statements, they must have re-
garded the growth of Russia with uneasiness. It has been sug-
gested that French diplomacy at this time sought to construct a 
barrier against Russia, consisting of Sweden, Poland, and Tur-
key.3 Of course these countries, especially Turkey, could also be 
used and had been used as weights, active or inactive, in the bal-
ance of power against the Habsburgs. To a great extent it de-
pended upon the amount of money that could be spared to 
secure their tenuous support at any given moment. 
Finally, whatever the positive value of staking out a distant 
sphere of influence, it could also impose a danger. The support 
of a distant friend, particularly one unable to master his own 
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affairs, could be expensive and onerous and require commit-
ments of power in areas far from home. The French govern-
ment would soon have occasion to reflect on this point. 
But there were other than strategic considerations involved. 
The dynastic element must be accepted with all seriousness in 
the statecraft of the eighteenth century. The king of France had 
quite obviously married beneath himself. It was probably the 
best that could be arranged at the time by a court that trembled 
over the possible extinction of the direct Bourbon line. The 
young king must be married as quickly as possible. A painful cri-
sis with Spain had occurred in I725 when the little Spanish prin-
cess selected as the bride of Louis was sent back to Spain, but she 
was too young and the matter of heirs to the throne was press-
ing. Marie Leszczynska was the daughter of a king, although a 
deposed one, and she appeared fecund. Her father, Stanislas, 
had been king of Poland from I 705 to I709 under the strong 
protection of Charles XII of Sweden. When that Scandinavian 
warrior-king was defeated, Stanislas lost his throne to Augustus 
II, from whom he had taken it to begin with. After the marriage 
of his daughter to the king of France he had shown little desire 
to return to Poland. But the French had contingency plans. 
At this time foreign-policy decisions of the French govern-
ment were taken by a Council of State dominated by Cardinal 
Fleury.4 Marshal Villars, the old soldier of the War of the Span-
ish Succession, reported most of the meetings of I733 in his 
memoirs. The discussions reflected the eagerness of the old ser-
vitors of the Bourbon house to recover the glory of the Bourbon 
court they had known under Louis XIV. Accordingly, they 
wished to correct the mesalliance of their king by restoring his 
father-in-law to active kingship. But Cardinal Fleury intuitively 
sought peace with France's normal rivals and was less than eager 
to leap into the adventure of securing a throne for Stanislas. In 
the first council meeting after the death of Augustus was known, 
that of II February, the cardinal approached the problem gin-
gerly, asking whether Stanislas had abdicated this throne in 
I709. Others, including of course Villars, assured him that there 
was no abdication. In the meeting of IS February Villars advised 
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that Stanislas should go to Danzig immediately and the Poles 
should be informed that his confirmation would be worth mon-
ey to them. Fleury's more cautious attitude prevailed, however, 
and Stanislas remained, for the time being, in France.5 
Whatever Fleury's reactions at the time, the French had al-
ready spent considerable time and effort preparing for the va-
cancy on the Polish throne. Detailed instructions were given in 
1729 to the new French ambassador to Saxony and Poland, the 
marquis de Monti. He was advised how to proceed in sounding 
out future support for the exiled Stanislas and told that he 
should have a plan ready. 
The Austrians were aware that there was a "French party" in 
Warsaw among the Poles and they could not remain neutral to it. 
The question was how far Vienna would go in opposing Stanis-
las. Once the French saw their candidate actively opposed, they 
had to assess the spirit and strength of this opposition and either 
withdraw gracefully or bring pressure upon the emperor. They 
had not long to wait for a clue to the emperor's determination. 
In the council meeting of 1 March, Villars noted that the dis-
patches from Vienna showed that the emperor was doing all that 
he could to block Stanislas and to reach an understanding with 
Tsarina Anna on this question. The French were not in a mood 
to yield, however, and by May their determination was demon-
strated by a council decision to make some preparations for war. 
The secretary of state for war was charged with preparing mem-
oranda on provisions and artillery depots. As Villars put it, war 
was decided upon in spite of the cardinal.6 Actually, war was not 
a foregone conclusion; first there would be a busy period of di-
plomacy for the French as they sought allies. 
It is not easy to allocate motives among the French leaders as 
they moved closer to war. Villars seems to have thought in dy-
nastic terms. Fleury probably would have abandoned the entire 
project had he dared. The marquis d'Argenson, an observer 
close to the court who would himself become the foreign minis-
ter in a few years, felt that the situation allowed France to use it 
as a pretext for a bold attack upon the emperor and his hold-
ings. In particular it would permit France to "pulverize the Prag-
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matic Sanction," that agreement by which Charles VI sought to 
secure for his daughter's inheritance of his Habsburg lands.7 
But the national existence of France was not at stake, the strate-
gic benefits to be gained were speculative, and France made no 
claim to additional territory. Only the dynastic factor was clear. 
Andre Hercule de Fleury, bishop of Frejus, had been brought 
to the court at Versailles as the boy-king's tutor and there won his 
cardinal's red hat. He also won the king's confidence, which he 
never lost, for after the failure of the ministry of the duke of 
Bourbon in 1726, Fleury was entrusted with the powers of a first 
minister for the remainder of his life. The brilliance and aggres-
siveness of the marquis de Chauvelin-effectively the minister 
for foreign affairs, although generally known by his title of 
keeper of the seals-sometimes led one to believe that he was 
managing the old cardinal, in 1 733 in his eightieth year, but this is 
simplifying the relationship. It may be that at times Chauvelin 
seemed to have the upper hand over the cardinal, yet the ultimate 
resolution of this rivalry-if it was a rivalry-showed the strength 
of the cardinal. He dismissed Chauvelin in 1737. 
Argenson during the early thirties spoke of "our two first 
ministers," meaning Fleury and Chauvelin.8 The nineteenth-
century historian Driault acknowledged the power of the cardi-
nal to dispose of Chauvelin, whom he believed to have been 
greatly wronged, and seemed to agree with Argenson that the 
crime of Chauvelin was to have made the cardinal jealous. But 
Driault saw Chauvelin as the active aggressive spirit in French 
foreign affairs and Fleury as a timid old man who was forced to 
surrender his powers temporarily to Chauvelin in order to sur-
mount crises. In his memoirs, Count Maurepas, secretary of state 
for the navy in 1733, speaks in one place of Fleury as being ruled 
by his counselors and in another of his making decisions des-
potically. Chauvelin's influence over the cardinal was assessed as 
considerable by the English and as basically anti-English. Horatio 
Walpole, a brother of Robert and ambassador to France from 
1723 to 1730, spoke of Chauvelin as a "most treacherous, false 
and ambitious spirit, but at the same time, of an assiduous, 
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supple, dissembling and sinuating disposition, where it was his 
interest to please." 9 
Dangervilliers, the secretary of state for war, was in a second-
ary class as minister, along with Maurepas. Maurepas main-
tained that Dangervilliers was only a kind of secretary to Fleury 
and Chauvelin. On another occasion he referred to Dangervil-
liers as a clairvoyant blind man ("aveugle clairvoyant"). 1° Few 
personalities come off well in the Maurepas memoirs-Berwick 
is an exception-but it is probably true that Dangervilliers made 
few policy decisions even though his hand is often seen in the 
drafting of dispatches and in marginal notes on incoming mes-
sages. The envoy from the court of Lorraine in France wrote to 
his duke on 25 January 1734 that Chauvelin had taken one of 
the secretaries from the military department and was occupying 
himself with all the military affairs. "This makes M. Dangervil-
liers very unhappy and it is believed that he may well resign." 11 
It is not entirely clear how Chauvelin felt about the Stanislas 
candidacy as such, but there is no doubt of his bitter and aggres-
sive attitude toward both Austria and England. There are some 
indications that Chauvelin at first favored the candidacy of the 
elector of Saxony in order to maintain the French treaty with 
that court, which represented a German state that had not yet 
seen fit to sign the emperor's all-important Pragmatic Sanction. 12 
But he doubtless saw very quickly the impossibility of standing 
against the dynastic factor involving the king's immediate family, 
and his active support of Stanislas appears in council meetings 
shortly after the news of the death of Augustus II. Evidently nei-
ther Chauvelin nor the cardinal liked the "forced situation" of 
February 1733, but Chauvelin's energy in pursuing the war tends 
to discount any reports that he ever seriously considered another 
course of action. 13 It is only that what we know of him suggests 
that he was the official in France most likely to question the values 
behind the support of Stanislas for what were demonstrably rea-
sons of family pride. Probably, like Argenson, he accepted the 
Stanislas candidacy as a pretext for action that could later be 
directed elsewhere. 
Chauvelin's personal papers have not been found, and with-
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out them our view of him as a policymaker and as a man is partly 
obscured.14 Argenson, in his journal, seems to have despised 
him, admired him, disliked him, and considered him his best 
friend-at different times. And Argenson's wry comment has 
clung to him: "He travels underground, like a mole." Driault, in 
his article praising Chauvelin, observes: "There are few exam-
ples in our history of such an active campaign as that which filled 
the last months of 1733; one detects a plan rigorously and ener-
getically pursued." 15 The searching memoirs, the drumfire of 
messages to the ministers abroad, all support this conclusion. 
Chauvelin represented the national statesman of the future 
rather than the dynastic servitor of the Bourbons, whatever his 
relation to the cardinal. 16 
England was an ally, and had been one since France had per-
ceived the menace of the 1725 Madrid-Vienna alliance in the 
First Treaty of Vienna. But France had less and less need for her 
ally, and the forced friendship was wearing thin. In retrospect it 
is an odd little moment of peace between two long-term rivals. 
The War of the Polish Succession would be a step toward termi-
nating this alliance. 
As France moved toward an active policy on the Polish can-
didacy, her ministers sought to know the attitude of the London 
government without giving away too much of their own inten-
tions. Behind all the French dealings with England was the cher-
ished belief that sooner or later England would be seriously 
weakened by internal strife arising from the reluctance of many 
Englishmen to accept the Hanoverian dynasty and its Whig gov-
ernment. In January 1733, Chavigny, French ambassador in 
London, reported the low esteem in which the king of England 
was held. "The hate and scorn which pursue him have no lim-
its." 17 Chauvelin evidently was somewhat of the same mind 
when he confided to Chavigny his opinion that a war for En-
gland would mean internal revolution. They are trying, said the 
French minister, to prevent any breakdown of relations with 
Austria and Spain, and they are in the position of compromising 
either the states of Hanover or the commerce of the nation. "It 
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may be the moment to strike decisive blows." 18 Despite this 
confident statement from Versailles, Chavigny's initial instruc-
tions from Chauvelin following the death of the king of Poland 
advised caution. Chavigny was reminded that when the French 
"union" with England was formed, the English had indicated 
that they would be agreeable to a restoration of King Stanislas 
and would even participate in the expenses of a Polish election. 
But, he admits, this good will may have been effaced. Make no 
demarche, said Chauvelin, we do not yet wish to declare what we 
will do. 19 
For about a month there was polite diplomatic sparring, the 
English murmuring that Poland was a very distant area for them 
to worry about and the French content to talk of other matters. 
Chavigny said he had to be dragged to the subject. After a con-
versation with Lord Harrington he wrote, "the more I back away 
the more he pursues me." 20 This changed in mid-March when a 
declaration of Louis XV was sent to the courts of Europe com-
mitting France to the protection of a free election in Poland. 
When Harrington was read the declaration by Chavigny, he 
noted the affirmative quality of the wording and admitted that 
the "play might become more serious than he had thought." 
When he asked whether, in case France acted offensively, she 
would move in the Lowlands or in Germany, Chavigny replied 
that he did not know, but "for every man the emperor moves on 
the borders of Poland we will move ten where they are needed." 
After a few additional remarks the dialogue ended, obviously on 
a strained note.21 
But Chavigny had gone too far. In a 2 April message Chau-
velin pointed out his errors in unmistakable terms ending with 
the remark that it does not become a great power to threat-
en. Paul Vaucher expresses the opinion that Chauvelin himself 
thought the English could be intimidated; the sudden change of 
tone, Vaucher believes, represented the old cardinal entering 
the scene and modifying the French attitude. 22 In any event a 
penitent response came back from Chavigny. It was less a threat 
than a confidence that Harrington had drawn ("extorque") 
from him, he said.23 
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Chavigny's opposite number in Paris, the English ambassa-
dor Lord Waldegrave, showed far less concern. On 23 February 
he sent his superior the duke of Newcastle half a dozen pounds 
of truffies with the possibly ambiguous remark that "it is all that 
can be found in Paris fit to be sent." On 1 1 March he briefly 
noted that there was stirring on the Polish election matter and 
that a visitor had come from Poland to see Stanislas. But Walde-
grave continued unflappable, directing most of his messages to 
Delafaye in the Foreign Office with the observation that there 
was nothing worth troubling the duke about. Regarding naval 
preparations, he wrote in June: "I know of none besides those 
often mentioned, of the four men of war to go to the Levant and 
the three at Brest which some day are to carry King Stanislas if 
he is chosen." 24 
By midyear the French must have felt the English gravitating 
toward the Austrian side and became more insistent about an 
understanding. Chauvelin directed Chavigny to seek specific an-
swers from the king and sent a set of questions to put to the 
monarch. Newcastle told Chavigny that George II would see 
him with pleasure and on 6 July the audience took place. The 
king denied that England had agreed to support the emperor at 
all costs but took refuge behind such observations as his certain-
ty that the emperor would not force an election in Poland, that 
Poland was a distant place for England to make decisions on pos-
sibilities, that the whole affair was not worth a war, and that, in 
any case, he could not speak for the tsarina. 25 
After reading the report of the 6 July meeting, Chauvelin 
concluded that the English would not take a position but that 
France must consider the courts of Russia, Austria, and Saxony 
as solidly against her.26 It was not the best reaction from the En-
glish, which would have been a strict neutrality, but it was not the 
worst, which would have been outspoken support of the emperor. 
In Paris, as the attitude of the French became firmer, Walde-
grave still did not believe that it would come to war. On 12 August 
he dined at the cardinal's with Marshal Berwick before the latter 
left to take command of the French Army of the Rhine. "From the 
looks of both I cannot think they are yet in earnest. What may 
come from the acts of others, is not to be penetrated, but from 
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appearances it is hitherto but a sham fight .... If they do anything 
at all it will be in the way of insults to the Emperor, bombard 
Luxembourg, and block it up for the winter." 27 
The events that were to take place in Poland, dramatic as 
they would be, and essential as they were to set the larger scene 
in motion, constituted only a kind of sideshow or operatic scene. 
The truly important events must occur in the West. The armed 
clash between the two major powers of Europe-France and 
Austria-could not take place in Warsaw or Danzig. Impover-
ished though he was by a lack of administrative control of his 
realm, the emperor had too many advantages in eastern Europe. 
France must challenge him in the West. 
But the emperor could not be attacked directly across the 
Rhine except in a few imperial fortresses, such as Breisach, 
Kehl, and Philippsburg, or the fortress city of Luxembourg. An 
invasion across the Rhine into what is today the Federal Republic 
of Germany would have been an attack, or at least an occupa-
tion, of several independent principalities, and the French would 
become willy-nilly the bully to drive them individually and collec-
tively to seek the protection of their emperor. At first glance the 
emperor appeared vulnerable in his possession of the lower half 
of the Netherlands, but a French attack there could not be toler-
ated by the English or the Dutch, the so-called sea powers. 
The long-term opposition of the French to Habsburg preten-
sions is reflected in a French memoir entitled, "Means to Use 
against the Emperor." It is basically a French effort to find the 
best means to pick and pry at the rickety framework of the Holy 
Roman Empire. It is dated November 1733, when the war had 
already begun but before its course and extent were clear. 28 First 
the memoir considers the case of Prussia. 
It is certain that the king of Prussia is now very displeased with the em-
peror and the tsarina and that he is incensed by the treaty which has 
been concluded at Vienna with the elector of Saxony. We think that it 
may be possible to engage the king of Prussia in a neutrality agreement 
and have him agree to hold all the troops he c:m on the borders of Bran-
denburg and Magdeburg. By this troop disposition the king of England 
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would be obliged to keep his state of Hanover armed, the elector of Sax-
ony likewise, and the emperor would not be able to release some of his 
troops in Silesia. 
The French have found a sensitive spot here. The English 
ambassador in Vienna believed the aggressive attitude of the 
king of Prussia toward the state of Hanover was mainly due to 
the intrigues of Count Seckendorff, the Viennese representative 
in Berlin. "That odious man," wrote Robinson from Vienna, and 
set about trying to effect Seckendorff's removal, in which, inci-
dentally, he had a limited success.29 To continue with the French 
memoir: 
The animosity awakening now between the house of Hanover and Prus-
sia on the subject of the administration of the Duchy of Mecklenburg, to 
which the house of Prussia has the right of succession by family pacts, is 
known to be well founded. We may profit from this by a treaty of neu-
trality in assuring the king of Prussia that he need not worry about some 
suitable arrangement for the states of Berg and Jiilich. We can also let 
him hope that, in the case that France achieves complete superiority, we 
may consider accommodating him with two bailliages in Silesia .... In 
case we can bring this prince into the war it appears that the king of 
Poland might try to get the senate to cede him Thorn, Elbing, and Mar-
ienburg, provided that he would engage on his side to procure for the 
crown of Poland the reunion of the provinces of Smolensk, the Ukraine, 
and Courland, which the Russians have taken from Poland. 
It was an interesting attempt to find sensitive pressure points 
involving the growing Prussian power. Unfortunately for the 
French, the king of Prussia would finally support his emperor 
more firmly than the French had hoped and make his contribu-
tion of troops to the army arrayed against France. But the mem-
Oir goes on: 
The Swedes may also join this alliance to retake Livonia, Ingria, and Es-
thonia. We do not believe that the elector of Saxony, the Russians, and 
the emperor can oppose them considering the strong diversion we will 
make against the emperor in Italy and on the Rhine. 
The house of Hesse has always been attached to France but appears 
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now closer to England. However, if we present to Prince William of 
Hesse an objective that flatters his ambitions, and if he may hope to be-
come king of Sweden, or even to place his son on that throne, we believe 
that he may be swayed .... 
We do not doubt that France is assured of the neutrality of some 
electors, including Palatine and Cologne and much more so the elector 
of Bavaria, in case events furnish him the means to act without exposing 
him to the loss of his states. 
The memoir goes on to list some of the lands that could be 
given to Bavaria and notes that when the other princes of the 
empire see the above states allied with France or neutral they 
will not make a great effort for the emperor. Finally, the memoir 
suggests that by means of presents the grand visier of Turkey 
may be brought to hold a greater proportion of his troops on the 
frontiers of the empire, thus causing the emperor to put fifteen 
or twenty thousand additional men in Hungary. The Turks 
probably will not attack the empire at this time but, concluded 
the memoir hopefully, they might well attack the Muscovites, 
whom they scorn. 
So much for a French memoir seeking alternative actions 
against the emperor on the east. It was somewhat inventive but 
not very practical as things turned out. But if the French could 
not easily get at the emperor in central Europe or in the Low-
lands, the emperor was definitely vulnerable in the South. 
In Italy the emperor enjoyed possession of the city of Milan 
and the rich province around it, the Milanese, as well as the 
kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. Tuscany, Parma, and Piacenza 
were held by Spain. The only native power in Italy, apart from 
the Papal states, was the kingdom of Sardinia, which occupied 
the Piedmont and Savoy. With its capital at Turin, it was gov-
erned by the dukes of Savoy, who had recently upgraded them-
selves to kings by acquisition of the island kingdom of Sardinia. 
If the French were to damage the emperor they must do it in 
Italy, and, since the Piedmont separated the French from the 
emperor's lands, an alliance with Sardinia was the one the French 
must have before beginning any serious military operations. 
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France also counted on Spain, but there was almost no doubt of 
Spanish support. The Spanish, after all, could not go over to the 
Habsburg side, because they could only be gratified in their desire 
for recovery oflands in Italy by despoiling the emperor. The king 
of Sardinia, on the other hand, was less obviously tied to a single 
course of action. He had reasons to fear the Spanish as much as 
the Austrians, and he might suddenly find a solution in Vienna if 
he were not properly satisfied by Versailles. He was also the head 
of the family of which Prince Eugene of Savoy, the leading official 
and soldier of the Habsburg regime, was a member. Charles Em-
manuel, king of Sardinia, must take a deep breath before signing 
a treaty with the French. 
So the French were at a significant disadvantage negotiating 
with the court in Turin, particularly because they were eager to 
engage in military operations in northern Italy during the latter 
part of 1733. As time slipped by during the summer they be-
came increasingly impatient. But the kingdom of Sardinia, as a 
small power located at that point where the interests of three 
major powers converged, had a great deal to win and possibly 
more to lose. Sardinia hoped to expand into the Milanese. The 
French, in their original negotiating position, used a proposal 
that would be copied more than a hundred years later by Napo-
leon III-namely, to offer the Milanese to the king of Sardinia 
who, in turn, would surrender Savoy to France. Both times, of 
course, the French were offering something which they did not 
possess and would have to take by force. 
In order that the French ambassador in Spain should appre-
ciate the problems of his colleague in Turin he was sent a mes-
sage on 23 June 1733 which outlined them briefly. The memoir 
of Ambassador Vaulgrenant in Turin to Ambassador Rottem-
bourg in Spain was roughly as follows: at first the king of Sar-
dinia wanted only the Milanese and we asked for several states 
for the Infant (Don Carlos, eldest son of Philip V of Spain and 
Elizabeth Farnese, and since 1731 ruler of Parma). We were fi-
nally reduced to not insisting on Savoy and asking only the Lo-
disan and the Cremonese for the Infant. However, the king has 
shown that he is sensitive to the emperor's continued possession 
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of the fortress of Mantua. This may be used to bargain for Savoy 
and for additional territory for the Infant. The king does not 
want the emperor in that area. On the other hand he is fearful 
for the growth of the house of Bourbon in Italy and knows that 
the power of the emperor there can restrain it.30 
As the summer wore on, the French found the king and his 
minister Ormea content to move with exasperating slowness. In 
June, Ormea complained to Vaulgrenant that the queen of Spain 
was deceiving them both and negotiating with the emperor to put 
one of her sons on the throne of PolandY This accusation was 
probably intended to elicit information or to divert attention for 
no negotiations are known to have taken place. But Rottembourg 
had reported in March that the Duke of Liria suggested the 
crown of Poland for the Infant and that a negotiator had left 
the court in Seville for Poland.32 Doubtless all possibilities, even 
the more remote, were examined to find employment for the 
queen of Spain's offspring. 
On 6 July more urgent instructions arrived from Versailles. 
Chauvelin suggests reminding the king that he has nothing to 
fear from the emperor's dispersed armies. Then, in language 
more conversational in tone, he adds: "He wants the Milanese, 
well, we will separate it from our just claim to Savoy." It was a 
considerable concession. But at least try to get them to yield on 
the Cremonese, begs the minister. "Faites le traite au plus sim-
ple," goes on the instruction, ticking off the points: establish an 
alliance, promise the king the Milanese, promise to act in con-
cert, work out the aid the king desires.33 
But it was not as easy as the ministry seemed to believe. 
Ormea explained to Vaulgrenant that Sardinia was not ready to 
act as rapidly as France would prefer. It is your concern with Po-
land that presses you, said Ormea. But he wondered whether 
the advantages that would accure to the son of the queen of 
Spain would be sufficient to engage the king of Spain and the 
Spanish nation to observe the treaty. Amid the coming changes 
in the Spanish monarchy, "What are our guarantees?" 34 
Ormea had reason to wonder. The Spanish monarchy was 
dominated by a termagant queen and a neurotic king who for 
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days and weeks would refuse to communicate, or bathe, or even 
cut his fingernails, and who had once abdicated in favor of a son 
who later died. The possibility of another abdication was ever 
present at the Spanish court. Moreover, the agreement sought 
by the French would not be a triple alliance; Sardinia would 
have an agreement only with France. 
And there was the question of money. On 2 August the French 
council discussed the demands of the Sardinians-namely, a 4-
million-livre loan and soo,ooo livres per month in subsidies. One 
million livres was to be paid immediately.35 Vaulgrenant was told 
in a 3 August message that the king would be paid the one million 
if he would be ready to enter the campaign, although the ministry 
observed that the subsidies were much higher than those paid in 
16g6 and 1701.36 
The French were now showing more impatience and the Sar-
dinians were coolly aware of it. On 8 August, Vaulgrenant com-
plained that he had been unable to see Ormea for fifteen days.37 
Perhaps the king and Ormea knew that on 28 June the French 
council had discussed which projects could be carried out against 
the emperor without the alliance of Sardinia and found it an un-
satisfactory list.38 
Vaulgrenant was pessimistic in his 12 August communication 
with the ministry, but the Sardinians must have felt that they had 
pushed the French as far as they could and that it was time to 
come to terms, for as of 15 August things began to move.39 In 
effect the king of Sardinia was willing to accept the French loan 
and subsidy amounts and agreed to contribute 12 ,ooo men. 
These articles came out in the 23 August draft treaty, which also 
stipulated that Sardinia would get all the Milanese, that there 
would be no separate peace, and that the combined army would 
be under the command of the king of Sardinia. In secret articles 
it was agreed to attack the emperor in Sicily and Tuscany as well 
as in the Po Valley. 
Although it was necessary to "conciliate" several points in the 
treaty, and this dragged on for another month, the Sardinian 
court seemed to expect the French to perform instantly after the 
agreement in substance. The French were moving as rapidly as 
COMMITMENT TO WAR 
they could, and it must have been not a little exasperating to be 
first delayed by Sardinian tactics and then prodded to hasten by 
the same people. Dilatory tactics of the king of Sardinia delayed 
the signing until 27 September, yet on 30 September, at a public 
function, Ormea whispered to Vaulgrenant that he was disap-
pointed at the slowness of the French plan for introducing troops 
into Italy. 40 
The agreement with Sardinia was the last major requirement 
for French plans for the action against the emperor with military 
force and the French did not commit themselves, in Italy or Ger-
many, until it was achieved. Cardinal Fleury was a cautious man. 
The Habsburg court was disappointed if not shocked to 
learn of the French-Sardinian treaty. The English were likewise 
surprised and disappointed to see Italy once again open to a 
French army. Perhaps, as has been suggested, England was bad-
ly served in Turin by the eccentric Lord EssexY 
As previously noted the French were less worried about the · 
support of Spain. As early as June 1732 the queen of Spain had 
told the French ambassador, "If you begin the war we give you 
our word that we will follow with all our forces." 42 In the spring 
of 1733 the French ambassador in Seville was duly assuring his 
government that there was no sign of a treaty by Spain with 
Vienna or London.43 But it probably was not reassuring to the 
systematic French to recall that a great part of the diplomatic re-
porting from Spain was, and had been for years, concerned with 
the state of the king's health and his unstable behavior. Negotia-
tions with Spain lasted until nearly the middle of 1733. On 31 
May the king of Spain wrote his nephew the king of France that 
he had empowered his ambassador in France to sign the treaty. 44 
Presumably this was the message that was read before the French 
council on 28 June, after which, according to Villars, they were 
able to proceed with preparations for war. 45 From this time on-
ward Spain, and especially the queen, pressed for war, while at 
the same time showing fear that the emperor might lay hands on 
the relatively unprotected state of Parma and the Infant Carlos. 
Doubtless the Spanish court felt that an early attack by France 
provided greater security for Parma than a long-drawn-out pe-
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riod of negotiations. The French answered the queen that they 
were resolved on war, and indeed they were. 
In all, what has happened? The French have taken the initia-
tive to precipitate a war, is the simple answer. Only ripples would 
have appeared on the surface of European political waters had 
the French government made only a pro forma claim for Stanis-
las. But France made alliances and other preparations for war 
and, in effect, dared the emperor to oppose Stanislas in Poland. 
France at the outset of the war sought no territorial gains and 
apparently foresaw none. The immediate cause of the conflict 
was dynastic. 
Of course one may believe that the real motivation behind 
French actions was a master plan in the mind of Chauvelin to 
reduce the power of the Habsburgs, the case of Stanislas serving 
only as a pretext. The later treatment of Stanislas admittedly 
supports this view. Driault saw it all as an effort to rework the 
balance of power in southern Europe-to drive the Austrians 
out of Italy and set up a tier of states between France and Aus-
tria. These states were to include Bavaria, Sardinia, and proba-
bly new creations in Italy that would be dependent upon France 
for their existence. Given French moderation, he argued that 
this would remove the great danger of Austria.46 
Whether one wishes to advance the strategic or the dynastic 
factors as paramount, there were reasons for moderation. Two 
important reasons were Cardinal Fleury and Robert Walpole, 
neither of whom wanted war. In the nineteenth century nation-
alist historians of their respective countries found them sadly 
wanting in zeal. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1733 the potentiali-
ties for a long and bitter general war were present. And yet this 
war did not get out of hand. With military operations in three 
areas quite distant from one another, and with most of the pow-
ers of Europe involved in one way or another, the war would still 
remain a limited struggle-a king's war, not a people's war. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Habsburg Position 
The fact that Augustus II, as king of Poland, held a throne from 
which he had deposed a ruler who subsequently became the fa-
ther-in-law of the king of France did not automatically mean 
that his relations with France were strained. Nor did the fact that 
Augustus, in his role as elector of Saxony, was an integral part of 
the Holy Roman Empire mean that his relations with his em-
peror were particularly close. The Saxon prince, in his capital at 
Dresden, was one of the stronger members of the Empire, and 
he had maintained as much independence from the Habsburg 
court as he dared. This independence could be achieved only 
with French support. Further, Augustus as king of Poland was 
also concerned with the treaty of 1726 between Austria and Rus-
sia, which weighed heavily upon the courts of eastern Europe 
until the French Revolution. The government of Poland, despite 
its Saxon monarch, has been described as a kind of Russian-Aus-
trian condominium against the national party in Poland.1 But 
the idea of a dismemberment of Poland was already current in 
the first half of the eighteenth century, and the nations that were 
to carve up the failing state were already eyeing their respective 
portions in advance. One countermove that had been consid-
ered by Augustus was a Saxony-Bavaria accord with France. 
This had been discussed with French Ambassador Monti in 
Dresden.2 Another effort, apparently an initiative of Augustus, 
was a November 1732 proposal to Berlin that the constitution of 
Poland be overthrown and Poland be made a monarchy under 
his house-elective still, but with the understanding that it re-
HABSBURG POSITION 
main in the Saxon house of Wettin. Under this arrangement 
both Prussia and Austria were to acquire parts of Poland.3 This 
was never agreed upon, however, and the death of Augustus 
changed matters. Prussia and Austria did not wish to drive the 
new elector of Saxony into the arms of the French. He had in-
herited the electorate of Saxony but it was probable that he 
would need Austrian support to gain the elective throne of Po-
land. It was a situation that might well permit Vienna to rein in 
an overindependent German sovereign and bring him to what it 
considered a proper relation to his emperor. 
This is why only a week after the death of Augustus II, 
Bussy, French charge in Vienna, reported that the Habsburg 
court saw the death of the king as a favorable event and that they 
believed the house of Saxe would break all engagements with 
France. Further, he reported that Austria would oppose the 
Stanislas party in Poland with the help of Prussia and Russia, al-
though imperial troops would not be sent into the border area of 
Silesia until contact had been made with Berlin and Saint Pe-
tersburg.4 Bussy's quick estimates of the situation were generally 
correct, but the development of the Habsburg position on the 
matter of the Polish succession was not a foregone conclusion, 
nor was it achieved overnight. 
In Vienna the affairs of state were still mainly in the hands of 
the great field commander Prince Eugene of Savoy. As chairman 
of the Privy Council (Geheime Coriferenz) and of the War Council 
(Hofkriegsrat) he had exercised both military and civil authority 
since the Treaty of Utrecht with, however, some ups and downs 
in the extent of confidence bestowed upon him by his emperor, 
Charles VI. He had enormous influence throughout Europe, es-
pecially among the princes of the empire, and his carefully cho-
sen ambassadors reported back to him from the courts of Europe. 
These were often men who had served in military campaigns with 
him and owed him their personal allegiance. 
But "der edle Ritter" as he was affectionately called, was in 
failing health. Diplomats began to comment on his increasing in-
ability to shake off coughs and "catarrh" and had even begun to 
question his powers of concentration. He continued to chair the 
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councils, to receive the intimate notes in the emperor's hand, 
and to send the emperor his considered opinion on decisions of 
state, but there was increasing evidence that his reliance upon 
his secretary Ignaz Koch was extreme. More important still, in 
terms of the shifting of influence at the Habsburg court, was the 
increasing reliance the emperor placed upon the young state 
secretary, Johann Christoph Bartenstein. This very able Stras-
bourg native had risen rapidly in the imperial service in Vienna 
and had been since 1727 the secretary of the Privy Council 
(Protokollsfuhrer). He would be the last challenger of the in-
fluence of Prince Eugene upon his sovereign, and ultimately his 
challenge would succeed. Bartenstein's preparation of briefings 
and dispatches placed him, along with Ignaz Koch, at the apex 
of the Habsburg decision-making machinery.5 
The early months of 1733 following the death of Augustus II 
required unusual activity on the part of the government in Vi-
enna. Bartenstein's briefings with their marginal notes in the 
emperor's hand, the notes of the secretaries taken during coun-
cil meetings, and the diplomatic correspondence, both Austrian 
and foreign, emanating from Vienna reflect a mood of caution 
and indecision at the Habsburg court. 
The detailed briefing of 5 February 1733, which Bartenstein 
prepared for the emperor and the Privy Council, suggests that 
he was prepared for the death of the king of Poland and had his 
material well in hand. He began by stating that the news of the 
death of the king arrived early that same day from the minister 
in Warsaw, Count Wilczek. Luckily, he added, Wilczek under-
stood what had been agreed upon with Russia and Prussia and 
had guidance for the moment.6 
It is true that the succession question had been threshed out 
among the three powers during the previous year and a treaty 
signed in Berlin was in process of ratification when the king of 
Poland died. It provided for the exclusion of the French party in 
Poland and for the stationing of troops on the border to "protect 
the freedom of the Polish election from foreign influence." A se-
cret article provided for 36,ooo ducats to be used to further the 
election of the Infant Emmanuel of Portugal, and in a second 
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secret article Russia agreed to see that the second son of the king 
of Prussia was chosen duke of Courland when the reigning duke 
died. 7 
Hartenstein's briefing continued, noting that Stanislas was, of 
course, among the "excludeds." There was some concern that he 
might be chosen immediately by acclamation but it was hoped 
that jealousy among the Polish factions would prevent this. The 
new elector of Saxony, the son of Augustus II and the man who 
would eventually become king of Poland with Russian and Aus-
trian help, was also at this time among the excludeds, if unof-
ficially. "He has spoken against Your Majesty and your house in 
such a way that it is not possible to trust him." He had been poor-
ly prepared by his father, added Bartenstein, but it was better 
not to bring out a specific exclusion against him, for this would 
only turn him toward France and Bavaria. The court should 
speak only of excluding Stanislas and preserving the free elec-
tion and not outwardly acknowledge opposition to the elector of 
Saxony. The emperor's hand appears in a short marginal note 
approving this attitude. 
Then the "includeds" are considered, beginning with the In-
fant of Portugal, who has been the presumptive choice of the 
emperor in recent months. Bartenstein advised caution here 
and to be prepared to accept another candidate in case the In-
fant were not successful. He then listed the possible candidates: 
the two princes Wiesnowicki, Crown Grand Marshal Mnischek, 
Prince Sangusko, Prince Lubomirski, and the palatin of Kiev, 
Joseph Potocky. He found none of these candidates worthy of 
strong support and then turned to the means to be used. What 
he called the "media prima classis" consisted of the 36,ooo duc-
ats which were to be drawn from the bank and sent to Wilczek 
immediately. Secondly, troops were to be sent to the Silesian 
border, and thirdly, a precise understanding between Austria 
and Russia must be maintained-a matter in which there were 
some unsatisfactory items. The proposed instructions to the 
ministers in Warsaw, Berlin, and Saint Petersburg were attached 
as rescripts, noted Bartenstein, and he asked for his emperor's 
approval. The emperor had made approving marginal notes 
throughout the document and at the end he gave his approval 
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once more and directed Bartenstein to forward all, along with 
the money, as rapidly as possible. 
England's ambassador in Vienna, Thomas Robinson, seems 
to have been very promptly informed of the decision and he re-
ported to London the departure of the courier with instructions 
and money for Warsaw. He also noted the departure of couriers 
to Berlin and Saint Petersburg to ask the Prussian and Russian 
governments to advance troops to the Polish borders.8 
The agenda notes taken during the meeting of the Privy 
Council on 2 2 February do not reflect any actions taken, al-
though Prince Eugene, and counts Sinzendorff, Starhemberg, 
and Konigsegg were in attendance. But the French charge in 
Vienna had already reported on 11 February that the first order 
to nine imperial cavalry regiments had gone out and they were 
to be ready to march to the borders of Poland and Silesia. On 14 
February he reported that the War Council had sent the second 
order to the troops, along with 6oo,ooo florins needed to put 
them in condition to march on the third order. 9 
On 23 February Bartenstein gave Charles VI another long 
and detailed briefing on the Polish situation. 10 He noted that 
new information had come from Warsaw and began with the 
problem of estimating the support Stanislas might have and the 
means available to frustrate his candidacy. According to Barten-
stein there was no longer a danger of a declared succession 
based on the original election of Stanislas in 1705, but a no less 
dangerous situation was developing in that the approaching Pol-
ish Diet meeting, the so-called Convocation Diet, called for 27 
April 1733, would not be the usual assembly of nobles on horse-
back (Reichstag zu Pferd) but would include a great number 
of lesser landowners (Landbotten), who were generally favor-
able to Stanislas. There were also reports of a secret design by 
which they might proceed to the election of a new king at that 
time. 
The policy Bartenstein proposed was a difficult one to carry 
out as he and the emperor must have realized. In essence they 
called for a free election, while at the same time seeking to pre-
vent one, for a truly free election would obviously go to Stanis-
las. It was not as logically contradictory as it appears at first 
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glance, because the imperial position was that Stanislas was con-
stitutionally disqualified by the solemn proceedings attending 
his loss of the throne in 1709. But it was a difficult position to 
explain. 
Yet it does not seem to have been too difficult to explain to 
their English allies. The English did not blink at the Austrian 
concept of free elections. Harrington told Robinson: "You need 
make no scruple of assuring the imperial court that His Majesty 
approves most entirely their resolution promoting a new and 
free election and endeavoring to make the choice fall on such a 
person who may be unexceptionable both to the Polanders and 
to neighboring powers." Harrington added that the English resi-
dent in Warsaw had "the most positive orders to act in perfect 
concert with the ministers of the Empire," and went further to 
state that England did not wish to displease the French by open 
opposition to Stanislas and would thus confine the resident in 
Warsaw "to a secret and underhand opposition." 11 
But to go back to Bartenstein's briefing, he declared that it 
was not yet time to settle upon a candidate, nor to disclose inten-
tions toward the Infant of Portugal or the elector of Saxony. A 
proposal by Prince Lubomirski, the palatin of Cracow, to form a 
confederation in greater Poland, he saw as a favorable develop-
ment, although Lubomirski's desire to use goo imperial troops 
to assist him was to be rejected. The possibility of James Stuart's 
becoming a serious candidate did not seem either in the English 
or Habsburg interests but, he asked, should we bring it up hu-
morously with the English ambassador just to be sure there is 
nothing in the idea? 12 (Harrington's message of 20 March and 
other messages from the English court made it clear that support 
of the Pretender would have been considered a slap in the face of 
the English sovereign.) The emperor approved the briefing. 
His Imperial Majesty in Vienna then received a message on 
16 March signed by His Christian Majesty, the king of France, 
declaring that France would overlook the movement of troops 
already made by the emperor but that France would support the 
liberty of election in Poland. A similar message was sent to French 
embassies in other countries for communication to these govern-
ments.13 The imoortance of this declaration must not be under-
HABSBURG POSITION 33 
estimated. It was a statement declaring support by the strongest 
power in Europe for a principle, and it involved the king's own 
family. The implication that military force would be applied if 
necessary was inescapable, and it undoubtedly raised the hopes of 
supporters of Stanislas in Poland, perhaps more than was 
justified. The declaration brought forth from the emperor a re-
ply that by virtue of the pacta conventa Austria had for two cen-
turies maintained the freedoms of Poland. Further, the emperor 
noted that he was not obliged to give an accounting of his troops 
in Silesia, a hereditary state. 14 
The declaration of Louis XV had no noticeable effect upon 
the Austrian court. But rumors moved rapidly, and in Warsaw 
the Russian minister heard that the imperial court was in a "ter-
reur panique" over a report that a 1 2 ,ooo-man Swedish army in 
French pay was ready to be used in support of Stanislas. 15 
The difficulties for the Habsburg court in the Polish question 
continued to be reflected in the meetings of the Privy Council. 
The notes taken in the meeting of 2 3 March give us a view of 
Prince Eugene as chairman listening to the views of his three col-
leagues, Sinzendorff, Starhemberg, and Konigsegg. All of them 
find it difficult to accept the elector of Saxony but realize that 
they are gravitating in this direction for lack of a better position. 
Starhemberg and Konigsegg are willing to accept the elector but 
want his acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction and a binding alli-
ance as conditions. Sinzendorff seems to have had the greatest 
difficulty in accepting even the notion of another elector becom-
ing a king. But he also wondered whether, if the elector succeed-
ed without the emperor's help, this would not be even worse.16 
On 6 April a meeting of the same participants found them 
still baffied. They were now aware, and somewhat reassured by 
the knowledge, that the members of the Polish Diet had decided 
not to try to proclaim Stanislas king at the Convocation Diet in 
April, but they were frustrated by the need to respond to the di-
verging position of their allies Russia, Prussia, and England. 
Meanwhile the Saxon court was active. In March the elector 
sent two ministers to Vienna with a personal letter to Charles VI 
requesting his assistance in attaining the Polish throne and prom-
ising loyalty in the strongest terms. The Habsburg historian 
34 HABSBURG POSITION 
Arneth suggests that the acceptability of the Saxon approach was 
greatly improved by the fact that the new elector appeared to be a 
much weaker man than his father and would not understand how 
to use the crown of Poland to attack the hereditary lands of the 
emperor.U But apparently the court in Vienna was not imme-
diately convinced of this, and on 23 April the Privy Council was 
still discussing the position to be taken toward the Saxon minis-
ters.18 The hatred of the king of Prussia for his rival the elector of 
Saxony and some delay in communications with the Russians had 
put the Austrian court in an embarrassing situation. Bussy, the 
French charge in Vienna, reported this mixup with an obvious 
satisfaction, noting that as late as 1 April the Saxon ministers had 
had no conference with the imperial ministry. 19 
It was in the meeting of 23 April that the members of the 
Privy Council mentioned an item that would be of great impor-
tance in the outcome of the war, yet one that occasioned rela-
tively little discussion in the diplomatic correspondence of the 
major powers involved. This was the matter of Lorraine. Al-
though the transfer of Lorraine to France would represent the 
last sizable addition of territory to the French royal house, and 
would represent a mortifying loss to the duke of Lorraine, this 
matter was seldom mentioned until the peace negotiations be-
gan to take form in 1735. Did the Habsburgs fully realize that 
when the duke married the Habsburg heiress Maria Theresa 
and became emperor of the Holy Roman Empire they could not 
incorporate the territory of Lorraine into a Habsburg-Lorraine 
dynasty? Britain and Holland would frown and French territory 
almost completely surrounded the area. Were the Austrians re-
signed to this unpleasant fact and did they for this reason simply 
push it to the background of their discussions? 20 In this meet-
ing, however, during a discussion of relations with Holland, it 
was advanced, presumably by Prince Eugene, that Lorraine was 
of great importance for France and that France would probably 
bring out new conditions involving the duchy. Some weeks later, 
on 8 August, the French charge in Vienna reported that Count 
Starhemberg was convinced that France wanted war regardless 
of Poland and that the real reason was the impending marriage 
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of the duke of Lorraine.21 These statements are the exceptions. 
Still, in spite of the limited direct references it must be assumed 
that all sides were aware of the importance of this exposed 
province. 
So much for the reaction of the government in Vienna to the 
immediate succession problem-that is, how to deal with the 
elector of Saxony and the other candidates for the Polish throne. 
Now, while ~he French sought new allies with some success, the 
Austrians were forced to examine their standing alliances, and 
with less success. 
The Habsburg formulation of a diplomatic position was de-
monstrably more difficult than that of the French. The latter de-
cided what they wished to do and simultaneously sought allies. 
The court in Vienna found that it could not take a position with-
out the concurrence and support of its allies and was forced 
to reconsider its policies continuously. Although the extensive 
Habsburg holdings and the Holy Roman Empire, laid out on a 
map, suggest a great power dominating Italy and central Europe, 
the emperor's hereditary lands actually constituted a beleaguered 
dynastic state with uncertain allies, faithless imperialliegemen, 
and inadequate preparation for conflict with the strongest power 
on the continent. 
The English alliance was the most important for the emper-
or. But the days when Marlborough and Eugene were comrades-
in-arms against the French may have led the Habsburg court to 
expect too much of England. Although there was strong senti-
ment at the English court to support Austria, the government of 
England was firmly in the hands of Robert Walpole, a man who 
was as willing to restrain the hawks on his side of the Channel as 
the cardinal was in France, and, for the time being at least, was 
meeting with more success.22 Even the obvious readiness of 
George II, king of England and elector of Hanover, to offer 
himself as a field commander did not shake Walpole's determi-
nation to stay out of the war-indeed it may have reinforced it. 
The English design, in which they would be successful, was to 
defeat the French plan as thoroughly as they could but without a 
true commitment to war. 
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The Austrian minister in London, Count Philip Kinsky, wrote 
on 14 April1733 that in a written response the English ministers 
were very cautious but that in conferences they did not hesitate to 
say that they would regard an attack by France as a casus foederis. 
He wrote again on 17 April to note that in spite of French prepa-
rations for war, in London it was believed that it would all end in 
only "campmens." 23 This suggests that the English assurances 
were those diplomatic statements that are maintained so long as 
they do not have to be acted upon. 
The English ambassador in Vienna was told to state that En-
gland hoped force would not be used in Poland and to warn that 
if it were used England might not feel that its treaty obliged sup-
port of Austria. The instructions to Robinson made it quite clear 
that England would be very difficult to draw into a war as an ally 
of the emperor over the Polish question. Harrington observed 
that only in a case involving the very letter of the treaty would 
England be obliged to act. "You have already had assurances ... 
that in case of war upon account of Polish affairs nothing of that 
kind would be expected from His Majesty." 24 The English had 
already established a similar freedom of diplomatic movement 
regarding France in the talks between George II and Chavigny.25 
The emperor promised that his troops would not cross the fron-
tier and even began to withdraw some troops from Silesia in 
July.z6 
All this was quite clear to Bussy in Vienna. The English were 
forcing the emperor to come to terms with the Saxons. On 6 
May he reported that the English were in all the negotiations 
with Count Liitzelburg, the Saxon special emissary. 27 The Aus-
trian agenda notes of Privy Council meetings are sprinkled with 
the names of Robinson and Dieden, the British and Hanoverian 
ministers in Vienna. In the notes for the 23 April meeting, which 
considered the proposals of the Saxon ministers, a marginal addi-
tion indicates that England advised bringing in the Saxons.28 
On 16 July 1733 the emperor acquired, somewhat reluctant-
ly, a new ally when the treaty was signed between Austria and 
Saxony. The text, available in the French archives, specifies the 
emperor's help with 12 ,ooo men-S,ooo infantry and 4,000 cav-
alry-to assist the elector in his candidacy for the Polish throne. 
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The elector was to furnish 6,ooo troops with a similar propor-
tion of infantry and cavalry. The elector also agreed that after 
his election he would not seek to reduce the "liberties of Poland" 
and would ask for ratification of his election by the Polish Diet. 29 
The "liberties of Poland" at this time meant the rights of me-
dium-sized and large landowners to be unmolested by a central 
government authority. In addition the Pragmatic Sanction was 
accepted by the elector and the emperor gave up any claim he 
may have had to the bishoprics of Naumburg, Merseburg, and 
Meissen. 
This was a first step down a diplomatic road which the Vien-
nese court entered with unwillingness. They did not wish to be 
tied to the active support of the Saxon candidacy. As late as July 
there was a chance that just the threat of a Saxon invasion might 
cause the Poles to abandon their support of Stanislas. But it did 
not, and the next step was the threat of a Russian invasion. The 
final step would be the actual invasion by Russian and Saxon 
forces. The important part of the emperor's plan was that impe-
rial troops would not be committed. In such a case the emperor 
would be able to move some of his forces toward the West to face 
the French, while at the same time claiming that his hands were 
clean in Poland and that the French had insufficient cause to at-
tack him. 
After the agreement with Saxony the emperor needed an 
agreement with the Poles-that is, with those Poles who would 
support a Saxon candidacy. It was not difficult to achieve. On 22 
August a treaty was signed in Warsaw between the palatin of 
Cracow (Prince Lubomirski) and the representatives of Austria, 
Russia, and Saxony. The treaty was required, so states the text, 
by the palatin's consideration of the "imminent misfortunes 
which menace his country if Stanislas comes to the throne of Po-
land, by which the torch of war could be lighted over all Europe, 
especially in the North, and in which Poland would become the 
principal theater by the entry of the Turks and Tatars." 30 The 
threat from the infidel East was still worth mention in any ap-
peal to the Austrians, even though it would be the Turks from 
this time on who were threatened. 
The specific provisions of the treaty recognized that Lubo-
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mirski was to head a confederation that would do all in its power 
to put the elector of Saxony on the throne of Poland and would 
be reimbursed for its efforts. The reimbursement, and any in-
demnity for damages resulting from these efforts, would be 
guaranteed by the three signatory powers. With regard to Stan-
islas, all the signatories promised not to lay down their arms un-
til Stanislas was expelled from the country and the elector was in 
peaceful possession of the crown of Poland. 
From the emperor's point of view all this sounded very fine. 
But there was a missing signatory to the treaty. The treaty of 
1732 determining the succession in Poland, which was in process 
of ratification when the death of Augustus II occurred and was 
never in force, included Prussia. The new treaty mentioned that 
the elector of Saxony was acceptable to the emperor and the sov-
ereigns of Russia and Prussia, but there was no Prussian signa-
ture to the treaty nor any specific Prussian obligations. 
The understanding between Austria and Russia would be-
come the basic reason why the party of Stanislas would ultimate-
ly be defeated. The emperor had hoped, however, to have the 
full agreement of the king of Prussia as well. 
Frederick William I of Prussia is remembered as the father 
who forced his young son, who later became Frederick the Great, 
to assist at the execution of the son's companion in a juvenile esca-
pade. In the middle of 1733 he was in a sustained fury against the 
government of Holland, which had executed an overeager Prus-
sian recruiting officer who had sought to subvert the Maastricht 
garrison. The king had imprisoned Dutch officers and men in 
Prussian territory and threatened to execute them. A detailed 
briefing on the Prussian-Dutch matter was given the emperor on 
14 April1733.31 The king was in the wrong, and his high-handed 
recruiting methods had alienated his neighbors; still he expect-
ed his emperor to support him, and the emperor well knew that 
he competed with the French for the affections of the imperial 
princes great and small. 
Prince Eugene wrote a personal letter to the king in February 
1733, and correspondence between the two courts through 
Count Seckendorff, imperial minister in Berlin, continued 
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throughout most of the year. The king swung between declara-
tions of loyalty to the emperor and expressions of obvious mis-
trust. Probably the real trouble was the elevation of a hated rival 
house and the danger that the Saxon kingship in Poland would 
become hereditary. While Prussia would carry out her military 
obligations to the emperor when the war began, the king's atti-
tude toward Saxony became steadily more bitter. 32 
A fourth ally of the emperor-after England, Saxony, and 
Prussia-was Holland, usually referred to at the time as the 
States General. The Dutch states in this period had no true cen-
tral executive, or stadtholder, but were represented diplomati-
cally by an official at the Hague known as the high pensionary. 
On 13 July 1733 the emperor called the ministers of En-
gland, Prussia, Denmark, and Holland to a meeting to discuss 
whether they were ready to carry out their treaty commitments 
in case of war. All declared that in general their governments 
were ready to fulfill their obligations. However, the Dutch minis-
ter hoped the imperial troops would not enter Poland and that 
the emperor would seek to restrain the tsarina from sending 
troops into Poland. Further, he stated that the States General 
did not expect to enter the war unless they were themselves at-
tacked by France. 33 
The English were disturbed by the emperor's stripping the 
barrier fortresses between France and Holland of 10,000 men, a 
part of the 16,ooo he was obliged by the Peace of Utrecht to 
maintain there in peacetime. These troops had been moved into 
Luxembourg and the maritime powers, England and Holland, 
had been given to understand that they must take upon them-
selves the care of the barrier. The important fortresses of Mons, 
Ath, and Charleroi, which should have been garrisoned by im-
perial troops, were entirely defenseless. This exposed situation 
made the States General feel obliged, for their immediate securi-
ty, to enter into negotiations with the French minister at the 
Hague for a neutrality agreement by which they would not con-
cern themselves with the Polish election and France would agree 
not to carry the war into the Netherlands. This surprised the En-
glish, who sent Horatio Walpole to the Hague with instructions 
HABSBURG POSITION 
to divert if possible the States General from concluding what he 
termed a precarious neutrality with France.34 But Walpole found 
that matters had already gone too far before his arrival. In Au-
gust a Dutch proposal was submitted to French minister Fenelon 
on the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands, according to 
which, if the French would not attack the Austrian Netherlands, 
which constituted the barrier, the States General would continue 
their good offices to achieve a peaceful solution. If they were un-
able to do this they would seek to dispose the emperor not to 
attack France from the Netherlands, or in case such an attack 
were made, they would not supply him with troops.35 
A Dutch document in the French Foreign Office files indi-
cates that the French accepted the proposal. However, there 
was not a complete meeting of minds. Fenelon had received in-
structions from his government which dealt only with the bar-
rier area, whereas the States General were speaking of all the 
Netherlands, or Lowlands. The difference was, of course, Lux-
embourg, an imperial fortress city which the French did not 
wish to include in the area they agreed not to attack.36 As the 
Prussian foreign minister observed: "Voila une neutralite sans 
neutralite!" 37 
A fifth important ally for the emperor was Russia. Here the 
difficulties and delays in communication seemed more impor-
tant than possible differences. The death of Augustus II, ac-
cording to prior agreement, should have led to the candidacy of 
the prince of Portugal. As the emperor fell away from this posi-
tion, he had to communicate the fact to his Russian allies. Al-
ready on 7 March Bussy had heard that Vienna had proposed to 
the tsarina to annul the article of the treaty which stipulated op-
position to the elector of Saxony as a candidate. Then on 1 April 
Bussy reported that an express had come from Russia and that 
he was aware of the contents. The tsarina supported the emper-
or in his favoring the prince of Portugal, or any other, but she 
did not want the elector of Saxony or Stanislas. The court was 
embarrassed.38 
A further indication of the confusion came in a 27 March 
message from Count Wilczek in Warsaw stating that the Russian 
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minister was pressing for an understanding on what the tsarina 
should communicate to the Polish primate in writing.39 The min-
isters of the two powers were obviously working closely together: 
Lowenwolde, the acting Russian minister in Warsaw, reported to 
his government on 3 March that the Habsburg minister had 
shown him his instructions from Vienna. 40 But they were not nec-
essarily in agreement. In the emperor's briefing of 3 June we find 
that the two Lowenwolde brothers (the senior had returned to 
Warsaw to resume his duties as minister) can hardly conceal their 
distaste for the elector of Saxony, and the emperor's resident in 
Saint Petersburg reported that the Russian court wanted a more 
definitive support for the elector from the emperor. By 18 July 
they had it in the Austrian-Saxon treaty mentioned above. The 
emperor had little choice if he wished to deny the French a clear 
reason to attack him. Bussy understood this too and so reported 
to VersaillesY 
It was the best the emperor could do with the diplomatic and 
military resources at his disposal. He had not achieved either un-
derstanding or support in sufficient measure from his allies. 
Within the empire he did not know precisely how neutral many 
of the German states would be, but he could be sure that he 
would have no help at all-and conceivably active opposition-
from Bavaria, Cologne, and the Palatinate. Bavaria had not 
agreed to the Pragmatic Sanction and its monarch fancied him-
self a candidate for election, not for the throne of Poland, but, at 
an appropriate time, for the imperial crown. There was no male 
successor in the Habsburg line to succeed Charles VI and the 
choice of Habsburgs by the imperial electors was, after all, only a 
matter of custom. The remainder of the states hoped to remain 
neutral if there was any chance they would be in the area of mili-
tary operations. 
Braubach says flatly that the emperor allowed himself to be 
diplomatically isolated.42 The evidence supports this conclusion. 
After the emperor received an unmistakable warning of immi-
nent hostilities from France in August, he seemed to show some 
misgivings. The warning came from the French minister in 
Mainz to the elector there, who sent it next day to the emperor.43 
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A few days later the emperor wrote to Seckendorff in Berlin. "If 
Stanislas were not excluded by law and the nation was unani-
mously for him in a free election, we would place no obstacles in 
his path in spite of the prevailing considerations against his per-
son." 44 But it was too late to turn back. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Road to Danzig 
The diplomatic and military preparations of the French and 
Austrian governments had made the Polish election a matter af-
fecting the balance of power in Europe. But it was, after all, in 
Warsaw and Saint Petersburg that the definitive steps were taken 
which set the war in motion. 
Augustus II, Augustus the Strong, of the Saxon house of 
Wettin, had come to Warsaw for the convening of the Polish 
Diet. But the king had a gangrenous foot, and during the last 
days of January 1733 his Saxon court awaited his death. There 
was talk and rumor in the dying king's antechambers. One Pol-
ish magnate offered the Kalmuk chamberlain-who was himself 
a gift from Peter the Great, incidentally-1 ,8oo Spanish ducats 
to gain the king's ear. But the king refused an audience and de-
manded the right to die in peace. Augustus had lived a lusty and 
profligate life, siring several hundred progeny, and there was 
now a pious story that he had repented all and had described his 
life as one great sin. But the Russian charge, Lowenwolde, heard 
only that the king in his delirium had cried out several times "oh 
coquins" (rascals) with no indication of what was meant. 
The king died early in the morning of 1 February and the 
messages went out from Warsaw to the capitals of Europe. Low-
enwolde found himself somewhat inconvenienced by the event, 
for he had prepared a reception and dinner for the day honor-
ing a date in the reign of his sovereign, the tsarina. His guests 
excused themselves and Lowenwolde wrote a somewhat petu-
lant account to Saint Petersburg. Since the king's death had not 
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been publicly announced they might well have ignored it for the 
moment, thought the charge. In any case he told his guests when 
they excused themselves, "A live monarch is worth more than a 
dead king." 1 
Privy Councillor Briihl accepted the heart of the king, which 
was to be taken to Saxony and, on 19 February the Saxon court 
that had come to Warsaw with the king, numbering some 1,200 
persons, left for Dresden. The primate observed to Lowenwolde 
on this occasion: "At last we shall be rid of all those Saxons." 2 He 
was badly mistaken. 
The death of Augustus II made the primate of Poland, The-
odore Potocky, bishop of Gnesen, the interrex. To the extent 
that there was any central government in this land of great mag-
nates possessing tens of thousands of acres, the primate and a 
small senate of aristocrats and bishops held the executive power. 
A "Colloquio" of the senate on 6 and 7 February called for a Diet 
of Convocation to be held beginning 27 April. This meeting 
would be only to establish guidelines for the election and set an 
election date. But it would make the Austrian and Russian courts 
nervous since they feared it might abruptly resolve itself into a 
Diet of Election and elect a king, probably Stanislas, by acclama-
tion. Assuming that it did not attempt an election (and in fact it 
did not), a Diet of Election would be called, made up of represen-
tatives selected by the regional diets. These would come to War-
saw and elect a new king.3 Although the story of the election is 
marked by violence and extraordinary corruption, nevertheless 
certain constitutional provisions were carefully carried out. 
Primate Potocky, as noted earlier in the Bartenstein brief-
ings, was counted as pro-Stanislas, although he did not immedi-
ately reveal his position publicly. Bartenstein also described him 
as money-hungry, while Lowenwolde referred to him as crafty 
("listig"), at the same time observing that he was an old man, not 
very competent in the morning and much less so after midday. 
The whole Potocky family, thought Lowenwolde, was trying to 
stand between the two camps, while secretly favoring Stanislas.4 
Quite as important for the fortunes of Stanislas Leszczynski 
was the French ambassador in Warsaw, the marquis de Monti. A 
man of Italian origin, Monti had fought in the French army in 
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Italy under Vendome and had left the service with the rank of 
brigadier. The instructions given him when he took his post in 
1729 as representative in Dresden and Warsaw consisted mainly 
of guidance related to the possibility of Stanislas succeeding to 
the Polish throne. The instructions were specific and showed 
long-range planning and intentions. One may wonder, however, 
whether the personal character of Monti was not as important in 
the final outcome as any other single factor. Had Monti been less 
energetic or less zealous in his efforts, things might have gone 
otherwise. But Monti was a soldier serving his king. 
Monti's 1729 instructions were to make contact with the pri-
mate, but to do so cautiously. The primate, he was told, was for 
Stanislas, but Monti must think in terms of what might happen 
in case of a vacancy on the throne. By custom the Poles will sell 
their support to several candidates and it will not be possible to 
avoid some payment in advance, although this must be under-
taken very sparingly. For several reasons this election should not 
cost as much as the effort to elect the prince de Conti in 1697. 
And it will be necessary to have an election; it will not suffice to 
assume that Stanislas is still legally king. If the primate will agree 
to an election by acclamation-that is, one in which the mem-
bers of the Diet of Election will have the authority to choose a 
king without referring the decision back to their provinces-this 
could be accomplished before the Saxons would have time to 
form a party. And remember, while it may be thought that France 
will support Stanislas, it is another thing so to state. These in-
structions should be kept very close. Among the members of the 
diplomatic corps only the Swedish minister may be confided in. 
Remain with the king of Poland in Dresden and go into Poland 
only when with him. Thus the burden of the instructions given to 
Monti.5 
Monti had accompanied the king and court to Poland for the 
meeting of the Diet and was therefore ready to begin the execu-
tion of his instructions without delay. Had he been in Dresden 
his appearance on the scene in Warsaw would certainly have 
been delayed and perhaps not even possible had the Saxons 
wished to prevent it. 
Monti's message after the death of the king was dated that 
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same day, 1 February 1733. It reflects the strange and chaotic 
situation in Warsaw. 
The confusion is going to be very great in the kingdom, especially dur-
ing a time of the Diet, and the animosity among the families goes be-
yond any description. Everyone wants to be the general; everyone will 
seek to detach troops from the army and everything will be in disorder. 
Already the primate, hungry for money, said that he was astonished 
that the ambassador of France had not spoken to him since the ministers 
of other powers here had already made proposals to him. 
Monti went on to say that he had as yet no orders. He did not 
believe that Stanislas could be accepted by acclamation. It was 
not necessary to act immediately on money questions since the 
one who gives last is right. Because of the great luxury that 
reigns in Warsaw, however, large sums of money would be need-
ed. Monti then went on to discuss the candidates, much as Bar-
tenstein would do in a few days in Vienna.6 
The English representative, George Woodward, reported 
that it was impossible to "make any judgment how the Poles are 
inclined as to an election, for all the wise people keep their 
thoughts very private and will have good reasons before they de-
clare themselves." A few days later he reported that the general 
bent of the nation was for Stanislas, but this must be encouraged 
by goodly sums of money. His reports did not seem to excite 
much interest in London except that he was told to make a 
strong representation against the Pretender as a candidate. 7 
Among the interested observers of the situation developing 
in Warsaw were the principal officials of the Russian court at 
Saint Petersburg-at that time several Germans who enjoyed 
the confidence of the tsarina. The first was Count Biron, a Livo-
nian of low birth who was the Tsarina Anna's paramour. The 
British resident at Saint Petersburg, after nearly three years 
there, stated that the tsarina was absolutely governed by her fa-
vorite, Count Biron, the two counts Lowenwolde, and Baron Os-
terman.8 The resident seemed to find Lowenwolde the elder an 
agreeable contact, mentioning him as his "particular friend." He 
described this count as a former chamberlain to the king of 
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Prussia and noted that he governed Biron as Biron governed the 
tsarina.9 Osterman he found less agreeable, describing him as a 
Westphalian who was taken into the service of a Dutch admiral 
as a valet de chambre and became his secretary by reason of pro-
ficiency in languages. "He is full of finesse and artifice, false and 
treacherous in his deportment, submissive and insinuating with 
low cringings and bowings which is reckoned the best policy 
among the Russians wherein he outdoes all the natives." 10 
The French resident in Saint Petersburg observed as early as 
28 February that the Polish problem completely absorbed the at-
tention of the ministry.U It must have been the same, or nearly 
so, in most of the other capitals. In the meantime, Poland was 
uneasy. Acts of violence began to occur. Wilczek reported a skir-
mish in Sandomir and another in Grodno in March. 12 But the 
Poles insisted on the observance of certain constitutional func-
tions despite the obvious fact that they were not truly masters of 
their own destiny. Indeed, it may have been the very realization 
of this which impelled them to stress the juridical character of 
their actions in the midst of chaotic rule and foreign intrigue. 
The primate had been given some assurance by the declara-
tion of the king of France on 16 March 1733. On 14 April the 
emperor addressed a message to the primate in Latin, the lan-
guage of official acts in Poland at that time, reminding him that 
during the past year when the liberty of Poland was in peril the 
primate himself and others had asked the emperor to defend it. 
He had always been a good neighbor and a faithful ally, pro-
tested the emperor, and he wished to gain no advantages. He too 
supported the free election, he said, but he was in agreement 
with his allies who had troops on the Polish borders. There was 
no mention of Stanislas by nameY 
The primate did not answer immediately. He was doubtless 
sufficiently occupied with the Diet of Convocation which con-
vened on 27 April and continued through twenty-seven sessions 
until 23 May, at which time it resolved itself into a general con-
federation, a constitutionally recognized creature. The "Con-
federation of the States of Poland and Lithuania" on 23 May 
swore to elect a Pole, one having no territories outside Poland, 
and to use all its force against a foreign prince.14 The primate 
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assumed credit for this in his publication of the "universals" 
which announced the Diet of Election to be held in September: 
"I succeeded in ending this Diet with a confederation to ban 
from future elections the intrigues and machinations of foreign 
powers." 15 He added another hopeful statement: "I was the first 
to swear the oath, in order to give an example to others, in the 
belief that the nobility and all those to whom it pertained, would 
have no difficulty in swearing a similar oath which excluded any 
foreigner from the throne." 
On 13 June the primate responded to the emperor's warn-
ing. "The Republic should not imagine that it had anything to 
fear on the part of its neighbors; it does not believe that it has 
offended any." Your reign, he told the emperor, will be more 
glorious for having kept the liberties of the kingdom and univer-
sal peace. 16 
This polite fencing continued with another letter from the 
emperor on 13 July. There was still no mention of Stanislas by 
name, but there was no mistaking the growing concern in the 
emperor's tone. He warned again of those who sought disorder 
under the pretext of valid counsels. 17 
In the meantime the primate was writing to other nations for 
support as well as carrying on a written dialogue with the Aus-
trian representative in Warsaw similar to that which passed be-
tween him and the emperor. He wrote also to Ali Pasha, grand 
vizier at Constantinople, and received the desired reply that the 
Porte would never consent to the suppression of Polish liberty.18 
There was less fencing in the letter from the tsarina to the 
primate. She noted the violence that had taken place at the Diet 
of Convocation in April. Although she emphasized freedom of 
election, she also noted that Stanislas was excluded in perpetuity 
by law and was a declared enemy of the country, recognized as 
constitutionally incapable by the "oath of the whole nation and 
of your own in particular." Efforts to place Stanislas on the Pol-
ish throne were described as an effort to break the peace be-
tween Poland and Russia and thus Russia might use the force 
necessary to sustain the laws and liberty of the Polish Republic. 19 
There was also no mistaking the meaning of the declaration 
made by Monti on 4 September, during the Diet of Election, but 
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as we shall see, he was unable to bring his country to carry it out. 
Monti promised a great deal to the not-yet-elected king of Po-
land. "The king, my master, promises to support him, not only 
effectively and with all the forces which God has confided to him 
but, beyond this, if the neighboring powers of the republic wish 
to attack him by reason of this election, the king, my master, 
promises to place in my hands, from the sums drawn from his 
own coffers, what will be needed to augment the army of there-
public."20 
Monti had not gone beyond his guidance; similar assurances 
were being made and would be made in the future. But this was 
to be another in the series of assurances that would not be car-
ried out. 
The many reports of money paid to influence the Polish elec-
tion give alternately the impression that what is known is only 
the tip of the iceberg or that enormous exaggerations are the 
rule. Doubtless we can never know the complete story of the 
money payments. But there are enough reports to assure that 
Poland became a kind of sink for money during the preelection 
period and that the interested powers were well aware that the 
Polish magnates accepted money freely from all sides. 
The French paid their money through Monti. Although Car-
dinal Fleury was famous for his economies, the Council of State 
as early as 25 February agreed to send 1.6 million livres in what 
Villars called the "voie Ia plus sure avec les Polonais." The news 
of the payment apparently did not take long to reach Vienna, 
for Bussy reported in March that the court there had heard that 
a million ecus had been sent to Monti to put Stanislas on the Pol-
ish throne. If one accepts the usual rate of three ecus to the livre, 
it was a figure not too far from that determined in the council. 
This was not all, of course, and we are told that by April the 
French had sent 3 million livres.21 
The French were also ready to use money rather directly in 
the Russian court. During the first part of 1733, or possibly even 
earlier, French resident Magnan in Saint Petersburg was attempt-
ing to negotiate with the court on contingencies that would follow 
a vacancy on the Polish throne. A present of 10o,ooo ecus was 
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offered to Biron. Osterman, the foreign minister, objected on the 
grounds that it would compromise his relations with Vienna.22 
Perhaps Osterman thought Biron was doing too well, for there is 
evidence the latter acquired considerable wealth in his service to 
the tsarina.23 
Further evidence of French money in Poland is noted in the 
11 April report of Magnan. Field Marshal Burkhard Muennich, 
the assistant to Osterman, had complained to Magnan that the 
sums of money the French had put into Warsaw and Danzig 
tended to contradict the principle of a free election. Magnan did 
not say that he protested the statement.24 
Money was a painful problem for the Habsburgs.' The French 
and English, great trading nations, were able to use subsidies 
throughout Europe to further their diplomacy. Spain had known 
great wealth in earlier days and still drew funds from her colo-
nies, although not in a measure to support an aggressive foreign 
policy. But the Habsburgs and their inland empire were always 
hard put to find money. The Austrian possessions in Italy were 
under pressure from the Spanish, and the English had forced the 
Austrian-supported Ostend trading company in the Netherlands 
to be closed. The emperor was thrown back upon his own re-
sources-the Habsburg family lands, with their income largely in 
the hands of the great magnates who guarded their rights and 
estates against his encroachment, and the states of the empire 
from whom he could only beg money and troops. Of course there 
was borrowing, and the Habsburgs had done a great deal of it. 
The failure of the Habsburgs in the time of Philip II to repay the 
Fuggers brought that great house into its decline. 
The impressive boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire and 
the lands of the house of Habsburg emcompassed most of the 
population of central Europe. But the emperor was financially 
strained to put even a few thousand troops in the field-that is, 
to field an army in addition to maintaining his garrison troops 
throughout his lands and the fortresses of the empire. It was 
reported to require 6oo,ooo florins to prepare the troops for ac-
tion in accordance with the decision of the War Council in Feb-
ruary. In July, French charge Bussy learned that 6oo,ooo florins 
had been borrowed in Silesia at g percent.25 
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By September it was obvious that urgent preparations were 
necessary and that greater sums must be considered. It was re-
ported that the emperor was forced to send a million florins to 
Saint Petersburg to reimburse the tsarina for the troops he did 
not furnish. The payment was to be the equivalent.26 By October 
the war had begun and the emperor found that although the 
states of the empire would vote to support him by a majority 
vote in the Diet at Regensburg, they looked to him to furnish the 
money to set their forces in motion to join with his own. Through-
out the fall he struggled with the question. The king of Prussia, 
who had an alliance with the emperor, did not furnish money, 
and the smaller German states took the lead from his behavior. 
The emperor was able to draw considerable sums from the 
Church and from various rich nobles, all in the inner Habsburg 
lands, who came forth to pay additional taxes. But it was not 
enough and eventually a property tax was needed.27 In the mean-
time loans were sought. The French charge in Vienna heard in 
October that the court had settled on a figure of 15 million florins 
required and intended to raise this by contributions of 5 million 
from Bohemia, 2.5 million from Moravia, 3 million from the sil-
ver mines in Silesia, 2 million from Naples, 1 million from the 
Bank of Vienna, and 1.5 million from cutting pensions in half.28 
And in what sounds like a sequel to the problems of Philip II, it 
was reported that the "famous" Jew Wersheim declared bank-
ruptcy. The court in Vienna owed him 1.8 million florins, Count 
Sinzendorff go,ooo, the electors of Bavaria and Cologne 3 mil-
lion. The bankruptcy was for 6 million. The Chamber of Finance 
denied the debt, but Wersheim was to be given safe conduct! 29 
As for the Russians, the younger Lowenwolde wrote from 
Warsaw on 13 February that there were only three means at 
hand to be used in the Polish situation-money, force, or both 
together, and in full measure. He lost no time in telling his sov-
ereign that money would be needed before the opening of the 
Diet of Convocation and thought it wise to have 1 oo,ooo thaler 
on hand by that time. Because of the lack of security on the 
roads he suggested that it be sent to Warsaw with a troops of 20 
to 30 dragoons who might come on the pretext of being a guard 
for the minister. 30 
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Others at the Russian court also seemed ready to accept 
money from the emperor-that money which was so hard for 
him to find. Bartenstein proposed in his briefing of 18 September 
that the brother of Count Osterman be given the title of imperial 
councillor and a yearly pension of 2,ooo florins. 31 At least this 
type of payment would not require immediate heavy outlays. 
So, with the money flowing from Paris and Vienna into War-
saw and Saint Petersburg, the Poles act out the drama of the 
election. 
There was initially some hope by the French that Stanislas 
could be acclaimed king at the Diet of Convocation. Monti was 
asked by Chauvelin to "do the impossible" and have it occur at 
that time since things would become uncertain if it were dragged 
out.32 When this could not be accomplished the French looked 
forward to winning the election as the alternative. 
The role of Monti is so prominent it sometimes appears that 
the later difficulties were due in great part to his overzealous ac-
tions. But the evidence suggests that Monti was only reflecting 
the attitude of his superiors, and he may have represented a rel-
atively cautious element. For example, in May he suggested that 
if Stanislas came to Poland it should be by entry into a port near 
Danzig to see how things would turn out. This, he pointed out, 
would preclude the possibility of his being in Poland without as-
sistance-an eventuality that actually occurred. But Monti left it 
to the French court to decide whether Stanislas should come by 
land or by a naval squadron. It is uncertain when the final deci-
sion was made, but a clue is the strong approach made to the 
English in late June. Chauvelin asked Chavigny to demand an 
unequivocal statement of friendship. It was apparently a last at-
tempt to allow the English to change their effective but unstated 
opposition. "We will regard any equivocal response as a proof of 
the information we have received." 33 Of course the English 
made no such commitment and the French thus could not con-
sider the Baltic a safe area. Stanislas would travel by land. 
Stanis las had warmed quickly to the idea of becoming king of 
Poland once again. In letters to Marshal Du Bourg he revealed 
that he had information from Poland which led him to great ex-
ROAD TO DANZIG 53 
pectations. He then began to write letters to Poland, to the great 
annoyance of Monti, who wrote to him: "I beg Your Majesty to 
write no further letters and let me act." Stanislas answered that 
he would not comply with this "unless required by the cardinal 
or the keeper of the seals" (Chauvelin). Monti also complained 
to Chauvelin: "It is desirable that King Stanislas does not write 
at all but one may not hope for this. Poland is awash with his 
letters." 34 
Despite this aggressiveness on the part of Stanislas while he 
lived at Chambord, Boye notes that he became suddenly quiet 
when he was told that he would travel alone to Poland.35 Had he 
expected to arrive at the head of a French army? 
It appeared logical that Stanislas would not attempt to cross 
Europe through Prussian or Saxon territory but would try to en-
ter through the port of Danzig, a semiautonomous city in Po-
land. The French did nothing to correct this notion but set about 
devising the scheme described in chapter 1. 
One of the more incredible footnotes to this journey was the 
apparently careless manner in which Cardinal Fleury passed on 
the information of Stanislas's voyage to the king of Sardinia in a 
letter written only two days after the secret departure. "King 
Stanislas left the day before yesterday in the night, disguised and 
accompanied by three trusted men, to go by land to Warsaw, 
where we hope he will arrive within two weeks .... His depar-
ture is an absolute secret from everyone, even from members of 
the king's council." 36 
The interception of diplomatic and military communications 
was a fairly frequent occurrence. Such behavior on the part of 
the cardinal supports the story of his lack of enthusiasm for the 
whole project. Did the cardinal have a plan to put into action 
had Stanislas fallen into enemy hands-possibly a plan to avert 
the approaching war? 
The Diet of Election had convened in Warsaw on 25 August. 
Its constitutional life, according to customary law, was six weeks, 
after which it would automatically dissolve. Stanislas was in War-
saw by 1 o September and on the next day the primate took de-
finitive action on the electoral plain at Wola. He got on his horse 
and made a tour of the field in a driving rain, passing before the 
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representatives of the palatinates, then among the 6o,ooo no-
bles. Of each he demanded the choice of a king. Several opposed 
Stanislas. He stopped for the night and began again the next day 
with the throng becoming more violent. Finally the marshal of 
the Diet, Radzewski, called for a vote on the spot. A noble named 
Kaminski uttered the fatal word "Veto" but on questioning re-
vealed that he was not against Stanislas but simply wished the 
election deferred and retracted his veto. Then, three times, at 
quarter-hour intervals, the marshal of the Diet asked if the 
members would accept Stanislas as king. He was elected by 
acclamation. 37 
It was very probably, as Boye said, "an irreparable impru-
dence." The nobles thought in terms of national pride and were 
challenging both Russia and Austria. The election was only an 
appearance of strength; the primate had appealed to them on a 
higher plane: "The Republic has only to invoke the assistance of 
heaven by a unanimous decision and I assure you that it will not 
permit a hair of our heads to be harmed. It is not the first time 
that threats have been made to the homeland but thanks to the 
grace of God, they have never been carried out." He went on to 
say the nation was assured of being under the protection of the 
"roi des rois." 38 
In fact the nobles would all return to their estates after the 
election. The few regular troops would be mostly on the fron-
tiers under one or another of the greater magnates. There would 
be no one to fight for the republic. The adversaries of Stanislas 
had been more or less outshouted at Wola, but even earlier, on 8 
and g September, one of the princes Wiesnowicki had given the 
signal for revolt. A group under the leadership of Prince Lubo-
mirski left the electoral camp and went to the other side of 
the Vistula. Count Wilczek wrote that following the election of 
Stanislas, which involved violence against foreign ministers and 
against "well-intentioned" Poles, "many thousands" left the elec-
toral camp to join Lubomirski, including the Wiesnowicki broth-
ers and the bishop of Posnan. 39 
The Russians, who had already begun their invasion of Lith-
uania, thus had a confederation in Warsaw, one which had asked 
for their protection. Doubtless they would have invaded without 
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this, but there was a case for constitutionality in the formation of 
a confederation during an interregnum. The theory was that the 
powers given the elected king were returned to the Polish nation 
upon his death. Until a new king was elected, the formation of a 
party by leading citizens was regarded as constitutionally legal. 
Osterman placed some importance on the notion when he wrote 
in August: "A confederation, however large or small it may be at 
first, will give the affair a great deal of weight, and will grow 
stronger after the intervention of the troops." 40 
Bartenstein, preparing his presentation for the emperor on 
18 September for a Privy Council meeting on the nineteenth, 
wondered whether the leaders of the rump confederation in 
Warsaw would proclaim the elector of Saxony king of Poland as 
they had indicated they wished to do. He also brought several 
other problems forward. It was possible that the French would 
use the nonrecognition of Stanislas as a pretext for a break in 
relations with Vienna. Another problem was that the elector 
might wish to enter Poland with more than 6,ooo Saxon troops. 
There were 6,ooo imperial troops in Gross-Glogau near the Pol-
ish border, and the elector might insist that the emperor provide 
as many men as the elector was prepared to commit. Bartenstein 
hoped the imperial troops would not be needed at all and could 
be used to strengthen the camp at Pilsen. But, he admitted, if the 
elector did not invade at all it might be up to the emperor to 
send in his own troops. This might come about if there were no 
proclamation in favor of the elector by the Lubomirski con-
federation.41 
It is clear that the Austrian position was militarily unsound. 
The Pilsen camp was a kind of halfway camp between Poland 
and the Rhine, but it was still a very great distance from the 
Rhine and an attack by the French from that quarter was every 
day more threatening. The emperor was probably not yet fully 
aware that he was to be diplomatically isolated in a few weeks or 
months, nor that he was well on the way toward having his only 
field forces north of the Alps misplaced at the outset of hostilities. 
Therefore the Austrians were dependent upon the Russian 
invasion and found themselves in the strange and uncomfort-
able position of chafing at the slowness of the Russian army ap-
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proaching Poland. In the 25 September briefing of the Privy 
Council it was suggested that Field Marshal Muennich might se-
cretly have placed obstacles in the way of more rapid movement, 
or even that the Russian court was playing false. They were 
probably relieved by the message of 3 October from the Aus-
trian charge in Saint Petersburg, who wrote that the Russian 
army had been held up by bad weather and a bad road.42 
What were the French doing in Saint Petersburg to prevent 
this slow but certain movement of Russian forces toward the dis-
organized forces of the Republic of Poland? In fact they had 
been busy during all of 1733. Magnan had been given full powers 
even before the death of Augustus II to conclude an alliance. His 
instructions after the death of the king were "to engage the 
tsarina indirectly to take no part in the Polish election and par-
ticularly to prevent her from using Russian troops." 43 But it was 
not an agreeable task in a court where he found that all the for-
eign representatives were pro-Russian or pro-Austrian, with the 
possible exception of the Swedish representative. Despite the fact 
that Magnan's negotiations were principally through the sym-
pathetic Field Marshal Muennich, who had served in French arm-
ies, he made little headway. He believed that Muennich had tried 
to change the views of the tsarina but that Osterman and Biron 
had much greater influence. It even appeared that Muennich's 
known friendly attitude toward France was causing him difficul-
ties. By April, Magnan heard rumors that Muennich was being 
paid by France and that his disgrace was expected. He also heard 
that the ministers about the tsarina had given her the impression 
that the election of Stanislas would plunge Russia into war. 44 
Sweden was a cautious ally for France, by this time too weak to 
be useful to France but still strong enough to be disliked by Rus-
sia. Magnan found that the Russian court would oppose by force 
the election of anyone who was friendly to France or Sweden. The 
Swedish resident kept his distance from Magnan, telling him that 
he had no instructions and making the unlikely statement that he 
was not following the Polish affair closely.45 
The Russian position became clearer each day. Magnan called 
attention in Versailles to the movements of Russian troops to em-
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phasize the firmness of their stance. On the surface the amenities 
were still observed. A letter passed from the tsarina to the king of 
France on 21 June congratulating him on the birth of a child. On 
the other hand, the ministry at Versailles during this same month 
ordered Magnan to return to France and he left on 4 July. His 
successor, Villardeau, continued the representation but, in keep-
ing with the custom of the Russian court, could not act as a 
charge d'affaires and had no right to correspond with the Rus-
sian ministers. He observed that he was no more than a consul. 
He continued to report the preparations for war, however. He 
heard that incoming and outgoing communications were being 
examined, and that Marshal Muennich was no longer in the war 
councils and had been sent off to visit fortifications.46 
The French diplomatic effort then switched out of the nor-
mal channels, forfeited by the departure of Magnan, and was di-
rected by Monti through a Polish representative. The primate in 
his statement to the Diet of Election announced that he had sent 
Rudomina, the chamberlain of Bracklaw, to Saint Petersburg. 
The chamberlain's reputed skill, good intentions, and credit 
with the Russian court made the primate hope that the mission 
would succeed and that he would return with peace. The British 
representative on 4 July noted the presence of a Polish envoy in 
Saint Petersburg named Rudomina whose mission was to per-
suade the tsarina not to send troops into Poland.47 
Villardeau was puzzled by Rudomina, the more so when he 
found him apprehensive for his own safety. So we may assume 
that Villardeau was not aware of all that was taking place.48 The 
envoy who was kept informed was the British minister, who was 
told by Osterman that the French had offered Russia an alliance 
which would also involve the allies of France, and that Monti 
would come to Saint Petersburg as ambassador if there were any 
chance of its success. The proposals made through Rudomina 
were the following, according to the British representative: 
1) the French and Poles would, after the election of Stanislas, 
·persuade the Turks and Swedes to conclude a defensive alliance 
with Russia; 2) Courland would be allowed to elect another duke 
following the death of the current sovereign; 3) Poland would 
give up its pretensions to Livonia; 4) the frontiers between Rus-
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sia and Poland would be "wasted" for a space of 30 to 40 miles; 
5) a considerable sum of money would be paid Count Biron.49 
The French proposals reflect, beyond the requirement to satisfy 
Count Biron, the concern of the Russians and Austrians over 
their uneasy border with the Ottoman Empire. In past confron-
tations France had not overlooked this area as a means of plac-
ing pressure on both Austria and Russia, and the War of the 
Polish Succession would mark another attempt, this one unsuc-
cessful. As early as October 1 730 Chauvelin had alerted French 
Ambassador Villeneuve in Constantinople that the French gov-
ernment would do all possible for Stanislas when the Polish 
throne became vacant.50 Villeneuve set about organizing sup-
port among the Tatar tribes in the Black Sea area. In the spring 
of 1733 he attempted to raise a Tatar army through subsidies 
and was told by the end of August that two Tatar forces, one to 
move against the Ukraine, the other against the Caucasus, were 
ready to take his orders. At the same time he had solicited a 
strong statement from the Turks regarding the Polish election, 
as the primate had done. It was all too good to be true. Ville-
neuve was unable to bring the Tatars to action and found that 
the Turks had turned cold on the Tatar plan, with the sultan or-
dering the Tatars not to attack. It may be that the French had 
oversold the menace of a Russian threat to the Turks. They had 
pointed out that Russia had dismembered Sweden, would dis-
member Poland, and then do the same to the Ottoman Empire. 
In response the Turks began to talk of a grand alliance with 
France. Alas, a major alliance with an infidel nation was not ac-
ceptable to the cardinal. In addition, the Turks were at war with 
Persia and experienced a setback in the fall of 1733.51 Thus the 
attempt of the French to bring a live force against the Russian 
rear was a failure. 
A successful Tatar expedition against the Russian frontiers 
might have embarrassed the Russian court and given some addi-
tional negotiating leverage to France. The failure of the plan 
made Magnan's efforts to reach an understanding in Saint Pe-
tersburg quite impossible. The Russians noted with suspicion 
the movement of a Turkish diplomat through Poland in March, 
his two- or three-hour conference with Monti, and his passage 
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on to Sweden by way of Danzig.52 The Austrians too were sus-
picious that Stanislas and the French were ready to use the 
Turks against Christian countries, an item pointed out in Bar-
tenstein's 23 February briefing. In Saint Petersburg the French 
representatives picked up what information they could of the 
Turkish-Persian struggle, realizing that Turkish success was to 
French advantage. Villardeau heard of a Turkish success in Oc-
tober, adding that Russian generals had been sent to Persia in an 
attempt to prevent a Persian-Turkish peace.53 But despite a con-
siderable volume of reporting and what must have been an ex-
pensive long-term effort by the French, the Turkish presence 
and Turkish actions do not seem to have affected materially the 
decisions in Saint Petersburg or Vienna in 1733. 
The critical decision of the Russians to enter troops into Po-
land was evidently made in a lively meeting on 10 July with the 
tsarina and all the former councillors of state in attendance. The 
question was whether the Russian intervention was to wait until 
the election of Stanislas occurred, not whether the intervention 
should take place. The group proposing premature movement 
carried the day, but Villardeau, reporting the meeting, was not 
convinced that they would move quickly. This information he 
passed on to Monti on 14]uly.54 
The Russians-Muscovites, as many called them-moved 
slowly, as we have seen, but by 5 October an army under Irish-
born General Peter Lacy was across the Vistula from Warsaw. 
Shortly before their arrival they had been joined by those Poles 
who were Saxon sympathizers, and when they reached the plain 
of Praga, near the village of Kamien, and near where Henry of 
Valois was elected in 1573, an election was held. The election 
could not be put off, because the constitutional period of six 
weeks for a Diet of Election was about to expire. The Russians, 
according to one account, withdrew a certain distance to give the 
appearance of a free election. Prince Lubomirski harangued the 
assembly. After the name of Augustus III had been applauded, 
the bishop of Posnan declared him king of Poland and duke of 
Lithuania. From the city of Warsaw, Woodward heard the firing 
and bell ringing that attended the proclamation. 5 5 
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On the west side of the Vistula it was called an election under 
duress. A letter purportedly from Lacy to Osterman described 
the method used to bring about unity among the Polish mag-
nates. "The Polish nobles being divided among themselves on 
the choice of a candidate, I persuaded them by promises, and 
still more by threats, to confer the crown on the elector of Sax-
ony." Perhaps this is what Prince Lubomirski meant when he 
wrote to the tsarina on that same day stating that in a free elec-
tion "under the auspices of your army" we chose the elector of 
Saxony to be king of Poland.56 
General Lacy then crossed into Warsaw. A great many had 
left the city, and there had been a general breakdown of order 
with scattered violence amid efforts to raise troops. An attack 
had been made on the home of the Saxon minister, and the Rus-
sian and imperial ministers were under siege in their homes.57 
The bridges had been destroyed, and Lacy was forced to build 
boat bridges and cross under artillery fire from the palatin of 
Kiev, who had mustered a force of 8,ooo men. The Russians re-
portedly lost 6oo men who fell on the spot, with a larger number 
drowned and 400 taken prisoner. Nevertheless the Russian force 
crossed the Vistula and entered Warsaw on 1 o October. 58 
Stanis las had departed on 2 2 September for Danzig, arriving 
on 2 October.59 The primate and Monti were in his party. Lacy 
levied contributions on the city of Warsaw and notified Danzig 
that if Stanislas were not expelled he would bombard and be-
siege the city with 3o,ooo men. 60 Lacy did not have the 3o,ooo 
men, however, as he came into Warsaw. The imperial minister, 
Count Wilczek, appears to have been counting the Russian 
troops carefully as they entered. On 2 November he noted that 
the Smolensk corps was approaching, although most of its infan-
try had been left behind on orders of Lowenwolde to garrison 
Lithuanian cities. Tpe troops that had already arrived, Wilczek 
noted, were being reequipped, and as soon as the rest arrived a 
decision was to be made as to which would remain in Warsaw 
and which go to Cracow or Danzig. Wilczek also heard that the 
corps had skirmished with a party of Polish irregulars, about 
2,ooo of whom had remained on the other side of the river.61 As 
the Smolensk corps came into Warsaw on 11 November he re-
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ported a total of 6,850 men, having counted them himself, and 
noted that supplies were moving slowly. Although the men had 
passed through in several hours, the supplies were still moving 
for two days in the two-wheeled "moscowitschen Wagerln." Fur-
ther movements of the army may be delayed, wrote Wilczek.62 
The Russian troops had been dispersed in Poland as an oc-
cupying force and it was many weeks before Lacy was able to as-
semble a force of from 12,ooo to 15,000 and appear before the 
city of Thorn on 16 January 1734. Thorn opened its gates and 
received a Russian garrison. But it was not until February that 
the Russians approached the city of Danzig. The French would 
soon be faced with the problem of whether they should try to 
relieve a besieged city. 
After one of the longest peaceful periods among the nations 
of western Europe the flame of war was once again ignited. The 
intervention of the Russian army in Poland and the departure of 
Stanislas for Danzig signaled a new situation, although not one 
to be regarded as profoundly affecting the existence of the na-
tions involved or their societies. Preparations had been made by 
the several courts and the diplomatic play carefully completed. 
An unmistakable final warning had been given by the king of 
France. When it became obvious that the Russians intended to 
use force to overthrow the election, the French decision was 
made. The king wrote to Monti that he intended to support at 
any price the free election and to show that his promise of a 
powerful protection to the Poles was not in vain. The same cou-
rier who carried the dispatch to him in Warsaw, he told Monti, 
also carried the orders to Marshal Berwick in Strasbourg to at-
tack the fortress at Kehl and establish bridges over the Rhine.63 
There were no real surprises; the formalities complete, the war, 
at some undetermined level of violence, would follow. Limiting 
factors arose either from the nature of the societies of eigh-
teenth-century Europe or from tacitly agreed upon conventions. 
The war was, of course, among courts rather than among or 
between peoples, and the diplomatic correspondence reflects 
this clearly. The diplomatic conversations and the meetings of 
the highest councils show an attempt to justify their positions, 
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and sometimes an indignation at the moves of an opponent. But 
the indignation lacks the ferocious righteousness and certitude 
that attended the religious wars of a century before-and would 
attend the great struggles of the twentieth century. The old no-
tion of just war in the Middle Ages had not survived the reli-
gious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, if indeed 
it could be said to have been present at that time. Moral indigna-
tion had taken on a juridic tone. Chauvelin protested to Villars 
in a council meeting against a suggested course of action: "But 
you declare yourself the aggressor!" 
Yet the broader notion of aggressive warfare, as developed in 
the twentieth century, had not emerged. The nation was not at 
war, but rather the court, and the dynastic claims that evolved, 
various and complex as they were, provided only a basis for 
juridic anger and legal abomination. The interlocking family sit-
uations of the princely houses of Europe permitted almost any 
claim to be made, and the dynastic rivalry fell neatly into this le-
galistic pattern. 
A major power then was less concerned about the possible 
capture of its capital or the overthrow of its society. Its army 
might be defeated, but neither the army nor the state would 
likely be destroyed. Except for a temporary seizure of Berlin by 
Russian forces in the Seven Years' War, no major capitals were 
taken in the eighteenth century before the French Revolution. 
Clausewitz's famous remark that war is a continuation of politics 
by other means, written in the nineteenth century and reflecting 
the effect of the Napoleonic wars, is a far more reasonable obser-
vation for the eighteenth century. 
In this period the danger of a war based on moral justifica-
tion, or crusade, and of the excesses that might be expected to 
follow, was unlikely. Further, the mobilization of a large propor-
tion of the population in support of war in any state was still 
technologically impossible for lack of physical communications 
and food supply. Consequently the war would acquire a profes-
sional, sometimes tedious, quality that was the mark of com-
manders seeking suitable conventions to achieve limited success 
rather than pitched battles to destroy the opponent's forces. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Military Operations North of 
the Alps in 1733 
It was a little late in the season to turn things over to the military 
and ask for notable results, as the French government was doing 
in October 1733. True, preparations had been made, but eigh-
teenth century armies normally went into the field in late spring 
and were preparing for winter quarters when autumn came. But 
as the summer waned, the French were frustrated by two unde-
niable facts: first, they had no allies-the treaties with Spain and 
Sardinia were not yet signed-and second, until the entry of 
Russian troops into Poland in October, no overt hostile act had 
been committed by either the emperor or his allies. Even the 
Russian move, which allowed the French to maintain that the 
emperor was using Russia to carry out his measures against 
France by an invasion of Poland, was not a completely satisfac-
tory casus belli for the French to use as an explanation in the 
various courts of Europe. Despite the preparations, the fact is 
that they did wait until the Sardinian treaty was in hand and un-
til the Russian troops had crossed the border of Poland before 
ordering a military move against the emperor. 
We are privileged to know in some detail what military actions 
were considered in the highest council of the French govern-
ment. Marshal Villars sat on the Council of State and attended 
most of the meetings during the spring and summer of 1733. His 
memoirs, which reveal a somewhat pompous and bombastic old 
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man, nevertheless square generally with other information, and 
they indicate that the meetings were in great part concerned with 
the negotiations with Spain and Sardinia. The dispatches from 
the ambassadors were read, and the answers and instructions to 
be sent back were read and discussed. Chauvelin, as secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, read the incoming and outgoing mes-
sages.1 As to what extent the young king was a participant in the 
discussions we have no direct documentary sources and must rely 
on Marshal Villars's memoirs. During 1733 Villars sometimes 
mentions the presence of the king in council meetings but gives 
little indication that he took an active part in the give-and-take of 
the discussion. Respect or discretion may have inhibited Villars 
from quoting the king or even noting his attitude toward a given 
question. But what we know of Louis XV in later years-his shy-
ness and his carrying out a secret diplomacy behind the backs of 
his ministers, for example-suggests that the young king at this 
time was probably a silent observer at the Council of State meet-
ings and willing to accept the positions of his former tutor, the 
cardinal. Lee Kennett described him as more a spectator than an 
active participant in the councils a quarter of a century later dur-
ing the Seven Years' War. 2 
The question of how and where to attack the emperor came 
up repeatedly in the discussions. It seemed an accepted matter 
that the emperor must be shorn of some of his holdings in Italy. 
But what of the Empire? In the meeting of 28 June, when the 
matter of examining a method of attack upon the emperor with-
out Sardinian help was before them, the council considered 
attacks upon the imperial fortresses of Breisach, Philippsburg, 
Luxembourg, and Mons. 
On 12 July, Cardinal Fleury advanced the suggestion that 
Luxembourg be bombarded but not attacked. Villars was greatly 
irritated. He had already taken the position that the empire 
must be attacked-that is, strong points or areas must be seized. 
(After the 20 May meeting Villars had observed that war was de-
cided upon in spite of the cardinal, "but there are still many ways 
by which he can prevent it.") In this case Villars declared that 
they must act seriously or not at all. At the 12 July meeting 
Chauvelin proposed an attack on the imperial fortress at Kehl, 
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across the Rhine from French-held Strasbourg, but the meeting 
ended with no agreement. By the 23 July meeting the cardinal 
was ready with a proposal to besiege Breisach or bombard Lux-
embourg. To besiege Kehl, thought the cardinal, would involve 
the Empire in the war. Villars objected that Breisach and Lux-
embourg were less important as fortresses than the others but 
would draw the Empire into war just as surely.3 
A short memoir in the French military archives discusses the 
basic problem before 'the council-namely, how to make war on 
the emperor and not on his Empire. It includes two important 
considerations peculiar to war in this era in the German Empire: 
that one must always be aware of which princely domain of the 
several hundred German sovereignties would be affected by a 
given military act, and that the question of forage for the cav-
alry must be ever present in the military planner's thoughts. 
The memoir pointed out that only Luxembourg, Breisach, and 
Freiburg were to be considered imperial cities. Perhaps the deci-
sion to contain Luxembourg without an attack had already been 
made before the writing of the memoir, for it discusses attacks 
only on Breisach and Freiburg. To besiege Breisach, it goes on, 
you need a bridge at Hiiningen, near Basel. However, after 
crossing this bridge you enter the lands of Baden, then those of 
the duke of Wiirttemberg and other princes of the empire be-
fore arriving in the lands of the emperor, which extend between 
Breisach and Freiburg. The army must forage and eat. Are con-
tributions to be imposed upon the lands of the princes? Further, 
when the enemy forms an army, he will advance toward Stras-
bourg and Kehl and will establish lines to the mountains which 
will prevent a siege of Kehl unless the lines are broken.4 
By the meeting of 20 September it appeared that the council 
had agreed upon Kehl as the best objective. Meanwhile a hitch 
had developed in the treaty negotiations with Sardinia. Al-
though the agreement was very close to signing, the king of Sar-
dinia asked for a stipulation that the French would not attack 
anywhere in the empire-obviously an impossible condition. 
Doubtless the king of Sardinia wished assurance that the French 
would place the bulk of their forces in Italy and not commit 
armies in the north which might draw strength away from the 
66 NORTH OF THE ALPS, 1733 
Italian front. The French could not agree to this, of course, 
but the treaty finally was signed on 26 September. Even so, we 
find that in the meeting of 4 October the decision had not been 
made beyond the possibility of recall, and the orders to cross the 
Rhine were held up until the word from Turin was sufficiently 
reassuring.5 
Most of these discussions have been concerned with the 
French view across the Rhine. What other military opportunities 
were open to the French north of the Alps? The Austrian Nether-
lands was a second area, but one of great sensitivity for the Brit-
ish. We have previously noted the neutrality agreement, over 
British protests, between France and Holland which followed 
the withdrawal of imperial troops from the barrier fortresses. 
This tended to cut both ways for the French as they sought op-
portunities around their perimeter. The neutrality agreement 
and a reluctance to anger the British had closed the Austrian 
Netherlands proper to them as a theater of operations. But the 
emperor was in solid and bold possession of the fortress city of 
Luxembourg at the edge of this forbidden zone, a city that fre-
quently was considered a part of it and had drawn the greater 
part of its garrison from the men in the barrier fortresses. To the 
extent that France admitted the inviolability of Luxembourg the 
emperor was relieved of the danger of an attack; but the emperor 
might very well make a diversionary attack himself into northern 
France from this strong point. In any event, the presence of a 
strong imperial garrison there immobilized a considerable force 
of French troops. That is why the subject came up repeatedly in 
French reviews of the situation. As late as 25 August the desig-
nated commander for the area, Lieutenant General Count de 
Belle Isle, complained that Marshal Berwick seemed determined 
to bombard Luxembourg after the siege of a Rhine fortress. 6 
Dangervilliers, obviously sympathizing with Belle Isle, wrote to 
the latter saying that a bombardment of Luxembourg had not 
been decided, and he surmised that the principal stores were un-
derground in the rock and safe from the shells then available. A 
few days later, however, the same minister wrote to Berwick as-
suring the marshal that he had explained to the king the reasons 
favoring a bombardment of Luxembourg.7 
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But the order to attack or bombard Luxembourg never came. 
The French elected to be satisfied on this front with Dutch neu-
trality and British inaction. 
A third area for scrutiny was Lorraine. What was usually re-
ferred to as Lorraine was at this time the combined duchies of 
Lorraine and Bar which comprised an irregular island in the 
midst of French territory. The annexation of the three bishop-
rics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun by the French in 1648 and the 
annexation of Alsace on the east had left Lorraine surrounded 
by France. Moreover, its independence had been an on-and-off 
thing with a temporary annexation to France during the seven-
teenth century and a French occupation as late as 1715. Yet 
it was still an independent duchy and it had a sovereign who 
proposed to link himself in marriage with the powerful house 
of Habsburg. 
Since 1729 the sovereign of Lorraine had been the young 
Duke Francis III, a man whose limited competence would bees-
tablished in time. What was intolerable for the French was that 
Francis had been educated from the age of fourteen at the Vien-
nese court and was betrothed to the eldest daughter of the emper-
or, Maria Theresa, the daughter to whom the emperor sought to 
bequeath all the possessions of the house of Habsburg. The 
alliance of the houses of Habsburg and Lorraine, with the con-
tinued possession of Lorraine, would press the power of an an-
cient enemy far too close to Paris. Nor would it be satisfactory to 
the British, whose policies had been to keep the Austrian power 
at a modest level in this area and especially to prevent it from 
breaking out in strength on the Atlantic coast. Britain had as re-
cently as 1729 secured the agreement of the emperor to termi-
nate his Ostend trading company in the Austrian Netherlands. 
Although the Austrians had observed that the French were 
quietly seeking to acquire Lorraine, the French records offer lit-
tle evidence of the fact. There is little discussion of the need to 
invade Lorraine in wartime-the need is assumed. As Marshal 
Berwick wrote a few days before the beginning of hostilities in 
his matter-of-fact way: "I have sent you the plan on Lorraine. It 
will be executed on the first order." 8 But did this mean a reten-
tion of Lorraine? It was not to be retained as an automatic result 
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of an occupation; that would be a political matter to be dealt with 
later. Whether the cardinal and Chauvelin saw Lorraine as the 
last block to be fitted into a map of France and quietly worked in 
this direction as a priority matter is easy to believe but difficult to 
demonstrate. Proprietary rights arose from dynastic rights, and 
the rights of the sovereign of Lorraine would not disappear with a 
French invasion. The sovereign of every small and medium-sized 
state in the empire must have watched this carefully. And it seems 
appropriate that the king of France was personally interested as 
well. Although we must assume that most initiatives from the king 
at this time were directly inspired by the cardinal, the reassurance 
Marshal Berwick had to give the king for occupying Lorraine may 
well have been in answer to a direct question from that hereditary 
monarch. It must be done to keep the enemy moving and to keep 
the Lorrainers from making war on us themselves, said Berwick. 
Dangervilliers said that he had read the letter to the king, who 
understood. 9 
So much for the aggressive strategy of the French north of 
the Alps. The decision not to engage the Austrian forces in the 
northern part of this area required some defensive measures for 
the French. In August, Marshal Berwick, on his way to Stras-
bourg to take command of the French forces facing the empire, 
passed through Metz, where he wrote to the ministry that he had 
worked out with his subordinate commander, Belle Isle, the 
measures to be taken to prevent the enemy from operating in 
French territory and to assure French communications. He pro-
posed fifteen battalions of infantry and thirty-four squadrons of 
cavalry as an army of observation to watch the fortress of Lux-
embourg and cover the country between the Moselle and the 
Meuse. From the Moselle to Alsace he proposed to deploy six 
additional battalions and fourteen squadrons, not counting gar-
risons. Counting garrison troops and reserves it all amounted to 
forty-four battalions and fifty-eight squadrons, or, assuming a 
reasonable unit strength, between 2o,ooo and 25,000 foot sol-
diers and between 7,ooo and 8,ooo riders. Belle Isle wrote the 
minister the next day noting his discussion with Berwick and 
stated that for the moment he would occupy himself with re-
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establishing the most essential fortress on the Moselle, that of 
Sierck, halfway between Metz and Trier. 10 
Thus the French were concerned with the plans for offensive 
warfare in Italy and along the Rhine, and with neutrality and de-
fensive measures along the northern and northeastern borders 
of France. When we turn to the Austrians, we find that they saw 
their problem as primarily defensive. If there was a strategy it 
seems to have been completed, in a negative sense, when the em-
peror's plan to avoid a clash with the French by using Russian 
forces in Poland was demonstrated a failure. The Austrians had 
no real strategy except to defend the various fortresses and cities 
they held with whatever forces they could muster. 
Along the Rhine the defenses of the Holy Roman Empire 
had not held up well against the ravages of eighteen years of 
peace. Starting with the upper Rhine, the imperial fortress at 
Breisach presented some problems for French planners in devis-
ing an attack, as we have seen, but the Austrians saw it as a 
potential disaster for the defender. Prince Eugene wrote to the 
commander in july 1733 promising a strengthening of the garri-
son as soon as possible, adding, however, that if the reinforce-
ments could not be made in time he trusted the commander 
would defend the honor of imperial arms. In September he 
tried to reassure the commander of forthcoming reinforcements 
but admitted that they would be a part of those which had not 
yet arrived in Freiburg. Again the prince was satisfied, he told 
the commander, that the honor of the imperial arms was in good 
hands if the French should overrun the area. 11 It was not a very 
cheerful assurance for a commander in the forward area await-
ing an enemy attack. The attack did not come, but even as late as 
the first part of 1734, the Duke of Wiirttemberg complained 
that the status of the fort was such that it simply was not COilpable 
of resistance. 12 
Farther north, in the imperial city of Freiburg, the com-
mander received instructions in midsummer 1733 to prepare 
for a blockade or siege. 13 His situation on 1 October found him 
with about 1 ,200 regular troops. Militia and armed peasants 
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made up several hundred more, although a considerable part 
were without weapons and hundreds of all categories were sick. 
The repair of fortifications was also slowed by disagreement be-
tween the Austrian officials and the military administration as 
well as the general shortage of funds. 14 
At Kehl similar difficulties emerged. In January 1733 the 
commander, Baron Phull, complained to the imperial represen-
tative at Regensburg that the funds allocated by the diet had not 
yet been received. As the threat of French attack grew, the em-
peror sought more action and the imperial representative at Re-
gensburg on 18 September demanded approval of funds for the 
repair of both Kehl and Philippsburg. This was duly granted in 
December, by which time Kehl had already fallen to a French 
siege. 15 
Farther downstream, Philippsburg was the most formidable 
of the imperial fortresses along the Rhine, possibly the strongest 
in Europe at that time. In June the Franconian Circle was or-
dered to strengthen the soo-man garrison with circle troops. 
But by November there were only slightly over 1,500 troops ca-
pable of duty instead of the 7,ooo needed for a thorough de-
fense, and there was a great shortage of artillerymen. New works 
in the fort were either incomplete or had not been started. 16 
In Hesse, along the left bank of the Rhine below Bingen, was 
Schloss Rheinfels, also in a sad state of repair. The emperor in 
August 1733 asked the king of Sweden, as landgrave of Hesse, 
to repair the fortress, with no reported results. In early 1734 
troops of the Rhine Circle were sent to Rheinfels. 17 
Across from Coblenz, high above the right bank, is the great 
fort of Ehrenbreitstein, then part of the territory of the elector 
of Trier. The elector had asked Prince Eugene to equip his for-
tress, which had neither troops nor an effective commander, 
with imperial troops and an imperial commandant. 18 
The fortified city of Luxembourg seems to have fared better. 
The Villars memoirs indicate that the French had been carefully 
watching the efforts of the Austrians to improve the fortifi-
cations and increase the garrison as the year 1733 progressed.19 
The correspondence of Prince Eugene with the imperial 
commanders of strong points, and with the leading German 
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princes in the West, is a sad compilation of commanders' com-
plaints coming to Eugene and the tireless but often futile efforts 
of Eugene to squeeze money or troops from the imperial princes 
and to cheer the unhappy commanders. 
French military preparations, meanwhile, had been quicken-
ing during the late summer months. Colonels were to be with 
the troops by the end of August. More important was the selec-
tion of commanders for the two principal theaters of operations, 
Italy and the Rhine-Moselle. The veteran Villars, in spite of his 
work with the minister in the formation of the armies, found 
that the top command, that of the Rhine-Moselle, was destined 
for Marshal Berwick and that he was to be made commander in 
Italy. This was taken badly by the public, according to Villars-
meaning we assume, by his friends at court. Chauvelin, to relieve 
the old warrior's embarrassment, put it out that Villars had re-
fused the other command, but Villars was not mollified. When 
told that the king wished him to command in Italy, however, he 
was forced to accept. Before leaving France he demanded an 
honor; he wished to be made a constable of France, a rank last 
held by the great Turenne, and he asked Chauvelin to obtain it 
for him. But on 19 October the war minister came from the king 
to tell Villars that he would not be made constable but would be 
a marshal general with precedence over all other marshals. On 
26 October Villars left for Italy to take over his command, and 
his journal came to an end.20 
The selection of Berwick for the Rhine-Moselle theater was a 
wise one. He was a commander who could be expected not to 
exceed his orders, and it was in this theater where restraint 
must be exercised if France were not to have the empire of Ger-. 
man princely states grouping defensively about their emperor. 
Berwick has been criticized as overcautious and unimaginative 
in his actions in this war. He probably was, but that was undoubt-
edly the performance desired by the-cardinal. The struggle Ber-
wick had with Belle Isle over the deployment of his forces was an 
example of the conservative commander seeking to hold back an 
enthusiastic subordinate. 
The northern wing of Berwick's command would prove to be 
the least active of the war areas, but its commander, Belle Isle, 
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was an ambitious young general who was able to formulate ex-
tensive and daring projects. The general and his brother, the 
chevalier de Belle Isle, were both active in the Moselle area and 
aggressively seeking fame and recognition. 
During the month of September 1733 a considerable amount 
of time was spent on the study of two projects proposed by Belle 
Isle in a memoir dated 29 July.21 On 7 September a document 
which might be called a short staff study appears in the records. 
Entitled Reflections on the Memoir of M. de Belle Isle of 29 july, it 
examined the requirements of the first of Belle Isle's projects. 
This was a manned defense line that would stretch troops from 
the Meuse at Mezieres south to Verdun, then east to Toul, then 
north along the Moselle to Sierck, then farther east along the 
Saar to Wissembourg in Alsace, using sixty-three battalions and 
fifty-three squadrons. The study concluded that the proposal, 
besides greatly increasing the work corvees and putting local in-
habitants in a state of armed alert more onerous than contri-
butions, would require more troops than the king had at that 
time.22 
The second project of Belle Isle, that of creating a defensive 
barrier by inundations and felled trees from Sedan to the Mo-
selle at Sierck and thence to the Rhine, is treated less summarily 
and it is suggested that the memoir be forwarded to the king. On 
8 September a message from Dangervilliers to Berwick revealed 
that the memoir had been studied by the minister and by gener-
als Puysegur and d' Asfeld. The second project, which they de-
scribed as a containment of the garrison at Luxembourg, was 
considered a possibility. Questions were raised, however, as to 
whether it would suffice as a defense of Lorraine, whether it 
would require fewer troops than the first project, and how much 
damage would be done !Jy the tree cutting and inundations.23 
On 10 September a further letter from the war minister to 
Berwick advised that the project was favored by d'Asfeld and 
Puysegur. Of course, admits the minister, it is true that the em-
peror has made no assembly of troops against us. Still, it seems 
from the map to be a simple way to protect a large part of the 
area. But, he adds finally, of course nothing will be done without 
your opinion. D' Asfeld then traveled to Strasbourg to talk to 
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Berwick about the lines, and on 14 September Berwick wrote the 
minister that he had listened to all the arguments but had not 
changed his mind. It would be impossible to have armies else-
where if so many men were committed to a line.24 
Apparently Belle Isle continued to press his case, for a letter 
from the war minister to Belle Isle on 2 1 September revealed 
that the decision had not yet been made. When Berwick gives his 
position, the king will take a position, said the minister. But a 
final judgment came from the marshal on 1 o October, only a few 
days before the beginning of operations, and by this time he 
must have been extremely impatient with the whole matter. He 
speaks of the lines as a useless expense; the measures should be 
those he had outlined before.25 
So much for Belle Isle's plan; but he will have others. On the 
face of it we may call it a rather unashamed attempt to preempt 
a large part of Berwick's army for his own ideas. With his plan 
rejected he must content himself with the prospect of occupying 
Lorraine. 
The time approached for military action and as late as 7 Sep-
tember Berwick indicated that he thought Breisach to be his 
probable objective. The important question was whether the 
emperor could assemble a large army. On 16 September Dan-
gervilliers wrote to Berwick that the king wanted an attack some-
where on the Rhine during the fall. The war minister pointed 
out in the letter that an attack on Philippsburg would be a long 
siege but that Kehl was an immediate target that could be han-
dled easily from Strasbourg. Berwick found this agreeable and 
stated that he would be ready within two days after the king's 
order to place two bridges over the Rhine, one above and one 
below Kehl. On 8 October, in a message to the king, Berwick was 
more specific: "I consider that I can cross the Rhine with a large 
detachment on the thirteenth and establish a boat bridge below 
Kehl." After this, he added, he would establish another bridge 
above Kehl and that he would pay great attention to keeping 
strict discipline among his troops in their attitude toward the 
German states. A letter from the minister of war in this same pe-
riod to an unknown recipient asserts that Marshal Berwick was 
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correct in forbidding acts of hostility against the princes of the 
empire. Of course, he added, we do not carry this so far that we 
cannot defend ourselves.26 
The king's order to Berwick to cross the Rhine-always a 
momentous occasion for a French commander-went out on 6 
OctoberP The crossing began on the night of 1 2-13 October 
with a detachment of twenty companies of grenadiers who 
landed near the village of Augenheim north of Kehl and worked 
all night putting a bridge across the river. By the fifteenth Ber-
wick was able to report that on the day before "toute l'armee 
passa le Rhin," although they were not yet well established in the 
swampy, stream-covered area. 28 
The problem of the German princes emerged immediately. 
Berwick was visited on the fourteenth by the court marshal of 
his majesty the duke of Wiirttemberg with a letter from his mas-
ter asking for a passport and security-which was accorded. The 
count of Baden had already asked for safe passage for two com-
panies of circle troops and his own personal guard. This also was 
accorded. Berwick's letter to the duke was extremely polite and 
spoke of protecting the princes of the empire as a guarantee of 
the Treaty of Westphalia.29 
Berwick had every reason to mean what he said. The Treaty of 
Westphalia confirmed the sovereignties of the German princes. 
Or, if one perceives the guarantees from the point of view of a 
German nationalist, it effectively prevented the emergence of a 
German national state. The individual rights of the German 
princes represented a long-term security guarantee for France 
-one that ended with the formation of the German Empire un-
der a Pruss ian monarch in 187 1. 
Behind the courtesies, however, the hard facts were that the 
French army would forage and levy contributions. The burning 
of several villages, along with severely forced deliveries of hay 
and grain, caused Berwick to promise repayment and drew 
from him the statement that the French came as friends, not en-
emies. But Baden was levied with a contributions total of 40,000 
florins, and other nearby areas negotiated as best they could 
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when faced with French threats. The duke of Wiirttemberg, an 
ardent supporter of the emperor, made a contributions agree-
ment with the French as the lesser evil.30 
How large was Berwick's army and what was it to do? Were 
the Austrians aware of the size of his forces? If his army was up 
to establishment strength in its units-and at the outset of a 
campaign we might expect it to be at least approaching full 
strength-it would have had about 38,ooo foot troops in its fifty-
six battalions and about 1o,ooo riders in its sixty-three squad-
rons of cavalry.31 
On the Austrian side, Count Ferdinand of Furstenberg, the 
imperial commissario at Regensburg, who was then at his own 
capital at Messkirch near the Swiss border, was sending Eugene 
in Vienna daily reports of French preparations. He had report-
ed on 13 October the French construction of a boat bridge and 
on the fifteenth he wrote that he had a completely reliable re-
port that the French had crossed the river with so,ooo men.32 
The attack on Kehl was an attack on an isolated garrison and 
it alarmed the Austrians, who then saw that their field forces, 
such as they had, were too far to the east if the French intended 
a drive into the empire toward the Habsburg hereditary lands. 
They would have been relieved had they been able to read the 
communication from the minister of war to Berwick on 28 Octo-
ber, which revealed that there were no such plans at all. There is 
no precise news about the Austrian camp at Pilsen, wrote Dan-
gervilliers, but the Prussians will not march this year. "I think 
you will have a quiet siege." Regarding what Berwick was to do 
after the siege, the minister suggested that he restrict himself to 
repairing the bridge at Fort Louis and to reducing his troops to 
the smallest number possible for the winter. It is possible, he 
added, that there will be peace on the frontiers.33 
In the meantime Berwick had a siege to perform and he 
wrote that the trenches were opened on the nineteenth. This an-
nouncement was a key statement for those days and sufficiently 
important for Berwick to enclose a special note to bring it to the 
king's personal attention.34 
The detailed report of the French army positions drawn up 
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for 2 1 October showed Berwick's forces deployed about Kehl, 
with a special Trench Command under a lieutenant general 
composed of six companies of grenadiers, three battalions of 
infantry, and 2,ooo workers.35 The French also found that the 
enemy commander was either unwilling or unable to mount 
an active defense. General Noailles, commander of the French 
right wing, reported that he went down into the trenches on the 
night of the twenty-first. "The night passed in quiet. We have 
nothing to worry about except colds and chest congestion." Ber-
wick on 22 October also noted that the enemy had not fired a 
shot during the preceding two nights.36 
Doubtless the fortress commander knew how unlikely was 
the possibility of relief. He chose a brief defense-about as brief 
as was permissible under the conventions of his time. By the 
twenty-ninth he had agreed to articles of capitulation, of which 
the following were crucial: "II est convenu que demain 30, Ia 
garnison sortira armes et bagage, tambour battant, enseigne de-
ploye, avec deux pieces de canon." Thus they would march out, 
drums beating, flags flying, to join their forces elsewhere, and 
the commander's honor would be intact.37 
On the Austrian side the reports of the commander at Kehl 
show that he had 1,200 Swabian Circle troops and 250 imperials, 
but a serious lack of artillerymen. When he saw the French 
crossing the Rhine in boats, he destroyed the pontoon bridge 
linking Kehl with Strasbourg and burned houses in the town 
that were too close to his walls. The attack was initially directed 
against the hornwork, which unfortunately had been razed and 
was in process of being rebuilt. (A horn work was one of several 
fortified constructions used as forward defenses to a fortress.) 
The commander on 18 October issued a list of instructions 
that directed his troops in how they should fall back toward the 
central fort as they were driven from the forward works. As the 
French moved their sappers and their batteries closer, there was 
little the garrison could do with the meager artillery at hand. On 
the twenty-fifth they made a sortie against the positions between 
the Rhine and the hornwork, which was repulsed by the French 
grenadiers. By the twenty-seventh the French were bombarding 
steadily. A fire in the hornwork drove out the Austrian troops 
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there, and after a council of war among his officers Phull decid-
ed to ask for terms. He had hardly 500 effectives and did not 
wish to have the fortress taken by storm. Fourteen canon were 
surrendered along with a large supply of munitions which had 
been destined for Breisach and sent to Kehl by mistake. They 
did not fit the caliber of the guns and mortars used at Kehl. 
On the thirty-first the garrison marched out with sixty wag-
ons, between the ranks of the French, who presented arms and 
continued a drum roll until the evacuation was completed. The 
garrison had not lost more than 40 men killed and wounded and 
numbered about 1 ,200. (The discrepancy with the garrison fig-
ures mentioned before probably represents desertions during 
the siege.) The French escorted the garrison as far as Ettlingen 
where the Swabian troops were turned over to local authorities 
and the imperials set out to join the imperial garrison at Frei-
burg.38 
This lackluster defense hardly came up to the accepted re-
quirements for siege defense in the eighteenth century. There 
were more or less specific rules as to how long a fort must be 
held after the artillery and digging operations against it are 
in motion. One professional observer, the count of Bavaria, a 
French general commanding one of the units in the siege, wrote 
in his diary that the garrison marched out with honors, "except 
that of having made a good defense, for I don't think there has 
ever been such a miserable one." 39 
The French lost 16 soldiers killed, 46 wounded, 2 officers 
killed, 7 wounded, and had 179 deserters.40 The last figure tells 
us why eighteenth-century armies invariably fought in close 
ranks and why they dared not fight at night if they expected to 
have very many troops present in the morning. 
The siege terminated, the marshal announced that he would 
proceed to Fort Louis with the bulk of his army and construct a 
bridge. The siege of Kehl was about as much campaign as the 
French desired to have on the Rhine in 1733. There is even a 
letter from Marshal Du Bourg, the governor of Alsace, to Prince 
Eugene, assuring him that there would be no further operations 
along the Rhine. We want to destroy the rumor that we will lay 
siege to Philippsburg, wrote the marshal. The artillery is going 
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back into the magazines at Strasbourg and you may negotiate at 
leisure during the winter. We wish to show good intentions to 
the circles and all the empire.41 It is a friendly letter of one gen-
tleman to another and probably in good faith. Of course Du 
Bourg did not necessarily speak for Italy, where more lively op-
erations were taking place. 
While Marshal Berwick, with the larger part of his command, 
crossed the Rhine near Kehl, a smaller part of his army, under 
Belle Isle, simultaneously began operations to the northwest. As 
Berwick had already pointed out in earlier messages, the re-
quirements in that area were to oppose Luxembourg, cover the 
Meuse Valley, invade Lorraine, and maintain communications 
with Alsace. 42 
On 13 October Belle Isle's troops entered Lorraine unop-
posed and he presented himself personally at the gate of the city 
of Nancy where he was hastily given the keys to the city. He then 
passed on to the ducal residence in nearby Luneville where he 
had an audience of one hour with the duchess, the mother of the 
absent sovereign. The command of troops in Nancy was given to 
General Lutteaux who began to concern himself with repairs to 
the citadeJ.43 
It was obvious that the French made strenuous efforts to 
keep the goodwill of the ruling house of Lorraine and of its cit-
izens. Forage was to be paid for as it was under Louis XIV, for 
example. But it was not long before misunderstandings arose. 
General Lutteaux found himself asking for the traditional "lit, 
bois, et chandelle" for his troops and being confronted by a 
duchess who stated that she was quite surprised by this, that it 
did not accord with what she had been told in a letter from Louis 
XV, and that she intended to write to Louis. The unhappy gen-
eral found that he must delay his actions and wrote to his minis-
ter. The response of the minister a few days later does not seem 
to give him clear authority. The general was probably more un-
happy still to receive a copy of a letter sent to the duchess by Car-
dinal Fleury on 25 October according to which Lorraine was not 
to bear any expenses even for its own security. The general then 
wrote to the minister saying that because of the cardinal's letter 
the city of Nancy would not give him the wagons and other arti-
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des needed to repair the fortifications unless they were paid for. 
The duchess, said General Lutteaux, stands on the letter from 
the cardinal and the Treaty of 1702. I await further orders, said 
the frustrated general. Poor Lutteaux even wrote to the minister 
showing in opposing columns what he had been ordered to do 
and what had been done. We have not advanced beyond the first 
day, he admitted.44 
By January 1734 Lutteaux would write that he was still hav-
ing troubles but that things were getting better. It was difficult to 
occupy a country and enjoy the friendship of its citizens and 
its hereditary rulers, although in this case the French bent over 
backwards. The duchess was offered the choice of remaining se-
curely in Luneville or coming to any city she wished in France. 
She finally elected to go to Luxembourg.45 
Lorraine would remain a quiet area throughout the war, al-
though there were rumors from time to time that the Habsburgs 
were planning an attack along the Meuse. The French kept an 
army of observation south of Luxembourg without making any 
attempt to initiate hostilities. 
The immediate concern of the Austrian emperor and his 
government on learning of the death of the king of Poland was 
to maintain the border security with Poland. It was believed that 
in the confusion of the Polish electoral period some of the Polish 
nobility and their forces would venture over the border and 
plunder villages in neighboring states. Therefore in March the 
emperor ordered the movement of imperial forces to the border 
in Silesia. The orginal camp site was Oppeln, about fifty kilome-
ters from the border. A strength of 1 o,ooo men was assembled 
there. In June a part of the force was moved to the northwest to 
Gross-Glogau while the others were moved back southward into 
Bohemia to Pilsen. By September there were 2o,ooo men avail-
able in Pilsen, some 13 ,ooo infantry and nearly 7 ,ooo cavalry. 
Some of the infantry had even been broughtthere over the pas-
ses from Italy. 46 
The available evidence indicates that the aging and failing 
Prince Eugene must bear some responsibility for the misplace-
ment of Austrian forces and also for misjudging French and Sar-
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dinian intentions. On 7 October 1733, in a letter to Prince 
Friedrich von Wiirttemberg, who then shared the command of 
imperial forces in Italy with Marshal Daun, Eugene noted that 
there was probably little to fear for 1 733 this late in the season 
and that he found it difficult to believe that the king of Sardinia 
would expose his states by permitting the passage of a French 
army. Finally, he concluded, the "fire" may well spread to Italy in 
the next year and "I will consider therefore the sending of time-
ly reinforcement troops in proportion to the need which we shall 
have for them." 47 
It was a weak and complacent statement. The French would 
attack in less than a week after this message, and the French-
Sardinian treaty had already been signed on 26 September, al-
though the Austrians were not aware of it until 8 October.48 It 
was a bitter surprise for Prince Eugene of Savoy to find that the 
head of the house of Savoy, King Charles Emmanuel, had turned 
to his old enemy, France. On 14 October the imperial minister in 
Turin was given the declaration of war. By the twenty-fourth 
Eugene would write to another of the Wiirttemberg princes that 
this was the beginning of a hard and bloody war. 49 
Thus, in mid-October, with the unpleasant fact of an active 
war with France already under way, the first thing to do was to 
move the forces in Pilsen into a more useful position. Obviously 
the Austrian leaders had relied on hopes rather than judgment 
in leaving the Rhine unprotected. 
In a long written presentation of 27 October, Prince Eugene 
reviewed the entire military situation and informed his emperor 
that the Pilsen corps had broken camp on the twenty-first and 
was provided with hard money for the purchase of supplies and 
with the necessary vehicles. Field Marshal Duke Ferdinand Al-
brecht of Braunschweig-Bevern was in command, and he had 
been advised by special messenger to expedite the movement 
westward by direct march and should do all possible short of 
ruining the troops to secure the city of Ulm. Eugene noted that 
the distance from Pilsen to Ulm was twice that from Strasbourg 
to Uim and that if the French seriously intended to make a junc-
ture with the Bavarians then Bevern might not be able to reach 
Ulm in time and might have to retreat towards Regensburg in 
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order to keep the Danube bridges there under his control. The 
possibility of an understanding between France and Bavaria 
might mean that France would move toward Ulm or Donau-
worth to maintain communications with the Bavarian lands. 
Bevern should further secure the depot at Ulm by sending a 
supply officer ahead to load the grain there on boats or rafts if 
the French should approach. It could then be moved to Re-
gensburg or wherever the duke desired. 
Eugene went on to discuss other force movements. He 
thought there was no further question of the imperial forces en-
tering Poland and that some of the Gross-Glogau troops might 
be moved to guard the Tirol passes or to Upper Austria to keep 
watch on the Bavarians. In Hungary he noted the need for cav-
alry to secure this large area. Admitting the bad effect on the 
Turkish frontier of withdrawing troops, he still recommended 
the movement of regiments to inner Austria or to the Tirol. 
Eugene left no doubt that he spoke for the War Council and 
as its president, and that he was greatly concerned about the atti-
tude of the elector of Bavaria. Bevern had not only been told to 
use his intelligence to observe all Bavarian movements and to re-
port anything suspicious, but had been given the authority to act 
with prudence in circumstances in which it might be impossible 
to secure a sufficiently rapid approval from Vienna. 
Finally, these immediate matters covered, Eugene went on to 
discuss more fundamental military measures with the emperor. 
He considered that little could be done this late in the season but 
believed that a great deal must be accomplished before the next 
spring.50 
First he summed up the emperor's military forces in rough 
totals: Netherlands, 2o,ooo; Naples and Sicily, 21 ,ooo; Lom-
bardy, 18,ooo; forward Austrian bases, g,ooo; hereditary lands, 
7 ,ooo; Hungary and bordering provinces, 3o,ooo; field forces, 
45,000. This made a total of 15o,ooo men. 
He qualified these figures by noting that Hungary, because 
of its local population and the Turkish threat, needed reinforce-
ment, and that the hereditary lands must be reinforced because 
of the proximity of Bavaria. Further, the forces in Lombardy 
were below strength from desertion and sickness. He then 
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warned that if the emperor did not send an army into Italy against 
the 4o,ooo enemy forces, one position after another would be 
lost, and if the French succeeded in occupying the Adige Valley 
they might well force the Austrian army back across the Alps as 
they did in 1701. 
North of the Alps Eugene noted that France and Bavaria 
would have the Danube to their advantage if they could join 
forces. The emperor must not rely on fortresses in this area; 
only an enlarged field army could protect the hereditary lands 
from a break-in by enemy forces. The imperial force must be 
one that could either prevent the juncture of French and Ba-
varian forces, drive back the enemy forces, or bring them to a 
decisive battle. This army must be ready by the end of February 
or the enemy would be able to break into the hereditary lands. 
The need was to be ready to hold off the enemy long enough for 
allied forces to join and launch an attack. 
Eugene's old bitterness against the house of Bourbon, as well 
as his hope for active allies, comes out toward the end of his pre-
sentation: "The danger cannot be too strongly represented; the 
house of Habsburg has never been in such a crisis. The Polish 
affair was simply a pretext and the intrigues which have been 
glowing under the ashes for so long a time have now broken out 
into a great fire. It is fortunate that it did not occur later and 
now the entire empire and the sea powers can see their too great 
indolence towards the house of Bourbon and have their eyes 
opened once again." 
It is a resolute document and probably represents, for a mo-
ment at least, the resurgence of the Eugene of former times. But 
it was very late. It would be the inaction of the French rather 
than Austrian efforts that would save the hereditary lands from 
mvas10n. 
On 31 October Eugene wrote again to the emperor stating 
that he had once more urged the duke of Bevern to hasten to-
ward Ulm. But it was a race without an opponent. The French 
had no intention of occupying the Swabian Circle lands and 
soon would retreat back across the Rhine, holding only the for-
tress at Kehl. Berwick understood perfectly the urgent move-
ments of the Austrians and on g November reported that the 
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Pilsen corps had been sent to the Ulm area to prevent a French 
juncture with Bavaria.51 
Eugene had reason to be suspicious of Bavarian intentions 
and to sense the existence of a solid agreement between Bavaria 
and France. Negotiations had taken place between the two dur-
ing the summer of 1733. The treaty that was finally approved 
committed the elector of Bavaria to work against anything con-
trary to French interests in the empire. The elector also repeat-
ed his refusal to sign the Pragmatic Sanction. The king of France 
agreed to support the elector in the assemblies and courts of Eu-
rope, to support the elector's protest against the Pragmatic Sanc-
tion, and to protect him, if necessary, by force. In two secret 
articles France agreed to provide two million livres annually for 
Bavarian forces of no less than 26,ooo men and to maintain 
these forces for five years. The treaty was signed on 15 Novem-
ber 1733.52 Despite these arrange.ments the position of the elec-
tor between the two great houses of Europe was a perilous one. 
We find in the French archives a letter from the duke of Bevern, 
dated 24 November, from a town in Bavaria near Ulm, stating 
that he would pass through several Bavarian locations on the 
shortest route to Ulm.53 The elector could not, according to the 
imperial constitution, refuse passage of the troops of the em-
peror nor those of any other state of the empire. The direct road 
to Ulm lay across Bavaria. 
So much for the Austrian military reaction. They must now 
do all possible to organize the empire against the French. Not 
only would the individual states be asked to supply their con-
tingents of men, but the central organ of the empire, the Diet at 
Regensburg, must be urged to declare war, although it was well 
known that several of the larger members were sympathetic to 
the French, and the attitude of the Prussians was ambiguous. 
There is in the Austrian Kriegsarchiv a large printed poster, 
a rectangle a meter long on the longer side, which is the imperial 
declaration of war. Dated 4 November 1733, it calls attention to 
the "Decret" against the breaking of the peace by Fran·ce, Spain, 
and Sardinia, and it appeals for help from all parts of the em-
pire.54 However, this is only one step toward a declaration by the 
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empire itself. The emperor would have to wait several months 
before a Rei&hskrieg would be declared. 
The imperial court laid great importance on the war declara-
tion and sent representatives to each of the German princes 
whose vote was questionable. Field Marshal Count Konigsegg 
went to the elector of Bavaria and to Cologne, Count Ferdinand 
Kiifstein to the Palatinate. But in vain. The three princes in these 
states, and the bishop of Regensburg, were the only German 
princes who would not approve the declaration of war. 55 Count 
Furstenberg wrote that there were representatives at Regensburg 
with devotion and fidelity but that Baron von Plettenburg of Ba-
varia in hate and recrimination opposed the declaration and in-
fluenced Cologne. Braunschweig and Hanover, he observed, had 
more "patriotic" instructions.56 
It was not until g April 1734 the Reichskrieg was declared, 
over the objections of the dissenters noted above. By this time 
the armies were in motion and the effect of the decision on the 
war for that critical campaign season was problematical. 
During the winter of 1733-1734 the emperor sought to in-
crease his forces. The 15o,ooo troops Eugene mentioned in his 
presentation represented the units of the imperial army on a war 
footing. The army was not on a war footing when the French 
attack came, however, but on a peacetime footing, which was 
roughly 15 percent less. Moreover, the units were seldom up to 
their full peacetime strength, some falling as much as a third be-
low. All this was touched upon by Eugene as he sought a way to 
draw units together to form a field force while not jeopardizing 
the borders of the Habsburg Empire. This would include, of 
course, bringing all units up to wartime strength. In addition he 
urgently requested the formation of six new infantry regiments 
plus the recruiting of Swiss regiments and battalions. 5 7 
Fritz Redlich, in his study of the German military enterpris-
er, finds that the Austrian recruiting of "five" new regiments in 
1733 of special interest as a turning point in recruiting. The 
practice in which noblemen raised regiments on their own ac-
count was giving way to financing by the state. In this case the 
cost of raising five of the ten companies in each regiment •was 
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paid by the treasury and the other five by the colonel-designate 
of the regiment in question. 58 
In spite of the standing Turkish threat some troops were 
taken from the Croatian border region. According to Rothen-
berg the use of Grenzer for the first time outside the border area 
was a complete fiasco. "The departure of the Grenzer for Italy, 
in December 1734, led to tumult and disturbances. At first the 
troops refused to depart at all and insisted on submitting a 
lengthy memorandum of their grievances to the emperor." Later, 
in Italy, when they heard reports of religious persecution by the 
Austrians in their homeland, they mutinied.59 
There were also other sources of troop strength. The first cat-
egory was "troops in imperial pay" ("Truppen im kaiserlichen 
Sold"). Already thirteen regiments were promised, of which some 
were already in imperial service. They came from the states of 
Wiirzburg, Saxony-Weimar, Saxony-Eisenach, Saxony-Gotha, 
Braunschweig-Liineberg, Wiirttemberg, Mainz, and Waldeck. 
Auxiliary troops ("Hilfs-truppen") were another category. These 
were the expected forces from Austria's allies, including Prussia, 
Holland, Denmark, and England. (England's contribution would 
include troops from Hanover, of course.) Here the Austrians 
would be disappointed. They would eventually receive contin-
gents from Hanover, Prussia, and Denmark, but there would be 
no help from the sea powers-England proper, or Holland. 
From all these sources the Austrian forces might have been in-
creased by 10o,ooo men during the course of 1734, bringing the 
total Austrian forces up to 25o,ooo. But the special interests of the 
German sovereigns and the poor execution of their agreements 
as well as poor cooperation from the allies thwarted the mobiliza-
tion from the beginning. 
The Pilsen corps, on the march since 20 October, placed its 
vanguard in Ulm on 11 November. Eugene wrote to Bevern to 
take care, that even so late in the season the French might un-
dertake an operation, particularly if they had Bavarian help.60 
But the French were already crossing back over the Rhine into 
Alsace, holding Kehl as a guarantee for a Rhine crossing for the 
next year. Bevern's corps then moved forward to position itself 
as a thin line of forces along the Rhine from the Neckar River to 
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Freiburg, establishing communication with Philippsburg and 
strengthening its garrison with 2 ,ooo men. The positions for the 
winter would to some extent reflect the threat from the elector 
of Bavaria, whose armies could move against the thin flanks of 
Bevern's command. But in general the Austrian positions were 
intended to occupy as much of the territory as possible. "The 
more areas on this side of the Rhine that we occupy the more 
difficult it will be for the French to draw subsistence from the 
German states, and the easier for the troops of Your Majesty," 
wrote Eugene to the emperor in November. 61 
The war along the Rhine was over for the year. Berwick went 
back to Paris in November, leaving Du Bourg in charge. Both 
sides would plan their strategies for the spring campaign that 
both knew would occur. 
CHAPTER SIX 
The War in Italy to May 1734 
The war in Italy would prove disappointing to all concerned, 
and the available evidence suggests that each party merited at 
least a good part of the frustration all shared. The mobilization 
of the resources of the allies-France, Spain, and Sardinia-in 
coalition warfare was limited by conflicting objectives. On the 
imperial side lack of resources, indecision, and uncooperative 
German princes plagued the emperor's efforts. 
The Po Valley was a cockpit in which French armies had 
fought for several centuries. The French strategy, given a weak 
Austrian army in northern Italy, was compellingly simple. Vil-
lars said it all in a few words when a meeting of the Council of 
State in June 1733 discussed the advisability of scattered attacks 
in northern Italy. "No," said Villars, "the king's army must reach 
Turin, march straight to Milan; the country is fresh and filled 
with food. From there, with the same dispatch, it must march to 
the foot of the Alps and prevent entry of the emperor's troops 
into Italy. You have behind you the state of Parma and Piacenza; 
you are positioned on the Po, and you carry out the siege of the 
citadel in Milan at your leisure" ("en pantouftes"). 1 But Villars 
would find that putting this strategy into deeds was a difficult 
matter. 
The French appeared to be moving with considerable dis-
patch as an army was assembled in the Dauphine and prepared 
to cross the mountains into Italy. Message traffic with Fontanieu, 
the intendant in the Dauphine, became lively in September. 
(The intendant was the key civilian functionary with broad re-
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sponsibility for logistics and other services.) Fontanieu was ad-
vised on 1 September to expect forty-five battalions of about 
30,ooo foot soldiers plus sixty-four squadrons of cavalry com-
prising another 8,ooo men. They would use four major routes: 
the Little Saint Bernard Pass into the Aosta Valley; the Mont 
Genis and Mont Genevre passes into Susa; the Argientiere Pass 
into the Stura Valley; along the Riviera coast, then north over 
the Tende Pass into the Piedmont.2 
The French forces were in motion in France before the ac-
tual declaration of war but moved into the Piedmont at approx-
imately the same time as the northern army launched its 13 
October attack on Kehl. In mid-October the appearance of mes-
sages indicating serious problems in troop movement showed 
that the entry into Italy had begun in earnest.3 The chief prob-
lem seems to have been an effort to put too many men on the 
trails over the passes at one time. The marshal general of lodg-
ing, the marquis de Peze, effectively the chief of staff of the 
army, found the daily movements too long as well. The minister 
of war told him in explanation that General Maillebois, tempo-
rarily commanding in Italy, thought that bodies of troops of less 
than corps strength should not appear in neighboring states and 
that they had therefore put eight battalions in movement at one 
time. But the minister wrote to Maillebois the same day indicat-
ing his concern, pointing out that there were too many men on 
the narrow paths. The king did not mean to go so far in keeping 
troops at corps strength, said the minister-an admission that 
the original directive had come from Versailles. A few days later, 
measures were taken in Grenoble to improve the passage oflater 
columns of troops.4 
Obviously the French had got off to a bad start. But it had 
been many years since a field army had passed the frontiers of 
France. Perhaps, also, the minister's effort to explain the situa-
tion to de Peze reflected the fact that the latter corresponded di-
rectly with Cardinal Fleury, Chauvelin, and the king. 
On 29 October the first column arrived in Turin and the next 
day a plan for the campaign was worked out by the French staff 
in the presence of Charles Emmanuel, king of Sardinia. The 
principal object of the war was asserted to be the conquest of the 
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Milanese. For this the mastery of the Po was declared essential. 
Specifically, the following movements were to take place. 
Two corps would unite at Vigevano on 30 October, cross the 
Ticino the next day, and invest Pavia. To the south a force would 
move from Alessandria and invest Tortone to secure the course 
of the Po as far as the mouth of the Ticino, and to protect the 
line of communications with Genoa, whence the supplies not 
available in Italy would come. A bridge would be built over the 
Ticino on the twenty-ninth. After investing Pavia the rest of 
the army would march on Milan and attack its fortified citadel, 
the chateau. A bridge over the Po would be built at Piacenza. 
The armies would then cross the Adda and blockade Pizzighe-
tone. Possession of this last fortress would enable the allies to 
block some of the entries from the Tirol in the north and open 
the Po Valley as far as the Mincio, where stood the fortified city 
of Mantua, key defense point of the Austrians in Italy.5 
Even before Marshal Villars could arrive, while d'Asfeld was 
temporarily in command, the difficulties with the king of Sardi-
nia began. D' Asfeld wrote to the minister of war that he would 
be glad to see Villars arrive; Villars would agree, he was sure, 
that they must besiege Pizzighetone before Milan. But Charles 
Emmanuel wished to move on Milan immediately, maintaining 
that the emperor had only 18,ooo men, mostly on garrison duty, 
and did not dare to mount an offensive without reinforcements. 
It will be seen later that his estimate of enemy troop strength was 
correct. Nevertheless he agreed to wait for Villars and submit to 
his decision. 6 
D' Asfeld was also at odds with his own colleagues, generals 
Coigny and Broglie, who questioned his authority over them.7 
Differences among commanders, often amounting to quarrels, 
have appeared in all military forces. But it is probable that the 
eighteenth-century armies in western Europe had more than 
their share, since most officers then were not true professionals 
in the modern sense. Especially among the higher ranks they 
were nobles first and placed pride above obedience, valor above 
knowledge, and, as a great many surviving messages indicate, re-
fused to submit to command channels in communications. 
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But things were not all bad for the French. The Austrians 
were in haste to pull back from their forward bases. There was 
consternation in Milan, and the emperor's forces were in the 
process of abandoning all the forward fortresses except Novara, 
Tortone, Pizzighetone, and the chateau of Milan.8 
As the French army moved forward at the end of October 
they were informed that the Austrians had withdrawn from 
Pavia, leaving thirty cannon behind. So precipitant was the Aus-
trian departure that the guns were left in working order. 9 A few 
hours later Pavia was occupied and a deputation of citizens has-
tened to the king of Sardinia to present him with the keys to the 
city. A surprised Europe saw the emperor's rule collapse in 
Lombardy. 
Meanwhile, Villars was making his way slowly through France 
toward Italy. He knew this would be his last command, and he 
savored the honors that were given him. As a soldier serving three 
queens he received for his hat the cockade of Queen Marie before 
leaving Versailles; the cockade of the queen of Spain awaited him 
in Lyons; and the third was placed on his hat after he received it 
from the hand of the queen of Sardinia when he arrived in Turin. 
Here it was that he is supposed to have made his memorable re-
sponse to the queen's question, How old was he?-"Madame, 
dans deux moisj'aurai MILAN!" 
The campaign was under way when Villars arrived in Turin 
on 7 November and duly announced his arrival by a message to 
the king of France.10 We may suspect that Villars was treated 
with some flattery, for he soon wrote back to the minister of war 
that he was very happy with the king of Sardinia and his minis-
ters. He would have occasion later to change his views. But the 
army was on the move by 10 November, about half of it com-
mitted to the siege of Pizzighetone under Maillebois, and the 
other half to an attack on Milan under Coigny. At least initial 
agreement was achieved with the king of Sardinia.U 
Villars actually joined the army on 11 November before Piz-
zighetone. The Austrians had been pulling their troops back to 
Milan and to Pizzighetone, and in the latter area they had de-
layed an allied approach by flooding the local terrain with the 
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waters of the Oglio River. Still, it was possible to begin the siege, 
and Villars must have been happy on the date of his arrival to 
report back to Versailles, "We opened the trenches this evening~' 
But already he was less sanguine about dealing with the Pied-
montese and foresaw difficulties in concerting their projects. 12 
Strangely, in the matter of the siege of Pizzighetone an argu-
ment developed among the allied military leaders in which Vil-
lars was supported by King Charles Emmanuel. Marshal Ber-
nard Rhebinder, a Swede of long military experience then in 
Piedmontese service, advised only a blockade of Pizzighetone so 
they might push on with the bulk of the forces to threaten or cut 
the lines of communication between the Austrian forces in Italy 
and the passes over the Alps. Although Villars's earlier state-
ments had seemed to favor such a strategy, at this time he de-
manded a siege, and a heated exchange took place between the 
two marshals with the result that Rhebinder was removed. Vii-
tars explained his change of opinion, not very convincingly, in a 
letter to his king. The principal reason, he asserted, was the ap-
proach of the Spanish army putting forces on his right. 13 Actu-
ally, the "approaching" Spanish forces were by no means near at 
hand. 
The question of whether or not there should be a siege of 
Pizzighetone also pricked the interest of Cardinal Fleury. As a 
rule the hand of the cardinal is seldom seen in the military dis-
patches, at least directly. Messages come from the minister of 
war, the king, even from Chauvelin, but there are few from the 
cardinal in the military files. Yet occasionally the light pressure 
of the cardinal's will is felt in military matters and his presence is 
made known. One of his informants, the marshal general in 
charge oflodging, the marquis de Peze, received this letter from 
him dated 30 October while the question of the siege was under 
debate. 14 
I read your letter of the twenty-third to the king, who was moved by the 
pleasure he would have when he knows his forces are in the city of Mi-
lan. This does not prevent an appreciation of your reasons to favor Piz-
zighetone. Marshal Villars, who should have arrived in Lyons yesterday, 
will presumably join the army before the taking of Pavia, and he will de-
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cide. I confess that winter quarters on the far side of the Adda would 
seem to me quite desirable for the army. Reflect on this and try to put 
some proposals about it before the Sardinian ministers. Report to me 
what you think can be done. 
The siege of Pizzighetone was to be comparable to the one at 
Kehl. The town was a small fortified area with about 4,ooo peo-
ple beside a citadel on the left bank of the Adda River, about fif-
teen kilometers above its confluence with the Po. On the right 
bank opposite was a fortified suburb called Gera which was con-
nected to the town by a bridge. Like most of the other Austrian 
strong points it was in poor repair. Field Marshal Lieutenant 
Count Livingstein, the commander, wrote to Eugene on 5 No-
vember, shortly before the beginning of the siege. "In all my life 
I have never seen a fortress on which His Imperial Majesty had 
spent so many millions so miserably arranged and so badly sup-
plied." At that time he had a total of 3,6g6 men (quite insuffi-
cient for a place of this size), some forty-five pieces of artillery of 
various sizes, and three mortars. 
As Livingstein later informed the Court War Council, the 
suburb of Gera was all-important for the defense of Pizzighe-
tone and, once it was taken, the fall of the main fortress would 
soon follow. But he was determined to make a strong defense 
despite his eighty-some years. He was said to have answered a 
summons to surrender from the king of Sardinia with the point-
ed response that he knew how to keep his sworn oath better than 
the king, and that threats for an old man who did not have very 
long to live were not enough to sway him. In harmony with the 
ideas of his time, he did not say that he would fight to the last 
man, but rather that he would not surrender without a brave 
defense. 15 
The allies arrived in force on 16 November. While they await-
ed the arrival of their artillery by boats on the Po, they put 1o,ooo 
workers to digging canals and breaching the dams that gave Gera 
its water defense. They were in some haste to complete this before 
rains might make-the work impossible. By the twentieth, the at-
tackers were digging the second parallel before the fort. The 
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artillery arrived and by the twenty-second the firing on both Pizzi-
ghetone and Gera was causing substantial damage. On the night 
of the twenty-third an attack by grenadiers and workers drove the 
defenders from that forward line of defense known as the cov-
ered way. Villars, now more confident of the softness of the 
enemy defenses, put eleven battalions on the left bank on the 
twenty-fifth and opened trenches around Pizzighetone proper. 
By 28 November the artillery fire of the allies was much heavier 
and the connection between Gera and the main citadel was en-
dangered. Livingstein sent a messenger proposing the surrender 
of Gera. The allies refused, but made the counteroffer of allow-
ing him eight days to surrender Pizzighetone, during which pe-
riod his garrison would be permitted to withdraw. If he refused, 
his garrison would become prisoners of war when the citadel was 
taken. Livingstein asked permission to send a messenger to Man-
tua to obtain agreement for his surrender and this was granted. 
But in Mantua the commander, Prince Friedrich von Wiirttem-
berg, proposed that the date for yielding the fortress be set at 16 
or 18 December. This proposal was, of course, an attempt to win 
time for the repair of fortifications then under way in Mantua. 
The allies refused this, and Wiirttemberg ordered Livingstein to 
continue his resistance. The resistance could not continue long, 
however, and the old commander finally yielded after he had 
been granted a delay until9 December. It was his contention that 
the fortress could hold out no more than four or five days if the 
attack recommenced and that his delay had won eight days for 
the Austrians, in addition to the garrison which, according to the 
terms of the agreement, was allowed to march to Mantua and 
would supplement the garrison there. So on 9 December Living-
stein and his troops marched out, flags flying, drums beating, 
arms on the shoulder, with twenty-four cartridges per soldier and 
the right to take the most direct route to Mantua. Villars had al-
ready reported the terms of the surrender to his king, with stip-
ulations accorded and stipulations denied neatly set off in parallel 
columns, a document most carefully drawn up at the termination 
of sieges.16 
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a matter of time. Villars wrote to the king on 4 December: "My 
first two objectives in arriving in Italy were never to see your 
army exposed to any sort of peril and to assure the king of Sar-
dinia, according to your orders, the conquest of the Milanese as 
soon as possible. I arrived on 11 November and on 2 December 
the two objectives were achieved." 17 
Villars now had some time to give to his ally, the Spanish. 
The expected appearance of the Spanish forces in northern 
Italy greatly excited the suspicions of Charles Emmanuel. The 
arrival of the duke of Liria as a Spanish liaison officer at French 
headquarters and the passing of communications between Vil-
lars and the overall Spanish commander, the marquis de Mon-
temar, caused the Sardinian ministers to state that they had no 
need of a Spanish ally, and the king of Sardinia demanded the 
departure of Liria. But Villars seems to have mollified the king 
after some explanations and regained his confidence, if notal-
ways his cooperation. 
The initial communication from Montemar came from the 
Spanish-held state of Parma on 19 November: 
I wrote Your Excellency from Barcelona, and I attach herewith a copy, 
since I am uncertain whether the duke of Liria has arrived at your head-
quarters. I thought it my duty to inform you of my arrival in Parma 
where I await your orders with impatience. 
I expect that we will soon have the troops from Spain in Livorno and 
Spezia; they consist of twenty-one battalions of 700 men each and ten 
squadrons of cavalry or dragoons of more than 120 men each. The rest 
of the cavalry will come by way of France, embarking at Antibes; eight 
or nine battalions of those troops in the state of Florence are to join the 
army which will be composed of thirty battalions and 5,ooo horse, with a 
corps of fifty to sixty engineers, a similar number of artillery officers, 
fifty siege guns and thirty-four field pieces with all that is needed for an 
important siege, and twenty general officers. 
I have just sent the order for nine battalions at Florence to advance 
to this side of the mountains; the other troops which will arrive in two 
convoys from Barcelona and Alicante will follow the same route. 
I pray Your Excellency to inform me without delay what this army is 
to do, whether alone or with the army which you command, and to dar-
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ify for me also the other points which I gave to the duke of Liria to put 
to you. 18 
The note has the ring of a faithful ally to be. But Montemar 
would prove 'to be even more difficult for Villars than Charles 
Emmanuel. Villars soon received word from the French resident 
at the court of the Infant in Parma, the marquis de Bissy, that 
Montemar was taking a very sticky attitude and had presented 
him with a number of reasons why he could not come to a con-
ference with Villars or the king of Sardinia. 19 
As Montemar indicated in his communication, he had under 
his command both the newly arriving troops from Spain and the 
Spanish forces in Tuscany already present under a previous 
agreement with the emperor. He would have roughly 26,ooo 
troops to contribute to the attack on the imperial forces. While 
the French were before Pizzighetone, that part of the Spanish 
forces ordered north was moving up the coast from Tuscany 
taking forts evacuated hastily by imperial troops during the last 
days of November. At Aulla, near Spezia, the Spanish forces 
faced a determined Colonel Nothelfer and a small detachment 
that refused to yield. It was late December when the attackers 
went through the formalities of digging the trenches and mount-
ing cannon, after which the garrison surrendered and the 140 
defenders were made prisoners.20 
Despite Montemar's earlier insistence on his independence, 
he did in fact cross the mountains for a conference with Villars 
at Sabbionetta on the Po on 1 1 December. This meeting was to 
fix the responsibility of the Spanish to operate on the lower Po, 
below the confluence of the Oglio, and to occupy the fortresses 
of Guastalla, Brescello, and Mirandola with ten battalions. Ba-
sically it was a strategy to assure that northern Italy was firmly 
won before the Spanish should undertake a projected attack on 
Naples and Sicily. Villars wrote to Louis XV on 12 December 
and outlined the results of the conference. He had explained the 
importance of securing the Po to its mouth and argued that it 
would not be difficult with Spanish assistance, particularly since 
the Po was very broad below the Oglio. Did Montemar agree to 
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this? Villars thought he did. "He [Montemar] understood well 
that one could not carry out an attack on Capua and the kingdom 
of Naples since our first objective must be to close off Italy."21 
The French strategy was quite logical. The duchy of Parma 
lay on the right bank of the Po and would be open to an Austrian 
attack unless the lower Po were secured. Since Parma was ruled 
by the Spanish Infant, Don Carlos, it was assumed that Monte-
mar was vitally concerned for the security of this prince and the 
territory of his state. It soon became clear, however, that Monte-
mar did not intend his forces to be used to help the French cam-
paign at all if he thought the campaign did not directly assist his 
own. More likely he felt that the defensive measures the French 
asked him to contribute were those which the French could and 
would undertake whether or not he assisted them. Letters from 
Villars to Montemar reflect the old marshal's fear that Spain did 
not understand how vulnerable the lower Po would be if the em-
peror decided to reinforce his army. The imperial forces could 
cross the Alps quickly, warned Villars, and we could have 8o,ooo 
men upon us. But if the Po could be held, he reasoned, the im-
perials could be prevented from penetrating deeply into Italy, 
and the allies would have the grain of the Ferrara area instead of 
the enemy. Villars had also heard that his old foe (and personal 
friend) Prince Eugene was coming to take the command in Italy. 
It was a false report, as it turned out, but it must have increased 
Villars's concern. Villars also begged Montemar to write to him 
in French, which Montemar understood better than Villars un-
derstood Spanish, but there is no evidence that Montemar even 
granted him this concession.22 The Spanish answer to Villars's 
plea for cooperation was an agonizing delay until the nervous 
marshal decided to move on and occupy Guastalla with his own 
forces. Not until 15 January 1734 did a force of 7 ,ooo under the 
duke of Liria appear and occupy Brescello and Mirandola in the 
name of the king of Spain.23 
At the same time Villars's relations with King Charles Em-
manuel were deteriorating rapidly. Both the subsistence fur-
nished the French troops and arguments over strategy poisoned 
the situation. General Vaulgrenant wrote to Chauvelin, sending 
him a memoir on the poor state of both men and horses as they 
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entered the month of December. The Piedmontese, he said, 
maintained that the treaty did not permit winter quarters or 
contributions in the Milanese. The message has a desperate 
tone. There was not a moment to lose, he stated; the army was 
threatened with a complete wasting away ("un deperissement, 
presque total"). 24 
Presumably the crisis was overcome. Versailles did not seem 
to have been particularly worried, nor did the minister of war or 
foreign affairs appear to back up his subordinates in this, or in 
other instances, with great energy. On 28 December, Danger-
villiers told the intendant not to press the matter with the Sardi-
nians in spite of the possibility that the Sardinian intendant was 
pocketing part of the money paid for troop subsistence.25 Coali-
tion warfare is not easy. 
Villars was reminded of his subordinate position in the great-
er plan of things when Charles Emmanuel on 11 December made 
a ceremonial entry into the city of Milan. A deputation from Mi-
lan had already presented itself at the allied camp and asked for 
the king's protection. An ancient custom authorized Milan to sur-
render when an enemy army crossed the Ticino on the west or the 
Adda on the east, and on the night of 3-4 December, French and 
Sardinian troops entered the city. The Austrian forces retired 
to the chateau and elected to withstand a siege.26 According to 
a French report, the king of Sardinia was received with a cere-
mony comparable to that given the kings of Spain and emperors 
of Austria. Fontanieu's wry comment at the time was that the en-
try of the king did not rouse great joy in the people, who would 
choose to be ruled by Spain, France, the emperor, the devil, or 
the king of Sardinia-in that orderP A hundred years later, the 
king's descendant, borne on waves of Italian nationalism, would 
receive a more enthusiastic welcome on entering Milan. 
Charles Emmanuel now had most of what he wanted and he 
wished above all to hold on to it. He set about, to the extent that 
he was able, to direct the strategy to that end. Poor Villars felt 
the effect soon when he was forced to wait an hour for the king 
in an antechamber and finally left. By 23 December he showed a 
deep anxiety as he recounted to Louis his difficulty in securing 
any cooperation from the king of Sardinia. "As for me, Sire, 
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when I think of the army of the emperor arriving in the Tirol, I 
realize that the king of Sardinia could cause the loss of our own 
army and consequently put your kingdom in peril." 28 
But the war had to go on, and another opening of trenches 
was announced for the siege of the chateau of Milan. About half 
of the French army was in the Milan area but the siege would be a 
polite and relatively restrained undertaking.29 It was arranged 
with the commandant in the chateau that the French would not 
attack from the city side, and he in turn would not fire from that 
side. On 20 December a great ball was held with Villars dancing 
a minuet at the opening. The orchestra was to begin the music 
when the first cannon was fired at the chateau. The officers could 
go from a tour in the trenches to the opera or balls during the 
thirteen days the chateau held out. But it was an active siege in 
which the imperial commander, Field Marshal Hannibal Mar-
chese Visconti, gallantly defended his position until, as the 
French dug their parallels and mounted their batteries, he was 
faced with a hundred cannon and had only five of his own still in 
action to reply. With the opening of a practicable breach Visconti 
held his council of war, beat the chamade, and raised the white 
flag. His capitulation permitted him to withdraw with full honors 
to Mantua with six cannon, two mortars, and six covered wagons. 
Departing with 1,389 men, he lost 4 75 to desertion before arriv-
ing in Mantua with fewer than goo men.30 
The end of 1733 thus found the French militarily successful. 
In less than three months the Austrians had been pressed back 
into the area around the fortress of Mantua. But the Austrians 
would not be content to let the matter rest. 
On the day the white flag was raised over the chateau of Milan, 
29 December 1733, the emperor and his advisors sat in a long 
Privy Council meeting in Vienna. They had been taken by sur-
prise by the defection of the king of Sardinia and his alliance with 
the French and simply did not have enough troops available to 
defend Lombardy. The dependence on a friendly or neutral Sar-
dinia was so complete that not only was there no planning for 
early hostilities in Italy but there had been troop reductions, as 
previously mentioned, and grain was still being delivered from 
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Lombardy to the armies of the king of Sardinia while the latter 
was urgently preparing for war. Although Prince Eugene used 
the establishment figure of 21 ,ooo imperial troops in Lombardy 
in one of his presentations for the emperor, the detailed reports 
of units, taking into account sickness and desertions, yielded only 
13,340 effectives in northern Italy.31 
The overall commander in northern Italy was the governor of 
Milan, Field Marshal Count Wirich Daun, one of the older and 
more experienced generals of the empire. Daun initially desired 
to hold the forward strong points, notably Pavia and Novara, and 
force the enemy to dislodge the forces there by the usual cumber-
some and lengthy siege methods. His second-in-command, and 
general in command of troops, Prince Friedrich von Wiirttem-
berg, a much younger man, wished to withdraw the forward gar-
risons to the base at Mantua as a final redoubt and keep a cavalry 
force in the forward area for observation, ready to fall back as 
need be or meet the enemy in open field. So the Austrian defense 
of Italy began with a disagreement between the two top com-
manders in the area. 32 
By the end of October Daun was forced to act along the lines 
argued by Wiirttemberg and had ordered the evacuation of Pa-
via. One by one the strong points fell or were given up by their 
inadequate garrisons, in most cases with the agreement that they 
be permitted to fall back on Mantua rather than be taken pris-
oners of war. Daun must have felt uneasy about the rapid col-
lapse of his positions, for in late October he left for Vienna-
apparently of his own volition-to justify himself. He presented 
his case to the emperor in a letter that was passed on to Prince 
Eugene for advice on the matter. 33 Daun would not return to his 
command. 
Prince Eugene, ailing though he was, came to life during these 
initial months of the war and began the mobilization of the im-
perial armies and the resources to supply them. The emperor's 
handwritten note at the end of Eugene's 25 October briefing was 
couched in confidential and affectionate terms. 34 On 14 No-
vember Eugene in a note to Marshal Bevern stated that already 
seventeen battalions were in movement toward the Tirol. By the 
end of the month he informed a garrison commander in Italy 
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that a new overall commander in Italy had been chosen.35 On 4 
December he briefed the emperor on the situation, showing im-
patience with the three reluctant imperial princes, especially the 
elector of Bavaria, and stated that the army of the new com-
mander in Italy, Field Marshal Mercy, should be fifty battalions 
and ten or twelve regiments of horse, plus two hussar regiments. 
Eugene also wished that his forces could fall upon the French 
along the Moselle Valley or from Luxembourg, but this could 
not be done without a "Reichskrieg" -that is, a war voted by the 
Diet in Regensburg, and with the approval of the sea powers, 
England and Holland. Eugene saw it all in the darkest terms: 
"For I see it all too well that this is the crisis for the house of 
Habsburg, upon which its future fortune or misfortune de-
pends." 36 Perhaps Eugene exaggerated somewhat. The house of 
Habsburg would survive this war and the accompanying defeat 
with less strain than succeeding struggles. Cardinal Fleury was 
not an antagonist who sought the death or even the severe lam-
ing of his opponent. 
Although the great concern of Eugene and the War Council 
in October was the protection of the areas north of the Alps-
hence the hasty movement of the Pilsen corps to the West-the 
emphasis had changed by December. This change was due to the 
fact that the French on the Rhine were going into winter quar-
ters after the taking of Kehl, and doubtless the rapid loss of the 
Italian strong points must also have invited reconsideration of 
the Italian strategy. The Privy Council meeting of 29 December 
1733 with both the emperor and Prince Eugene in attendance, 
took up as their first point on the agenda the north-south mili-
tary situation. Bartenstein's "Protocoll" of the sense of the meet-
ing, prepared for the emperor on the following day, reads as 
follows: "There should be consideration of the unavoidable ne-
cessity for the most rapid creation of two armies, one in Italy and 
the other in the Empire. And since in the first area the danger is 
greater than in the second, and because delay there would entail 
broad and damaging consequences-indeed if the enemy is al-
lowed still more time the evil may become irreparable-so first 
of all everything possible must be done to bring about early 
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operations by the army under the command of Field Marshal 
Mercy." 
The disadvantage of the Italy-first defense, as discussed in 
the protocol, was that the campaign in the Empire would have to 
be delayed. The French were already insinuating that the army 
of Marshal Bevern was only a token ("Schein") to induce the 
German states to commit themselves by a declaration of war 
in the imperial Diet, after which declaration, according to the 
French, they would find they had little protection given them by 
the emperor. Efforts must be made to convince the German 
states, went on the Bartenstein protocol, that neutrality with the 
French would enable the enemy to penetrate the inner lands of 
the empire.37 
The beginning of 1734 saw a stream of messages going out 
from the Court War Council and from Eugene personally in a 
great effort to set the lumbering machine of the Austrian empire 
in motion and produce a field army for northern Italy. The in-
tentions of the French in Italy were probably quite clear to the 
Austrians. In any case the Austrian embassy in Paris had report-
ed the French strategy to be that of marching with the bulk of 
their army across northern Italy to the defiles of the Trentino, 
obliging the Republic of Venice to declare itself, occupying the 
city of Verona, and thus preventing imperial troops from enter-
ing Italy. It was the Villars strategy. Moreover, said the Austrian 
dispatch from Paris, the French were prepared to send 2o,ooo 
additional troops to Italy.38 
With the capitulation of Milan at the end of 1733 the French 
were apparently free to move on against the last imperial strong 
point in Italy-Mantua. But the king of Sardinia from this point 
on would act as a brake on French movements. He saw the war as 
a struggle to maintain the possession of Lombardy and thought 
that any move east or south might imperil his position. The 
French saw security in a larger sense as requiring the defeat of the 
Austrian forces in Italy and, if possible, the blocking of Austrian 
reinforcements. It is very likely that Villars could have taken 
Mantua had he pushed on. Pajol points out that the marshes 
around the fortress were dry; there were few defenders, and 
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these demoralized. In his opinion the French should not have 
permitted the garrisons of the several surrendered strong points 
to join the Mantua garrison, and the French should have acted to 
prevent the Venetians from letting more Austrian troops pass 
down the valleys of their republic to the Po Valley, since the prin-
cipal entry led through Venetian territory. 39 
Before the arrival of Austrian reinforcements, Villars contin-
ued to have trouble with his Spanish ally. The problem arose 
with the intention of Montemar to withdraw his army from 
northern Italy-it had hardly arrived!-for an attack on Aus-
trian territory in Naples. While this intention had been no secret 
to the French, the timing was important. Villars wrote to his king 
on 8 January 1734, noting that Montemar had agreed in writing 
to put himself under his orders but had not reported to him in 
thirty-four days what his intentions were. There were reports 
that the Spanish army was preparing to leave for Naples, said 
Villars. A few days later he wrote to the king of Spain, asking 
him to replace those troops which were being sent to Naples.40 
On 18 January Villars learned from Bissy at Parma that Mon-
temar had refused to reveal whether or not he was leaving for 
Naples. Villars then wrote a strong letter to Montemar remind-
ing the Spanish general that he, Villars, was supposed to be com-
manding, and reminding him as well that the campaign of 1706 
was lost to the Austrians under Eugene because of poor general-
ship involving the loss of Milan, Naples, and Sicily within three 
months.41 
Villars then traveled to Parma and visited the Infant, Don Car-
los, the son of Elisabeth Farnese, queen of Spain. He reported 
that the Infant showed "amiability, prudence, and timidity, espe-
cially for the orders of the queen his mother." Montemar's orders, 
according to the Infant, instructed him to march on Naples and 
to take the Infant with him.42 Villars wrote to Montemar, noting 
his conversation with the Infant, and stating that he had advised 
the Infant to tell Montemar to go ahead. (Could Villars have 
done otherwise?) But Villars did ask who would cover Parma 
and Piacenza and mentioned the reports that the road from 
Trent over the Alps was covered with imperial troops. But it was 
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no use. Montemar had avoided Villars by absenting himself 
from Parma. Apparently the Infant intended to be absent too 
but was detained by a mild illness.43 
In February Villars had more bad news. Not only did Monte-
mar intend to leave Parma but he intended to withdraw his troops 
from the garrisons of Revere and Mirandola. It was now the turn 
of the ministry to mollify the old marshal before he went too far in 
his protestations. A letter from the king to Villars noted that of 
course the decision of the Spanish "est tout a fait un contretemps" 
but that he must avoid a quarrel and not bring it out in public.44 
The ministry was making good use of young King Louis to deal 
with the angry and frustrated old marshal. 
On 25 February, after the departure of the Spanish forces, 
Villars wrote his strongest protest to Montemar, asking him 
whether the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the Po with-
. out advising his allies was not enough, if publicized, to suggest 
that Spain was reconciled with the emperor. But he had also re-
ceived another letter from the king, who reminded him that the 
Spanish had not concealed their plans for Naples. What was new, 
said the king, was the way they had abandoned their forts on the 
Po. "I am sending a message to Madrid on their conduct and to 
ask strongly that the troops now being embarked in Spain be sent 
to the Parma area." 45 
But for a time the Spaniards disappeared from the war the-
ater in the Po Valley. The old marshal must turn to other frustra-
tions. He sought to push on across the Oglio to the east but his 
generals checked him with an appeal for troop rest and, since the 
area had been struck by a heavy and unexpected snow, he agreed. 
He was now resigned to wait until March for a move toward the 
Mincio and Mantua. In the meantime the Austrian strong point 
of Tortone had surrendered in early February. The last fort west 
of Mantua had now fallen. Villars knew what should be done. "We 
should put ourselves between the garrison in Mantua and those 
who will come from Germany." 46 But he must wait. 
Villars also wished to place some of his forces on the right 
bank of the Po to compensate for the loss of the Spanish forces, 
and he sought to build a bridge. In this project he hoped to have 
the support of the king of Sardinia. But by 26 February we find 
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that his intendant was complaining that the king was not doing 
his part and that in order to get started he had sent General 
Broglie and 1o,ooo men to begin the work on the bridge.H Fi-
nally, however, Villars did succeed in placing a corps on the right 
bank under General Coigny. 
While Villars struggled with his allies, the new commander of 
the imperial forces in northern Italy was moving his reinforcing 
troops over the Alps. Field Marshal Count Claudius Florimund 
Mercy had served his emperor for fifty-two years in peace and 
war. In addition to having a history of extraordinary personal 
gallantry in combat, he had been a successful administrator in 
the Banat. But at this time he was sixty-eight years old, blind in 
one eye and short-sighted in the other, suffering from gout (and 
probably from his many wounds), and unequal to the task of 
commanding a field army. But he was not to be denied his last 
command and set off via Innsbruck, where he held talks on sup-
plies, across the Brenner Pass into Italy. Arriving at Rovereto on 
5 February, he met his predecessor traveling north from Mantua 
and was informed of the military situation. On 13 February he 
moved on toward Mantua with some of the reinforcing columns. 
They moved through Venetian territory in the Verona area. 
The Venetians, in order to give the French less grounds for 
complaint, had already asked the Austrians not to use their neu-
tral territory for troop movements. But it was too difficult to 
reach Mantua by any other route, and Prince Eugene ordered 
the use of the road through Verona stressing order and disci-
pline among the troops.48 
Villars was forced to watch the buildup of the imperial forces. 
On 27 February he wrote that Mercy could make himself master 
of the Po with the 2o,ooo men in Mantua plus the 12 ,ooo newly 
arrived reinforcements. For the next several weeks he would 
worry about the enemy crossing the Po and turning the exposed 
flank where the Spanish had departed, and about how to secure 
better cooperation from the Sardinians in placing a major part of 
his forces on the right bank of the Po. A gentle warning against 
dividing his forces came from Versailles in a letter from the king, 
who supposed that Villars would hold his army together and not 
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try to cover the Parmesan although he might occupy the posts 
the Spanish had evacuated.49 It was one thing to put garrisons 
in fortresses in an area from which they might have to be with-
drawn, but quite another to split a field army and place a part of 
it several days' march away with a river between. Dangervilliers, 
writing a few days later, seemed to suggest that Villars not ex-
tend his lines further. "We think you will have to assemble your 
forces to dispute the terrain." He went on, saying that the enemy 
would not fail to bring the war into Modena and, if possible, 
Parma. He also explained to Villars that the king of Sardinia 
might resist moving out of the Milanese for fear of a new Ger-
man corps coming over the mountains and putting itself along 
Lake Garda in the land that had been taken for him. And with 
regard to the Spanish, the minister added that, although they 
had gone, the alliance was in a common cause.50 
It was well that Villars had been given permission to occupy 
the strong points on the right bank because he had already done 
so. Broglie had been given the task of replacing the Spanish gar-
risons and had occupied Guastalla, Revere, and Mirandola to se-
cure crossings over the Secchia and the Parmeggiana rivers in 
case a retreat should become necessary. 51 On 14 March a letter 
from the king applauded the move, saying that Villars had prof-
ited by the negligence of the imperial forces who could have 
stopped the move. Probably in response to this approval Villars 
in late March placed five more battalions on the right bank. 5 2 By 
March the king and court at Versailles were probably aware that 
the old marshal's health was giving way. During the month the 
king wrote him three letters, gently reproving him in one for 
writing to the king of Spain and generally showing him more 
than usual consideration. On 26 March Villars wrote to the king 
that he was badly "enrhume" and coughing, that he must use 
opium to ward off fatigue and for travel. He begged the king to 
let him return; he was not fit for defensive war, he said. The 
ministry finally seemed to understand that Villars needed more 
backing from the French court, and he was informed that the 
cardinal had written to the king of Sardinia requesting better 
support for the French forces. 53 
The result of all this lack of agreement was that the French 
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and Sardinian forces did not take the opportunity to strike at the 
imperials during those weeks in early spring when the latter 
were building up, and they would now have to await an imperial 
initiative. By April the imperial army was formed in sufficient 
strength and could select its area of operations. "The fear of a 
crossing of the Po by the imperials is so widespread in the States 
of Parma that the furniture had been removed from the palace 
at Colorno, which the advance party selected as our headquar-
ters." So wrote Villars to the king on 8 April, going on to say that 
he had reassured the Infant and Parma and then must reassure 
himself regarding the defense of the Oglio on the left bank 
where, once again, he was unable to persuade the king of Sar-
dinia to move his forces forward. Charles Emmanuel's position 
was that the line along the Oglio was too long and he therefore 
would bring his forces only up to the Adda.54 
By 19 April Villars's complaints have a shrill tone. From Co-
lorno he writes: "I am extremely sorry to be obliged to explain to 
Your Majesty the dangerous and forced position of your army." 
He explained that the dispositions of the allied forces did not 
deter the enemy, whose strength he then estimated at 55,000, 
but rather encouraged him to attack. The fault was, of course, 
that he had no support from the Piedmontese forces. "If the en-
emy army has a general with any sense at its head it will march 
promptly against the Oglio." 55 The king of Sardinia did in fact 
bring his forces up to the Oglio before the end of April, but the 
attack was not to come in this area. 
The French and Piedmontese might have been less anxious, 
although not justifiably so, had they known that the new Aus-
trian commander had completely lost his sight in what may have 
been an epileptic attack. Eugene wrote Mercy on 20 March that 
he, Eugene, would not come to Italy but would command the 
army on the Rhine. After urging Mercy to a speedy recovery, 
Eugene asked whether in his opinion they should operate on 
only one side of the Po, or on both, and whether they should 
send a force to counter the Spanish attack on Naples. 56 Shortly 
after, Eugene was in contact with Mercy's second-in-command, 
Prince Ludwig von Wiirttemberg, to say that he was in agree-
ment that no help should be sent to Naples and that they must 
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act with force in the north to cross the Po or the Adda. In any 
case, "you must leave no more time to the enemies to reconnoi-
ter and fortify further, but act with the utmost vigor, and in such 
a way that the army, or at least the greater part of it, will be 
assembled." 57 
But by 14 April little has happened and Eugene is impatient. 
He wrote to Mercy: "I hope to learn from Your Excellency what 
form the operations are really taking, since the season is well ad-
vanced and it would be an undeniable shame to remain inactive 
with such a fine and strong army when one has superiority over 
the enemy. The enemy is deployed over a vast terrain along the 
Oglio and the Po and so separated that indeed a part of his forces 
can easily be cut off from the others." 5 8 
This was enough. On 2 May at dawn the imperials began 
crossing the Po above San Benedetto in boats. Coigny and his 
eight battalions were camped across from the mouth of the Min-
cio and had become used to the lack of activity. Possibly they 
e~oyed it-on both sides.59 Now, however, they found the im-
perials moving in behind them. They retired rapidly upstream 
toward Guastalla. The imperials now threatened the state and 
city of Parma. Villars wrote to Louis: "The king of Sardinia has 
twice ruined the project which might have caused that part of 
the emperor's army which is in Mantua to perish by cutting it off 
from all help from Germany." And he added, somewhat plain-
tively: "I think that I have a great deal to complain about in my 
zeal for Your Majesty's service and that which concerns my 
reputation." 60 
The imperials expected a response from Villars by some sort 
of attack on the left bank of the Po toward Mantua, as they 
watched the French on the right bank retreating-hastily and in 
disorder. Villars did in fact throw a column across the Oglio on 4 
May, driving the imperials from Borgoforte. But the French 
thrust soon lost momentum and, when countered by a brigade of 
imperials, quickly returned across the river. Although a rumor 
swept the Austrian forces that the entire French army was as-
sembled to cross the Oglio, it was soon discovered to be false. It 
was a critical period. Not untilg May did Fontanieu state that, for 
the first time since the retreat began, their positions were stable, 
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with Coigny placing his left on the Po and his right toward the city 
of Parma.61 
In retrospect it seems rather obvious that Villars's disposi-
tions had become vulnerable to attack. Prince Eugene saw it and 
suggested the weakness to his commander on 14 April. Even a 
trusted distant correspondent of Eugene was aware of it. The 
marquis de Prie, in Baden, wrote to Eugene that he had heard 
from Lombardy that Villars was over the Po with a large force 
and the rest of his army was in the Cremonese with its lines on 
the Adda. It is possible that these two corps could be attacked 
while unable to assist one another, thought de Prie. He must 
have had rapid intelligence from Italy, for on 5 May he wrote 
again to Eugene stating that what he had described as possible 
seemed to have occurred.62 
Was Villars really able to command in these last days? He 
must have been nearly broken by the constant debate. Claude 
Sturgill, writing of him in the War of the Spanish Succession, 
found him a commander who took hostages from the civil popu-
lation, fired into cities, and used wounded as cover. Villars was 
also the only general of Louis XIV strong enough to disobey his 
master on occasion.63 But this was now an older Villars. 
The king of Sardinia threatened him with that article of the 
treaty which provided for a council of war to settle a diversity of 
opinion. "I have never held councils of war," wrote Villars, "and 
my health is too changed to permit such a burden." On 26 May, 
with the front stabilized, he was permitted to leave at last and 
made his way to Turin. He would get no further. He wrote again 
from Turin to the court: "It is possible that they may say I am 
feigning illness, the more so because I have taken care to conceal 
the change in my health." However, added Villars, the cardinal 
would get the report of the physicians.64 On 17 June 1734, in 
Turin, he died. 
There was always something of the boastful player about him, 
and not infrequently something of the unwitting comic. He was 
unquestionably vainglorious and sought honors unashamedly, 
making himself a splendid target for sneering courtiers. When 
not in the field he was truly a courtier himself. He was derided, 
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privately of course, as virtually illiterate and, in fact, his personal 
signature of several heavy strokes suggests a man unused to writ-
ten language. But in an age when valor among officers was taken 
for granted and was sometimes the only qualification an officer 
had to recommend him, Villars had more than his share. 
With Villars's passing, the war in Italy would take on a new 
color. The armies are in motion and both the French and Aus-
trian courts would ask for more definite results. The old military 
leaders were leaving the theater. Daun, Livingstein, Visconti, and 
Villars were gone. Mercy would soon be gone. The war as a min-
uet, as a dance of forces from one fortified place to another, was 
over and the armies would clash in earnest, if not intentionally. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Siege of Danzig 
The war in Italy and in the Rhineland was led by elderly gener-
als who proceeded about their business much as they had done 
in the battles that had made them famous twenty or thirty years 
before. It was unlikely that any striking tactical or strategic sur-
prises would occur. Above the aging military commanders on the 
French side was the even more venerable and cautious figure of 
Cardinal Fleury, playing his diplomatic cards with great finesse; 
while above the Austrian commanders was the frustrated em-
peror, calling for assistance to German princes who did not wish 
to hear. The overeager, but eventually dampened, actions of the 
subordinate French commanders, Maurice de Saxe and the mar-
quis de Belle Isle, would be the only notable contrasts. 
In what might be called, from a military point of view, the 
Danzig sideshow, there were, however, actions and personalities 
that contrasted sharply with the character of the main theaters 
of the war. In Italy and the Rhineland it was the same generals 
taking the same fortresses again that they had taken years be-
fore, but no prior stage play had been written for the Danzig af-
fair. It took place in a newly emerging subsystem of military and 
diplomatic power, one which had a few years before experi-
enced the Great Northern War in which Charles XII of Sweden 
and Peter the Great of Russia were pitted against one another. 
British sea power and growing Prussian military strength were 
the other elements in the balance of this area, which was on the 
fringes of both Austrian and French influence. 
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During the early months of 1733-long before Stanislas 
Leszczynski took refuge in Danzig in October-the French am-
bassador to Denmark at Copenhagen watched the growing crisis 
that followed the death of Augustus II at Warsaw. He was Louis 
Robert de Brehan, Count Plelo, born in 1699 a member of the 
old Breton nobility. His military career had ended with his falling 
into debt and the necessary sale of his commission. He would have 
returned to provincial life had not his brother-in-law, Count 
Maurepas, then minister of the navy, arranged for his appoint-
ment in 1728 as ambassador to Denmark. 1 Plelo had some claim 
to literary background and was a member of a small circle that 
included well-known French literary figures, but had apparently 
some misgivings regarding his preparation for a diplomatic ca-
reer. He accepted the appointment, however, and en route to 
Denmark in 1729 was sufficiently humble to write to his minister, 
Chauvelin: "Guide my steps in a career in which I have as yet only 
my goodwill to conduct me, and in which I feel that I still lack 
greatly in perception." 2 
Plelo would show considerably more confidence in his own 
abilities in months to come. Already, in September 1729, we may 
deduce from a letter he wrote to Maurepas, that he was re-
proached for his eagerness. Another letter to Maurepas shows 
his increasing desire to propose a more active strategy in the 
North when he asks why it must be the English and the Dutch 
that are the "maritime powers." Why can't France send a squad-
ron under a brilliant commander like Duguay-Trouin? 3 It was a 
question he would ask again, but one for which he would never 
receive a satisfactory answer. 
Still, it was not thought likely that the eventual resolution of 
the Polish question would involve him. His instructions on assum-
ing his post were principally concerned with the complicated 
Schleswig-Holstein question and ignored Poland. When Augus-
tus II died on 1 February 1733, Plelo was resigned to playing 
a bystander's part. In February he wrote to his ambassador col-
league in Warsaw, the marquis de Monti, whom he had known 
personally in the army. There is nothing exciting here, he said, 
but the death of the king of Poland had opened a "grande scene" 
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for Monti. He hoped that Monti's role would be brilliant and for-
tunate. His own role, he observed, would be that of trying to se-
cure the neutrality of the Danes as France began to assume an 
aggressive stance toward the emperor. "One cannot imagine that 
the interests of Denmark require that she follow the will of the 
court of Vienna .... We want to be assured of Danish neutrality 
in this affair." 4 This was an example of Plelo's guidance from 
Versailles. 
During the next several months Plelo strove to secure the de-
sired neutrality. But the Danes had a defensive alliance with the 
emperor and would not be strictly bound. They told him they 
would remain neutral unless France attacked the emperor in 
Germany. With regard to Stanislas, they had no objection to him 
and would not try to prevent him from passing through the 
Sund, the narrow waters between Denmark and Sweden. But 
the minister made it clear to Plelo that the king of Denmark, in 
case of some action by Russia or Austria, would not "go beyond 
the attitudes which we should like to observe" ("traverser les res-
sentiments que nous en voudrions marquer.") It was vague and 
careful language befitting a small country, but Plelo became so 
impatient with these statements that he burst out: "The Danish 
ministry is one of weakness, bad faith, lack of resolution, and in-
constancy, which does not permit us to count on it from one mo-
ment to the next .... On the other hand, the imperials and the 
Russians spare neither the promises, threats, money, nor lies to 
seduce it, and the terrain is well prepared." 5 
But the Danes could go only so far to oblige France and 
probably assumed that France had already determined to attack 
the emperor. In the meantime the Danes observed the apparent 
preparations to bring Stanis las to Poland via the Danish Sund and 
the city of Danzig. Plelo was very busy. The king of France had 
written him another reminder that they needed reassurances be-
fore French ships could be sent into Danish waters.6 
By 13 July, Plelo had better news. In a carefully worded doc-
ument the Danes not only gave approval for the passage of 
French ships but welcomed them in Danish ports. The docu-
ment observed that the king of Denmark was sure that "the in-
tentions of His Christian Majesty, in sending this squadron to 
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the Baltic, is not to disturb or give offense, much less attack any 
of the powers which are allied to him." 7 
Plelo may have thought that his strong pretensions regarding 
French sea power had been effective. He had reported to the 
king of France in June that "this talk of a squadron and of ves-
sels ready to appear from one moment to the next, repeated by 
me to satiety, made an impression on these people here." 8 Or 
was the youthful ambassador overestimating the effect of his 
statements and the Danish respect for French sea power? At any 
rate no squadron arrived during July or August, and the Danes 
turned their attention to the question of their alliance with the 
emperor under the 1731 Treaty of Copenhagen. Plelo found 
that the imperial ministers had asked the Danish minister in 
Vienna to have the troops of the king of Denmark ready to 
march. When Plelo pressed the Danish foreign minister as to 
what Denmark would do if things came to the "dernieres ex-
tremites" he was told that if the Russians should enter their 
troops into Poland, France would have a right to declare war on 
them. But the Danish minister thought only the Swedes would 
support the French, and knowing the Swedish constitution he 
very much doubted if they would take action, and even if action 
were taken it would probably be against Livonia or some other · 
former Swedish province lost to the Russians. 9 Just don't attack 
the emperor unless he attacks you, said the Danish government 
to Plelo; otherwise the Danish king is forced to fulfil the terms of 
his alliance with the emperor. In spite of the fact that both Swe-
den and Denmark were guarantors of the liberties of Poland, 
this was all the comfort Plelo could get from the Danish court. 
Early in September Plelo was delighted to learn that a French 
naval squadron was actually on the way. Twelve vessels had de-
parted for the Baltic. It was the squadron that presumably was 
bringing Stanislas to Danzig. We are not seeking a quarrel with 
the Russians, said the French ministry, but we will tolerate no 
"mauvaises manreuvres." The ambassador rushed to the Danes 
with his news, incidentally finding that they had already heard it 
from other sources. "I can't tell you how great an effect the pro-
jected arrival of a squadron has produced in this area already . 
. . . Danish Minister Plessen spoke to me in laudatory terms 
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about the firmness which seems to mark our actions. We must 
follow through to the end." 10 
The squadron arrived at Elsinore on 15 September with 
three vessels missing and proceeded to Copenhagen. The news 
of the election of Stanislas in Warsaw arrived at almost the same 
time, and the deception regarding the travel route of Stanislas 
was ended. Plelo's messages showed an increased fervor and the 
word "zele" enters his correspondence. In his enthusiasm he re-
marks in one dispatch to his minister: "Vous connaissez le creur 
francais, tant ce qu'il a de zele, et s'il m'est premis d'employer ce 
terme, de tendresse pour son prince." Already the ministry at 
Versailles must have had some misgivings about the enthusiasm 
of their representative in Copenhagen, for a 26 September mes-
sage from Versailles counseled moderation. But Plelo was play-
ing the "French presence" for all it was worth. He asked that the 
king of Denmark receive the officers of the squadron, and he an-
nounced in court the election of Stanislas. The Danish king's re-
sponse to the announcement must have been a short comedy 
scene with the king responding in a very low voice. The minis-
ters from Saxony and Russia pressed as close as they dared to 
hear the king's answer but, as Plelo admitted afterwards, he 
could not understand the answer either. 11 
At first it appeared that the French squadron would return 
immediately to France. Plelo seemed ready to agree, probably 
after talking to the commander, the chevalier de La Luzerne, 
and discovering how precisely the latter's instructions from the 
Ministry of the Navy were stated. As a matter of fact, Plelo was 
even willing to instruct his ministry in naval strategy, as he noted 
in a message that there were three reasons for the arrival of the 
squadron, first to cover the movements of the king of Poland, 
second, to show the northern powers that they may be visited by 
water, as friends or enemies, and, third, to salute the Russians as 
friend or foe ("de gre ou de force"). The season was too far 
along to go into the Baltic, he agreed, and nothing could be 
gained thereby. But this was before the rumors of a retreat of 
Stanislas to Danzig began to arrive. On 8 October, under pres-
sure of this new information, Plelo wrote to his minister that, al-
though he understood that the squadron must not be risked in 
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the Baltic on the basis of a rumor, he proposed that two frigates 
be sent to reconnoiter Danzig. The next day he wrote to Monti 
explaining that the squadron would have to return because of 
the strict orders it carried but that he wished one or two frigates 
could be sent to Danzig. 12 
In the next few days Plelo seems to have let his zeal carry him 
on. Unable to make La Luzerne detach two frigates for Danzig, 
he had himself carried out to the squadron in a small boat just 
before the sailing and stressed to La Luzerne that something 
might happen to the king of Poland for which La Luzerne might 
be blamed later. The commander could not be moved. PU~lo de-
manded a council of war and following this was able to hold 
three frigates. He explained it all to his minister, hoping this ac-
tion would be approved. He must have realized quickly his im-
propriety, for in a message to the king he asked for pardon and 
admitted that he yielded to his own zeal. 13 
He had indeed overstepped his authority. A message from 
Versailles told him that he had only compromised the position of 
Stanislas in Poland by holding the frigates. The rumor alone had 
produced a bad effect, said the minister, giving the impression 
that the king of Poland expected these ships in order to escape, 
and it would have been even worse if they had arrived at Danzig. 
Whether PU~lo accepted this reasoning or not, he duly informed 
Monti that the three frigates were sent back to France on 2 1 
October. 14 
Both the Russians and the English were watching the French 
squadron. Lord Forbes had hardly arrived in Saint Petersburg to 
upgrade the English mission to an embassy when Count Oster-
man informed him in July that a French squadron was to pass 
the Danish Sund-and what would the English do? Forbes an-
swered that he thought the French vessels were too small in 
number to be a problem and the season was already late for any 
operations in the Baltic. Osterman hoped that the English would 
send a squadron. Forbes was happy to be told later from London 
that he had given the right answer and that operations at this 
season would be indeed precarious. A few weeks later Forbes 
was informed that the returning French squadron had been 
sighted off Dover. 15 
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Plelo had lost a battle but believed that there was something 
he could do. The king of Denmark had told him that Denmark 
must help the emperor with whom he had an alliance. France 
had now attacked the emperor, and the king of Denmark must 
keep his word. Plelo's suggestion to his government to counter 
the sending of a Danish military contingent to the emperor was 
to offer the Danes subsidies to delay, or better still, hire the sol-
diers for France. Ten or twelve thousand troops going into Po-
land would be useful, thought Plelo; most of the Danish ministry 
was imperial at heart, and only money could balance it. Paying 
the Danes would be expensive, he admitted, but it would mean 
fifteen to twenty thousand troops and ten to twelve war vessels, 
and there is the possible opposition of these people to the pas-
sage of French ships into the Baltic. "I only await orders," he 
concluded.16 
Actually, he sought to do a great deal more. A few days later, 
on 10 November, he forwarded a memoir outlining a plan which 
was, to say the least, bold in scope. His project had several parts, 
but the object was to stop the Russians. First, the Turks should 
attack the Russians. Plelo admitted that he did not know how to 
bring this about. Second, a squadron should be ready to sail 
about the end of April with fifteen or sixteen vessels of the line, 
ready for a five-month campaign and with six or seven thousand 
men, including cavalry. The Swedes would be subsidized to have 
pilots ready to aid the French ships and to strike in Finland. The 
French fleet would go straight into Livonia and Courland which, 
according to Plelo, had poor defenses. French troops would land 
and pillage the country while ships would bombard Riga and 
Revel. The desolation of these lands should make the Russians 
in Poland return home. This must be done, emphasized Pli~lo, or 
Denmark will go along with the Russian view and the Swedes will 
be prevented from acting for us.17 
Did Chauvelin and his staff pass this memoir about from one 
man to another and shake their heads? It would be interesting to 
know what they said, and what the cardinal said after reading it. 
The message of 3 December to Plelo was presumably an answer 
and it noted dryly that an expedition to the Baltic such as that 
projected in the memoir could not be undertaken without great 
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difficulty and expense. The original draft text said baldly that it 
would not be sent because the English would put a fleet to sea, 
but this statement was lined out and a longer explanation was 
given. The notion of interference by the English remained in the 
text, however. The ministry also commented on Plelo's sugges-
tion that the Danes be bought off from their aid to the emperor by 
noting that France was not accustomed to paying people for not 
working against her but for working actively in her favor. 18 
In the meantime, after the reproach from Chauvelin, Plelo 
was also trying to explain his holding the three frigates. In a let-
ter to his brother-in-law Maurepas and to Abbe Alary he showed 
his bitterness at the reproach he had received. He sent letters 
from Monti and from the Swedish ambassador in Stockholm to 
support his claim that it was not a "zele inconsidere," which 
made him desire to hold the squadron. "The risk to the vessels 
was uncertain; the danger to the king of Poland was actual. ... 
My zeal is great, I admit, but it is not blind." 19 
Chauvelin was obviously ready to drop the frigate matter. 
"We credit your motives and good intentions. Do not worry 
about this. It is a closed matter." Chauvelin went on to note that 
the king of Denmark, in spite of his protestations, was the first to 
declare for the emperor and to find the Polish affair a "cas de 
son alliance." Because the attitude of the Swedes may depend on 
the way the Danes are handled, France will consent to a six-
month payment of subsidies. He then added, in an apparent at-
tempt to encourage subtlety in his impetuous ambassador, the 
king of Denmark may not respond either to the approach of the 
king of Poland or to that of the elector of Saxony. "You do not 
need to ask for a direct answer." 20 
As to the attitude of the Swedes, whom Plelo seemed to be-
lieve eager to reassert themselves in the Baltic, the French am-
bassador in Stockholm was of another opinion. If the Swedes are 
to be moved by glory it will take a long time to persuade them, 
noted the ambassador. He pointed out several cases of Swedish 
circumspection and added that the Swedes wished that any sales 
of munitions for Stanislas in Poland be only through the account 
of a private merchant.21 
Plelo may seem immature and reckless in his actions, but in 
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other ways he was aware of traditional limitations that have 
worn much thinner in the twentieth century. At the end of 1733 
he was approached by one Treschler, a Danish officer of Saxon 
birth, with a plot to assassinate the elector of Saxony. Plelo im-
mediately turned the officer over to the Danish government, a 
move later approved by Chauvelin.22 
Stanislas was received with enthusiasm in Danzig in October 
1733 and seems to have felt confident in his position there. In a 
letter to his daughter on 3 October, the day after his arrival, he 
mentioned that the Russians would soon have the Turks and 
Swedes to be concerned about ("sur le bras") and that France 
would keep the emperor occupied. He was thoroughly satisfied 
with the marquis de Monti and expected to have a tranquil 
rei gnP 
Stanislas was accompanied to Danzig by several politically im-
portant figures. These included the primate, Theodore Potocky; 
Stanislas Poniatowski, who had given up his own candidature; 
and five Czartoryski princes. His own intimate staff was a more 
interesting group. First there was Tercier, the secretary of Mon-
ti's embassy. He was later to direct the secret correspondence of 
Louis XV and the duke of Broglie. Pierre Joseph de la Pimpie, 
chevalier de Solignac, became a secretary of Stanislas and stayed 
with him, later guiding his literary pretensions. Stanislas Zaluski 
was a chancellor of the Polish crown and bishop of Plock. After 
Danzig fell, he was kept in office and became an intimate coun-
sellor to Augustus III. Finally, Joseph Zaluski, who was sent to 
the Holy See by Stanislas after the fall of Danzig, later came back 
to Poland and played an important role there. These, all men of 
letters, were the intimate staff.24 
Many weeks were to pass before the Russian army arrived in 
the Danzig area. During this period .the French publicly made 
great protestations of support for Stanislas while privately they 
showed little resolution. Boye, in his masterful work on Lesz-
czynski, lays it all at the door of the cardinal. "He was, we will see 
only too clearly, the sworn enemy of the father and the daugh-
ter." There were splendid exchanges of compliments between 
them, says Boye, but Stanislas was always the dupe.25 If Stanislas 
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was an enemy in the cardinal's eyes-and Boye may have exag-
gerated this-he would not find any favor with the cold Chau-
velin either. In a letter of 8 November Chauvelin advised him to 
assemble troops.26 This was hardly the kind of assistance the be-
sieged king was expecting. In December and january as the win-
ter set in, his letters to Marie showed him far less serene about 
the future. No help came in this season, of course, but neither 
did the Russians. But a definite promise of help came in a 15 
December message sent by Louis XV to the Danzig Magistraat.27 
Very dear and good friends, 
We see with pleasure, from your letter of the 18th of last month, and 
from the accounts of our ambassador the marquis de Monti, all the in-
dications of fidelity and zeal which you have shown toward the king of 
Poland. The threats made by his enemies and ours have not been able to 
diminish the sentiments which will transport your glory to succeeding 
centuries and which make you so dear in our eyes. 
Several powers already show an interest in your preservation, but 
none will be able to extend this as far as we desire to do, since we regard 
your interests as our own, and we intend to neglect nothing which our 
strength and goodwill can encompass. 
In the light of the decisions that were taken in the next few 
months this effusive and categorical statement should have trou-
bled someone's memory at Versailles. Nor would it be the last 
such statement. It was quite enough to convince the burghers of 
Danzig, and in a 3 February sitting the city agreed to keep their 
royal guest. It was after this that they assembled a garrison of 
about 6,ooo men. In addition there was a "garde bourgeoise" 
and some volunteers. About s,ooo troops were allocated to the 
outer forts. The Swedish Colonel Stackelberg, with the title of 
adjutant general of the king of Poland, was put in charge of the 
fort at the mouth of the Vistula below Danzig, the Weichsel-
miinde fort. 28 
Lacy, commanding the Russian forces, had difficulty in as-
sembling a sufficient force for the attack on Danzig. According 
to the British resident in Saint Petersburg, who was kept well in-
formed by the Russians, Lacy had stayed at Thorn to provide his 
troops with boots. The troops were worn out with long and pain-
122 SIEGE OF DANZIG 
ful marches and the need to repair bridges, which were every-
where destroyed. Lacy announced that he intended to start for 
Danzig on 31 January 1734 with 24,000 troops, descending on 
both sides of the Vistula.29 Manstein, in his memoirs, asserts that 
the besieged in this case outnumbered the besiegers three to one 
and should have used their superior numbers to fall upon the 
dispersed Russians as soon as they arrived.30 
Whatever his numbers, Lacy and his force arrived in Danzig 
territory in early February and approached the city. On 20 Feb-
ruary, Monti wrote to Plelo, "A party of Muscovites appeared at 
the first defense line. We beat a general alarm and everyone took 
to arms." 31 Lacy demanded the delivery of Stanislas. When this 
was refused, he set to work cutting off the water supply of the 
city while waiting for his superior, Marshal Muennich, who ar-
rived on 10 March. Muennich wrote to the Magistraat giving 
them twenty-four hours to recognize Augustus III as king and 
on the same date made an attack on a redoubt called the Bagels-
burg. Here 8oo Poles and Danzigers repulsed the attack with se-
vere losses for the Russians. But the Russians gradually seized 
the outer defense points, with the exception of the Weichsel-
miinde, and cut off the city from all land access.32 
An important element in the siege was the attitude of the 
king of Prussia, since the Russians could bring in heavy artillery 
only by crossing Prussian territory. In spite of the protests of the 
French, permission was granted, and the larger guns came by 
sea through Pillau into the inner bay known as Frisches Haff and 
from there to the Danzig area.33 When told of this, the British 
resident in Saint Petersburg wrote to London: "Count Muen-
nich's military eloquence has prevailed on the king of Prussia to 
let the cannon pass." 34 On 30 April a heavy bombardment began 
to fall on the city. 
What were the Poles doing elsewhere? Was there any orga-
nized effort to aid the king so enthusiastically acclaimed a few 
months before? Messages tell of skirmishes throughout the coun-
try, but the organized forces were few and unreliable. The largest 
force appears to have been that of joseph Potocky, palatin of Kiev 
and a brother of the primate, who had forces in the Cracow area. 
These were of little help in the siege of Danzig and apparently 
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held to the Cracow area in order to have an avenue of retreat into 
Turkish territory if needed. Boye mentions that a force of 1 o,ooo 
under Tarlo advanced toward Kalics in February, but after an 
encounter with the Saxons near Warta, fell back in disorder.35 
Manstein tells of a battle between Lacy's forces and an estimated 
Io,ooo Poles, who were dispersed on 17 April in what was the only 
serious effort of the Poles to relieve Danzig. The British resident 
in Saint Petersburg was not far wrong when he reported that the 
only Polish troops were S,ooo rabble in the Danzig area. Wood-
ward in Warsaw heard that the castellan of Czersk lost nearly 6oo 
men in a clash with the Russians six miles from Danzig.36 
How could so large and populous a nation become helpless 
before so small a force of invaders? Andre Corvisier analyzes it 
as a failure to place its military nobility at the service of the state. 
Precisely the opposite phenomenon was occurring in the neigh-
boring state of Prussia, where the nobility was militarized and in-
corporated into the army. Poland was at the other extreme, the 
military institutions of the monarchy having declined to the 
point that the royal army comprised only a few companies and 
fortresses. The nobility in Poland, to use Corvisier's expression, 
escaped "domestication." 37 
Actually there may have been a moment when Danzig itself 
could have broken the siege. An attack in early May by Muen-
nich on the Hagelsburg cost the Russians several thousand casu-
alties compared to insignificant losses for the Danzigers. Had a 
sortie been attempted at this time, the siege might have ended. 
The slow but steady movement of the Russian forces and their 
acceptance of casualties gave the impression of an inexorable 
force, but the messages of the British in Saint Petersburg reveal 
that the Russian court felt considerable apprehension for possible 
French and Swedish actions. Biron was uneasy, reported Forbes, 
and must steady the tsarina. There was talk of having to raise the 
siege for some reason and "drawing the stake out of the play." On 
15 May, when doubtless the Russian losses around Danzig were 
known in Saint Petersburg, Forbes reported that Biron and Os-
terman were ready to quit Danzig if the Saxons did not do more.38 
But the French were probably unaware of any lack of resolu-
tion on the part of the Russians. This left the possible lifting of 
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the siege up to the cardinal at Versailles. At some time in late 
February or early March, Danzig received another reassurance 
from France. A letter signed by Louis on 18 February said: "You 
may rest assured that we will neglect nothing to sustain against 
all foreign efforts your just and proper sentiments, and to pro-
tect you against threats which may be made." 39 Matters were be-
coming desperate in Danzig and words were not enough. Was 
this letter intended to keep up the spirit and resistance of the 
city until that promised help arrived? We might expect rather 
serious preparations. 
The decision of the French government as to what was an ap-
propriate force to send to the Baltic did not begin to take con-
crete form until early April 1734. It was to be a modest force, 
even by the standards of that day. Plelo had recommended in 
March that a French army strike through to Saxony and, as we 
shall see, Belle Isle and others must have been encouraging such 
a plan. But the orders from Versailles were to assemble and em-
bark a force of 650 men from each of three regiments-less 
than 2,ooo men in all. A communication from the port of Calais 
acknowledged a 4 April order from the ministry to embark the 
men of the Perigord and Blaisois regiments.40 Those of the La 
Marche regiment would follow a little later. A steady exchange 
of communications continued between Segent, the commissaire 
for the expedition to Danzig, on the one hand, and the ministry 
of the navy on the other. The commissaire, in charge of admin-
istration and supply, filled the role of intendant at lower levels of 
command.41 The reports of the commander-designate of the ex-
pedition, one Brigadier La Motte de la Peyrouse, also began to 
appear in the files. 
La Motte was sixty-six years old and an experienced officer. 
His actions and reports suggest a stiff and cautious man. A biog-
rapher asserts that he was known to Dangervilliers, who wanted 
to employ him.42 Another source insists that Cardinal Fleury of-
fered the post to several colonels who refused unless granted 
certain "gratifications." La Motte left this up to the cardinal and 
was accepted.43 La Motte may have needed employment. The 
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rank of brigadier had been devised for competent lieutenant 
colonels who were unable to purchase a regiment and become 
colonels. The brigade, enabling a brigadier to command, existed 
only during hostilities. By this route a man could become a gen-
eral without ever being a colonel.44 
La Motte and Segent, on the two warships added to the expe-
dition, were delayed by contrary winds and did not arrive in 
Copenhagen until early in May 1734. Four French troop trans-
ports arrived there on 23 April, however, bearing the men of the 
Blaisois and Perigord regiments. Piela was shocked at their lack 
of provisions, both food and powder, and set about making local 
purchases. Moreover, his reaction reflected disbelief that the ex-
pedition could be so small and poorly equipped, and his mes-
sages warned that the measures undertaken were inadequate. He 
apparently chose to believe that the ships arriving at Copenha-
gen were only an advance guard and so informed Monti and the 
French ambassador in Sweden. In his message of 24 April he 
stated that officers of the expedition who came ashore told him 
they were followed by 2o,ooo men. Is it possible that he believed 
this? Probably not. In the same message he lectured the ministry, 
saying that with twenty-four or twenty-five war vessels and 1 2 ,ooo 
to 15,000 men "we will be on top of our affairs in three months 
and the North will tremble for a long time. What glory for France, 
Monseigneur, if this can be done. But also what shame if our peo-
ple, too weak to save Danzig, arrive only to share in its fall." He 
understood the risks, added Piela, but the present circumstances 
required taking chances. "There are those occasions when one 
must win or die" ("vaincre ou mourir").45 
On 1 May, still awaiting the two warships bearing La Motte 
and Segent and the remainder of the troops of the first two regi-
ments, Piela became more desperate in his appeals. He warned 
that they must send more than twenty vessels and more than 
15,000 men. Three or four battalions may encourage the Danzig-
ers and cause them to defend themselves, but it cannot prevent 
their defeat. The honor of the king and of the nation are at stake, 
he told the ministry. 46 
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La Motte and Segent arrived at Copenhagen on 4 May. The 
commander immediately wrote in his own hand to the ministry, 
giving due credit to the efforts of the ambassador in equipping 
his troops. He expected to leave the next day for Danzig. One 
may wonder whether La Motte had serious misgivings about the 
expedition he was leading into the far reaches of Europe. Ac-
knowledging that he might find obstacles at Danzig, he added 
that they would surmount them with "the help of the Lord and 
the will of our troops." It then occurred to him to insert the 
phrase "and our precautions" after the word "Lord." 47 
On 8 May the six vessels left Copenhagen for Danzig. The 
fort at the mouth of the Vistula with its Swedish colonel was no 
longer in direct communication with the city, but there were 
agreed signals regarding the arrival of help and for sorties of the 
garrison. Here on an island in the river, under the guns of the 
fort, the little force was landed on 1 1 May. They did not remain 
long. La Motte found that he could not reach Danzig because of 
Russian entrenchments which had been thrown up between the 
fort and the city. He also found the supplies in the fort disap-
pointing and held a council of war, following which, on the 
fifteenth, they reembarked the troops and returned to Copen-
hagen.48 
La Motte probably could not anticipate the reaction of Plelo 
when the expedition reappeared at Copenhagen. He had taken 
action, like any conscientious commander, for the security of the 
forces under his command and doubtless felt that he knew the 
difference between prudence and showing faint heart before the 
enemy. Plelo had been busying himself with further provisions 
for the expedition. He reported the arrival of three additional 
vessels bearing the troops of the La Marche regiment and he of-
fered his advice on the tactics to be employed at Danzig. He was 
obviously stunned to find on 20 May that the expedition had re-
turned to Copenhagen. He went on board the warship Achille 
where he wrote a report to the king stating that the expedition 
had made no effort to reach Danzig, that a panic of terror had 
seized the soldiers, then the officers, and even the commanders. 
They could not speak without trembling, he wrote, and La 
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Motte he found was a man "shocked, befuddled and absolutely 
incapable of any vigorous decision ("etonne, battant la cam-
pagne, et absolument incapable d'aucune resolution vigoreuse"). 
Only the naval officers were worthy of their king. "I saw only 
one thing to do, Sire, to put myself at the head of your troops 
and to attack the enemy .... We left, then, Sire, with the five ves-
sels of war, four transports, several landing corvettes, and the 
three regiments." On the same day he wrote to Chauvelin: "I 
don't know yet whether we will succeed but the shame, the in-
famy of what happened can only be effaced by complete victory 
or by all of our blood .... Whatever happens the king will see 
that I am worthy to serve him." 49 
Perhaps La Motte was made to feel that he had not shown 
sufficient vigor and did not resist the demand to return to Dan-
zig and the virtual taking over of his command. Not all the offi-
cers had been in favor of the return to Copenhagen. Baraillh, the 
naval commander, was critical and wrote to Maurepas on 20 June 
that he thought they had been too fearful in their reaction. 5° 
It seems doubtful that Plelo took over the command as com-
pletely as his message suggests, but at any rate the expedition 
returned to the mouth of the Vistula and disembarked on the 
same island as before. They were now, in effect, obeying the or-
ders of Plelo and Monti, although the messages of Segent and La 
Motte suggest that the decision to return was taken as soon as 
they encountered the third battalion that was to join them, and 
La Motte later describes Plelo's role at this time simply by saying 
that "Count Plelo wished absolutely to come with us." On 25 
May, from the island in the river, La Motte wrote that he was 
awaiting orders from Monti, from whom he had received a let-
ter. Had he received this at the time of the first landing, he 
added, he might not have made the decision which he did and 
which "gave rise to the suspicions which have since appeared." 51 
The order from Monti to attack the Russian defenses soon 
came. They were to attack at nine o'clock on the morning of the 
twenty-seventh, at which time a sortie from the city would be 
made. 52 The greater part of the three battalions, with an overall 
strength of probably I ,200 to I ,soo men marched on the Rus-
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sian lines. They found themselves in trouble. La Motte reported 
it as follows: 
We were first obliged to cross an area with water up to our waists. We 
didn't expect this since we had been assured there was nothing as deep 
as the ankles. This caused many powder cases and arms to be wetted. 
After this we entered a wood where after a thousand paces we came to 
the fortifications of the enemy before which there was a great defense of 
felled trees. Our grenadiers threw themselves on this with all the valor 
possible but most of the officers of these two units had already been 
killed or wounded by the heavy fire of the enemy, and being unable to 
extend to the right or left because of the narrow way in the woods, al-
most all of the first troops perished there. Two redoubts, which we had 
not been able to see, and which struck us from left and right with can-
non fire, broke the column, which was not in complete formation. 
The soldiers, astonished to find such an obstacle in a place where 
they expected to surprise the enemy, were obliged to fall back as they 
saw the large body of infantry troops which came to reinforce the area. 
This caused me to pull back to the protection of the fort, and by a mis-
fortune for which I will never be able to console myself, M. de Plelo, who 
wished to follow me in spite of my wishes and the efforts I made to pre-
vent this, was killed here. 53 
Segent duly reported the loss of 7 officers and go soldiers 
killed, and 24 officers and 112 soldiers wounded. La Motte com-
mented further on the engagement, saying: "I foresaw this 
catastrophe, which was against all the rules of war which my ex-
perience taught me ... but the ardor of Count Plelo and the or-
ders of the marquis de Monti prevailed." 5 4 A letter sent by the 
chevalier de La Luzerne, commander of the men of the Peri-
gord regiment, to his brother a few days after the engagement 
probably gives us a clearer picture. According to him, both Plelo 
and Monti, in spite of the genuine obstacles which were pointed 
out to them, insisted on an attack on the enemy in his entrench-
ments in an attempt to force through to the city. 
We executed their orders on the twenty-seventh of this month and we 
had our nose bloodied. The regiment, and that of LaMarche and Blai-
sois, have lost more than 130 men and all of our grenadiers, a number 
of officers killed, a great number wounded, of which I am one by a ball 
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which cut a vein from the temple to the ear. I have been bled twice but 
hope there will be no further consequences. I forgot to tell you that M. 
de Ple!o, who wished to come with us, has remained here. 
What throws me into despair, my dear brother, is that we are here 
with people more dangerous for us than for our enemies, and that they 
would sacrifice us all without being able to execute our commission, that 
of rescuing the father-in-law of our king. We are about to die of hunger, 
abandoned by everyone, and worse than ever before.55 
From this time on there is little spirit in the expedition and, 
except for a sortie from the city on 1 June, which did not change 
the situation, no further actions. La Motte and his men, like the 
besieged in Danzig, await rescue from some quarter. Plelo and 
Monti have played their cards and lost. The reckless flash of feu-
dal chivalry has given way and the ways of eighteenth-century 
military custom have reasserted themselves. Plelo, who was will-
ing to sacrifice his life and the lives of men under him but would 
not plot to assassinate the head of an enemy state, was dead. It is 
very possible that he was killed by his own men. The account of 
the battle indicates that the French retreated before they had ac-
tually reached the enemy entrenchments, certainly before they 
had attacked them in hand-to-hand fighting. Yet Plelo's body 
bore bayonet wounds when it was returned by the Russians.56 
But success had been closer than would appear from the for-
lorn attack of Pli~lo and La Motte. As we have seen, the Russians 
were threatening as late as 15 May to abandon the siege if the 
Saxons did not assist them. The Saxons arrived-eight battal-
ions and twenty-two squadrons-on 25 May, two days before the 
engagement. The Russians also decided to commit their fleet at 
precisely the right moment, and it arrived on the scene before 
Danzig at a time when the luckless French expedition was hop-
ing and expecting a French relief squadron to appear. 57 
The expected French relief squadron was a casualty of Car-
dinal Fleury's determination to keep the war within bounds-
bounds which he had chosen. A decision to prepare a squadron 
often warships at Brest had been made and Duguay-Trouin was 
given the command. Duguay set about his work with great en-
ergy but partly because of a breakdown in his health and partly 
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because of the irresolution of the French government no squad-
ron ever sailed. It became a phantom squadron, awaited by the 
desperate Monti, La Motte, and, until his death, Plelo. Monti 
sent a letter via Copenhagen to Duguay. Plelo's successor in Co-
penhagen, Malbran la Noue, by this time aware that the fleet 
would never sail, simply held the letter. La Motte seems to have 
believed that help was coming after the unsuccessful attack. He 
reported: "While awaiting the arrival of M. Duguay-Trouin I 
have withdrawn the troops into the camp on the island." On 1, 3, 
and 11 June he continued to mention in communications that he 
awaited Duguay-Trouin. His situation was desperate but he did 
not dramatize it. "I am very impatient to seeM. Duguay-Trouin 
arrive." 58 
What had happened to the will of the French? The answer is 
clearly a fear of involvement with the English. Chauvelin wrote 
on 29 May to the already dead Plelo, praising the measures he 
had taken but noting the uneasiness of the English and the need 
to show them that France was acting in moderation. On 14]une 
the ministry wrote that the Council of State had decided that 
with the uncertainty regarding the English they could not send 
more than five vessels, which it was hoped would raise the siege 
with the two battalions on board. 5 9 A more quietly dramatic rev-
elation of the attitude at Versailles comes from the interlinea-
tions on Segent's report of 28 May which acted as a cover letter 
for his report of casualties. The notes written between the lines 
and in the margin may have been those of Dangervilliers and 
quite possibly were made during the council meeting noted 
above. We find the following: "We must disabuse ourselves of M. 
Duguay-Trouin since the English might follow him into the Bal-
tic and he would not be sure of returning." 60 
So no help came to the little camp of soldiers at the mouth of 
the Vistula. The five transports with two additional battalions 
failed to arrive before the French expedition capitulated. In any 
event there was no intention to send them past Copenhagen un-
less an escort of vessels of war was at hand.61 Baraillh waited 
with his five transports at Copenhagen in case he was needed to 
reembark the expedition. He awaited Duguay-Trouin, accord-
ing to Malbran, but instead was sent orders from Maurepas on 
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11 July to return to France. The expedition had surrendered 
and he was not needed.62 
Monti had not been ready to give up after the failure of the 
27 May attack and continued to communicate with La Motte and 
plan attacks. La Motte's reply to this call for further action was 
that he was waiting for Duguay-Trouin and that they had little 
bread left. Monti agreed to try to send provisions. The attack 
had failed because La Motte had attacked in the wrong place, 
said Monti, but "ce qui est fait, est fait." In a postscript to his 
message of 18 June he added that if La Motte would try another 
attack, he would send an officer who knew the country.63 
But it was too late for another attack. They were under attack 
themselves on their exposed island. The Russian fleet had un-
loaded cannon and ammunition and begun a bombardment of 
the Weichselmiinde fort while pushing their works closer. On 18 
June the French officers held a council of war in which each stat-
ed his opinion. Most were ready to send an envoy to Marshal 
Muennich to ask for terms. Conveniently, the next day Muen-
nich sent a demand for surrender to La Motte. But while this 
capitulation began to take form La Motte was embarrassed to re-
ceive a letter from the king of Poland, countersigned by Monti, 
the burden of which was that La Motte should not surrender if 
the king did not. It was a last effort to prolong the siege, but it 
had no effect. La Motte's response, signed also by his officers, 
was that they found it impossible to execute the orders.64 A rep-
resentation of the expedition was sent to Muennich with full 
powers to negotiate and by 23 June a document showing there-
quests of the French and the answers by the Russians in parallel 
columns had been drawn up. The next day Marshal Muennich, 
the duke of Saxony, and Admiral Gordon, commander of the 
Russian fleet, came to the French camp. On the twenty-sixth the 
French went on board the Russian ships.65 
The French surrender was with all the honors of war. The 
principal condition of the Russians was that the Russian ship 
Mittau and its crew, taken earlier by the French in the Baltic, be 
returned. Although it was agreed by the Russians that the French 
would be returned to Copenhagen, they were taken to the Rus-
sian naval base at Cronstadt until the French returned the Mittau. 
SIEGE OF DANZIG 
It was only after great hardships, including a shipwreck for some, 
that the survivors and La Motte reached France in the spring of 
1735. Boencourt estimated that only about 200 of each regiment 
returned of the 65o-man regiments sent out. La Motte was pro-
moted to marshal de camp and made governor of the citadel of 
Valenciennes. Certain "gratifications" in small sums of money 
were given to the officers.66 We find nothing to indicate that Louis 
XV ever concerned himself with the memory of the man who so 
zealously, if imprudently, sought to save his king's honor, Count 
Plelo. 
After the surrender of the French expedition the city did not 
long survive. As early as April there was evidence that the lead-
ers of the city were seeking an "honorable capitulation." Accord-
ing to an unsigned document in the Austrian files, dated 15 
April in Berlin, the city of Danzig had approached the king of 
Prussia in terms "forts lamentables" asking his assistance. They 
sought in exchange for submission to Augustus III a general 
amnesty, the retention of their old privileges, no garrison and 
definitely not a Russian one, permission for Stanislas and his ad-
herents to leave under Prussian escort, and withdrawal of the 
Russian army from the city and its territory. 67 
Prince Eugene was shortly thereafter in possession of this 
approach to the king of Prussia through Seckendorff in Berlin. 
He gave his opinion to the emperor that to restore the peace of 
the North nothing would be better ("nichts Gewiinschteres zu 
sein") than to get Stanislas out of Poland and let him withdraw to 
France. Eugene, who at that moment had just arrived in the 
Rhine area to take command of the forces there, may have felt 
that his master would be unable to dismiss Stanislas so easily, 
and he added that of course there might be circumstances of 
which he was unaware and the emperor might be better able to 
decide.68 
By May the British were looking ahead and suggesting clem-
ency for Danzig, a port of considerable importance in the Baltic 
trade. Forbes pointed out to the Russians that such clemency 
would reflect honor on the tsarina and would, in view of the 
trade between Danzig and British ports, be viewed favorably by 
the king of England.69 
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The city capitulated on 30 June 1734. Muennich received let-
ters in the most humble terms from the important Polish leaders 
in Danzig, accepting Augustus III as king. Monti became Muen-
nich's prisoner, delivered up by the burghers of Danzig accord-
ing to one report, but Stanislas was not to be found, and the 
leading Poles disclaimed knowledge of his escape. 70 
Stanislas had left the city secretly with a Swedish associate, 
General Steinfticht, and one other person. Although they be-
came separated, Stanislas was able to cross into Prussian terri-
tory and was recognized in the town of Marienwerder on 4 July. 
He had asked the king of Prussia for protection, and the king 
was sufficiently annoyed by the elector of Saxony to refuse to 
take any action against the refugee king. As a matter of fact he 
permitted Stanislas to set himself up in the old castle of the Teu-
tonic grand masters in Konigsberg where the supporters of the 
exiled king began to gather round him. 71 
Monti and the primate were less fortunate. Monti was con-
sidered by the Russians to have lost his diplomatic immunity by 
his actions at Danzig. It must have been disagreeable for the 
French to ask the British to intercede for them to recover their 
soldiers and their ambassador, for the British had quietly but 
firmly opposed them in every court in Europe, but they did so, 
and asked the help of the Dutch as well. The Russians were will-
ing to release the French troops when they received their frigate 
from the French, but Monti, they said, was not accredited to the 
Russian court and had violated international law by bearing 
arms and acting as a French general, which could be proved by 
intercepted messages. 72 The British and Dutch intercessions 
were met with a declaration detailing the violations committed 
by Monti and stating that he deserved to be treated as an enemy 
of the empress of Russia. 73 Monti remained a prisoner at Thorn 
for eighteen months and died shortly after his release and re-
turn to France. 
The primate remained in prison for a year. He wrote person-
ally to the tsarina without result. The pope pleaded his cause 
with the emperor who interceded with the tsarina to secure his 
release. 74 
Stanislas remained at Konigsberg as a government in exile. 
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After some fleeting success in starting a new uprising under 
Adam Tarlo, and a further effort of Steinfticht to organize a 
mass levy in Podlesia, his efforts ceased. He would be forced to 
remain in Konigsberg while the negotiations involving him took 
place without his concurrence.75 
The city of Danzig was saddled with a great debt by the terms 
of the agreement of capitulation, and its representatives were 
still pleading with the Russian court through the British for an 
abatement of the sum when the war ended in 1735. 
Poland now recedes from view. The attention of the great 
powers and their diplomatic and military efforts move back to-
ward the West. The spotlight on the side stage has been extin-
guished. And it is easy to agree with Boye when he says that 
Fleury and Chauvelin had a great deal to answer for in what he 
calls the false treaty of Danzig.76 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
The War in the Rhineland in 1734 
Military activity north of the Alps in 1734, apart from the mat-
ter of Danzig and a few small encounters, would be restricted 
to three French initiatives: a siege of Trarbach on the Moselle 
River, an attack on the Ettlingen Lines near present-day Karls-
ruhe, and a siege of the great Rhine fortress of Philippsburg. It 
was a fairly modest effort considering the strong French forces 
available, but the efforts of eager subordinate commanders to 
extend the conflict would be set against the strong will of the 
senior commander, Marshal Berwick, and that of the old cardi-
nal at Versailles. 
During the winter months of 1734 military operations in 
Italy had slowed and in Germany they had virtually ceased. The 
weather permitted limited operations in Italy during the winter 
months but in the Rhine Valley the armies, like a modern circus, 
went into winter quarters until the roads became passable in the 
spring and grass for the horses began to grow. Military posts in 
the Rhineland reported and evaluated the strengths of enemy 
forces and any other intelligence they could secure, particularly 
any construction of defenses that might change the military 
balance. Since France was the aggressor, the problem for the 
French was to decide how and when they wished to engage the 
imperial forces when weather permitted a resumption of opera-
tions. The emperor's problem was a defensive one-how to se-
cure the contingents of troops from the German princes and 
provincial assemblies in accordance with the declaration of war 
which would be made by the imperial Diet at Regensburg, and 
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how to build up the imperial army to meet an attack. It was hoped 
that he would also receive help from his allies, England, Holland, 
and Russia. 
According to an official French version of the 1734 campaign 
published later in that year, the French government initially 
wished to undertake no projects on the Rhine and intended to 
remain on the defensive, drawing only upon French resources 
for the supply of the army. But a later decision was made to en-
gage in some operations before the emperor could assemble his 
army, since it was not believed that he could field a significant 
force before June. The town and fortified chateau at Trarbach 
had been used for sorties against the French in a previous war, 
and Belle Isle proposed a siege of both Trarbach and the city of 
Luxembourg. The latter objective was not approved but a siege 
of Trarbach appears to have had conditional approval early in 
the year. In view of the requirement for early action, colonels 
were ordered to their regiments by 1 April and generals by 15 
ApriJ.l 
Two memoirs in the French military archives probably repre-
sent the attitude of the ministry of war in the spring of 1734. 
Both are dated 8 April and, although they differ somewhat in 
proposed operations, the basic concepts are the same and French 
operations in 1734 were in general responsive to them.2 
Both documents stress that the principal effort must be made 
in Italy. One memoir notes that the object of the war is to injure 
the emperor and reduce his power. "Success in Italy is enough." 
There are no conquests to be made in Germany, the text con-
tinues, and the war on the Rhine is only a strong diversion of 
which the success is of only secondary importance. It is necessary 
to cross the Rhine and open the eyes of the German princes 
so that they will bring pressure upon the emperor. The other 
memoir takes a similar point of view, adding that enterprise in 
Germany will stir jealousy in England and fear in Holland. The 
principal difference between the two memoirs is that one seems 
to fear an imperial riposte on the lower Rhine and proposes that 
Coblenz be taken to check the movements of the Danes, Hano-
verians, and Hessians, while the other sees this area as too far 
north to consider. This less aggressive memoir finds disadvan-
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tages in almost any French move that can be made. Philippsburg 
can be attacked only in September, it believes, because high 
water floods the area earlier in the summer. The Ettlingen Lines 
close the roads to those who cross at Kehl or Fort Louis. To cross 
below at Philippsburg one must have Mannheim and the Elector 
Palatine there does not appear ready to receive us. Breisach and 
Freiburg lead nowhere. Luxembourg is part of the Lowlands, 
and the king of France has accepted the neutrality of this area. In 
the Moselle Valley there is only the chateau at Trarbach which 
"belongs to the elector of Trier who has not definitely declared 
himself yet." Some hand, possibly that of Dangervilliers, changed 
the language in the quoted passage to "belongs to the Empire," 
which probably reflected that the memoir was being overtaken by 
events, since General Belle Isle and his forces entered the city of 
Trier on 8 April, the date of the memoir. 
The recapitulation at the end of the memoir makes the fol-
lowing points as recommendations: 1) have 4o,ooo men in Al-
sace by 20 April ready to cross the Rhine at Mannheim or above; 
2) leave 10,ooo men to occupy Speyer and mask the move to-
wards Philippsburg; 3) use the magazines at Landau for the 
troops, then those of the Elector Palatine; 4) put 1o,ooo men in 
the area of Luxembourg to contain the imperial garrison and 
support an action at Trarbach; 5) the 16,ooo men that were des-
tined for Flanders can replace those at Luxembourg when the 
attack is made on Trarbach; 6) see Philippsburg always as the 
end of the campaign. 
Thus the only feasible initiatives foreseen were attacks on 
Trarbach and Philippsburg. In short, the French, although the 
aggressors, contemplated only the taking of a fort on the Mo-
selle and another on the Rhine. And the last point above put a 
definite period to the military campaign. 
As the French planned the timing of their 1734 campaign, 
they had two main factors to consider. The first was that the em-
peror and Prince Eugene were using all their considerable influ-
ence to get the military contingents from the German princes in 
motion to join the imperial army. Until these various contribu-
tions arrived, the imperial army would be extremely weak. It was 
an excellent time for a French attack. On the other hand, spring 
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campaigns were limited by the grass available for the horses, and 
the supply was not usually adequate until late May. As the mem-
oir noted: "This is the most important restraint of all." Some 
compromise between the two factors was needed. 
In view of the need for early operations Berwick was back in 
Alsace at the end of March, and messages signed Berwick began 
to emanate from Strasbourg. The intelligence he received led 
hirn to believe that the enemy was assembling forces behind the 
Ettlingen Lines, and that the fortresses of Breisach, Freiberg, 
artd Philippsburg were lightly garrisoned. In messages to his 
subordinate in the Moselle Valley preparing to attack Trarbach, 
he called attention to this assembly of imperial troops. Berwick 
was also informed that imperial couriers had been sent to hasten 
the arrival of the Hessian and Hanoverian forces, and from the 
French ambassador in Berlin came the news that the Prussian 
regiments promised to the emperor had been withdrawn from 
Prussia and Pomerania and had arrived in Berlin in preparation 
for a move toward the Rhine.3 The French were pressed by 
these reports to move as soon as they could. 
The remains of the fortified chateau of Trarbach still cling to 
the steep hill above the town of Trarbach and its sister town, 
Trarben. The lovely Moselle winds through the valley in deep 
curves. Where the high steep banks did not face the sunless 
North, they were covered with vineyards, then as now. With 
both Coblenz at the mouth of the Moselle and the fortified city 
of Luxembourg to the southeast in imperial hands, the chateau 
at Trarbach represented the controlling center of a corridor 
which led directly, if somewhat tortuously, into France. The Mo-
selle frontier was a sensitive one for France. Belle Isle's elaborate 
defense plan for this sector, as shown in Chapter 5, was too am-
bitious to be put into action. But throughout the war French com-
manders would worry about keeping the imperial forces directly 
before them in the Rhine Valley and fear an attack around their 
northern flank through the Moselle and Meuse valleys. Luxem-
bourg is closer to Paris than Strasbourg is. 
A French military memoir dated 12 April 1734 discusses the 
problem of the Moselle, stating that this was the most threatened 
WAR IN RHINELAND, 1734 1 39 
frontier. The solution recommended was to put enough troops 
in the triangle formed by the Moselle and the Rhine to eat up 
the subsistence there. This would keep the enemy on the other 
side of the Rhine until the grass was growing, according to the 
memoir. The general would spare the country as much as possi-
ble, but it was indispensable to take the hay and grain. Straw and 
wood was needed for the soldiers. "We need a great deal of 
wood for cooking bread and may have to go as far as to demolish 
houses to get it. And we need cows to infinity." 4 
Belle Isle assembled his army-probably approaching 2o,ooo 
men-on the plain above Sierck on 7 April and moved into Trier, 
which was unfortified and whose gates were thrown open by the 
citizens. The elector of Trier had only a few troops and these were 
in Trarbach and Coblenz. Belle Isle sent his brother, the chevalier 
de Belle Isle, ahead from Trier to take the walled city ofTrarbach. 
This was accomplished with little resistance on 15 April. But the 
chateau, to which the military forces in the town withdrew, had 
bombproof underground defenses. Although it had no forward 
works about it, its crenelated walls allowed the garrison to put up 
fire without exposing themselves.5 
After Belle Isle had moved into the territory of the elector of 
Trier he was given permission to besiege the chateau at Trar-
bach, but the final decision was left up to him and on 15 April 
Berwick asked him if he had definitely decided to go ahead with 
the siege. There was always the chance that some of the units of 
Hessians, Prussians, or Danes moving southward toward the im-
perial army might be diverted towards the Moselle. The duke of 
Noailles, who commanded the army of observation that moved 
between the Moselle and Berwick's main force near Speyer, 
called this to Belle Isle's attention, adding that Berwick had even 
talked of giving up the idea of a siege at Trarbach and changing 
the positions of his army. On 20 April Berwick also cautioned 
Belle Isle, suggesting that he watch a movement of Hessian 
troops near Schwalbach. 6 
But Belle Isle would get his siege and make the most of it. 
The messages from Berwick reflect some of the impatience of 
the old marshal with his bumptious subordinate. Berwick could 
be sure that his cautious policy was that of the cardinal, but Belle 
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Isle too had friends at court. Dangervilliers was one who sought 
Belle Isle's friendship and criticized the marshal's decisions. He 
assured Belle Isle, in a letter of 6 April, that the imperials could 
not assemble a large force in early spring. "We will be the mas-
ters during April." He then went on to cast doubts on the inten-
tions of Berwick. "If, in spite of all appearances, the marshal 
should not consider it appropriate to make any significant oper-
ation, I confess to you that I should be very sad to see only these 
movements." The marshal is only using up forage, he observed, 
and if he is not going to do anything it will ruin the lands of the 
Elector Palatine with whom we are not angry. But, he added fi-
nally, perhaps the marshal has a plan. 7 
Belle Isle must have been amused to receive a letter of this 
sort, with its confidential tone, from his war minister and anoth-
er with the same date, but with quite a different tone, from his 
superior, Marshal Berwick. 
I have your letter of the fourth saying that you will not be able to have 
the regiments leave until after the expedition of the chevalier de Belle 
Isle. Until I have news of what is happening at Trarbach and what you 
recognize as possible to do this month I cannot make a decision. But in 
order not to lose time have the goodness to advance (illegible word) 
troops over to this side in accordance with the letter which I sent you the 
day before yesterday. I pray you in the future to follow to the letter what 
I tell you.8 
It is strong language from one senior general to another. 
One is tempted to believe that Belle Isle may have held the two 
communications before him at arms length, one in each hand, 
and laughed. Lee Kennett was correct when he observed that 
Belle Isle "always had difficulty distinguishing the functions of a 
minister from those of a general," although he was speaking of 
Belle Isle as war minister a quarter-century later. 9 
Dangervilliers also offered advice, telling Belle Isle that the 
chateau at Trarbach was more difficult to take than it had been 
in an earlier campaign. It will take from twelve to fifteen days to 
position the artillery, he noted. They could hold out a month 
and take you into June. It is not expected that you will be inter-
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rupted by the enemy, but it appears that the marshal has other 
plans and you may have to join him. After Trarbach is taken, 
concluded the minister, the marshal will be d son aise along the 
Rhine. A few days later he advised Belle Isle that there were 
troubles at Speyer and the marshal had hanged four soldiers. 
"Keep your troops in a condition in which you do not have to do 
the same." Belle Isle could feel himself on fairly firm ground. 
The minister was corresponding directly with him and with his 
younger brother, one of his subordinate commanders. And Belle 
Isle's letters had been read to the king, Dangervilliers told him. 10 
The siege itself could not have been a very difficult one. 
Some 40 members of the town's garrison were captured. The 
garrison of the chateau was composed of 6oo men furnished by 
the elector and 100 imperial troops sent in from Luxembourg. 
During the first few days the French tried a number of methods 
to force entry but were thrown back and on the 25 April began 
the standard procedure of opening the first parallel. Other nor-
mal procedures were followed. For example, the French agreed 
not to attack from the town side and the garrison agreed not to 
fire from that side. By 2 May, after 2,687 shells had fallen in the 
fort and all but two of its cannon were out of action, the white 
flag went up. The garrison marched out, drums beating with 
two cannons and a mortar and were allowed to proceed to Co-
blenz. There the elector of Trier, in his great Rhine fortress of 
Ehrenbreitstein, wrote to Prince Eugene of his great satisfaction 
with the performance of both his own commander and the im-
perial representative at Trarbach. The imperial officer himself 
was of a different opinion and so unhappy about the defense un-
dertaken that he would not sign the capitulation. The French re-
port noted a French loss of 200 men to only 10 lost by the enemy 
and suggested that the unexpectedly early surrender of the for-
tress at Trarbach might have been related to the fact that the 
commander was young and newly married.11 
And Belle Isle made the most of it. Berwick consented-we 
may assume without enthusiasm-to the return of the chevalier 
de Belle Isle to Versailles to report personally to the king. Belle 
Isle also enjoyed a note from Chauvelin, who hoped he would 
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take Coblenz as easily as Trarbach. Dangervilliers threw in his 
flattery and even the cardinal felt compelled to tell Belle Isle that 
the king was well satisfied with his conduct and was impressed by 
the taking of Trarbach and other achievements.12 
But Berwick now took firm hold as the theater commander, 
moving his main forces on 1 May. He gave Belle Isle clear orders 
on 6 May that as soon as he was finished with Trarbach he was to 
join him on the Rhine. On 11 May he told him to blow up the 
two forts of Trarbach and Kim on the Moselle. 13 Belle Isle left 
Trarbach on 15 May to join Berwick. The final razing of the Mo-
selle forts was accomplished only after several further weeks of 
discussion. 
The position of the elector of Trier must have been a painful 
one. The colonel commanding the elector's forces at Coblenz 
wrote to Belle Isle concerning the officer and men who were 
taken prisoner in the town of Trarbach. He called attention to 
the fact that there had been no declaration of war on either the 
French side or that of the elector. Since the soldiers were simply 
for the protection of the town and not for hostilities, could they 
not be released? If not, would he discuss ransom terms? The 
French answer from Belle Isle was that the elector's vote in the 
imperial diet at Regensburg had been against France and the 
men would be considered prisoners of war. Still, this was not 
total war. Although the plundering of the population in the area 
was undoubtedly severe and workers were forced into the dig-
ging and construction required by a siege, there were at least 
some promises of restitution. Belle Isle told the elector that he 
regretted taking the forage but that it was unavoidable and he 
would give a receipt as in France. 14 
The elector of Trier was not alone in his discomfort. The 
Austrian files contain the apologetic letters of smaller German 
sovereigns who found that as close neighbors of France they 
could not be supporters of their emperor. One letter to Prince 
Eugene in 1734 poses the dilemma: 
This will inform you of the things which I cannot report to you [offi-
cially] so that you will not think ill of us. As you know, the emperor 
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wrote to our prince to send a contingent of troops. His Majesty believed 
that he should respond and on the nineteenth of last month he did, ask-
ing him to accept money rather than a contingent because we have no 
troops. We have had no response from the emperor. 
If we should try to put troops on foot they would melt like snow in 
the sun. We would never get any from the king of Prussia or the electors 
of Cologne or the Palatinate. 
To avoid the ruin of the country we have done as the other princes 
of the empire bordering France in trying to arrange with France a treaty 
of contribution. 15 
An imperial rescript of 8 June 1734 would recognize the 
problem and allow princes who were prevented by enemy action 
or other causes from sending a contingent to pay in money. 16 
Thus the unfortunate princes must count themselves lucky to 
pay their "contributions" to the French and to the emperor 
simultaneously. 
The fall of Trarbach and the absorption of Belle Isle's sepa-
rate command into Berwick's army would end the attempt of the 
subordinate to take a large share of the action, but he was al-
ready marked as "un homme d'une ambition demesure." In a 
personal letter the aging and renowned military theorist, the 
chevalier de Folard, congratulated Belle Isle on his siege of Trar-
bach and noted that although the French had by this time crossed 
the Rhine he did not think they would take proper advantage of 
it. What should be done, said Folard, was to "detach a corps of 
2o,ooo men, commanded by yourself, and have it march straight 
into Saxony. Nothing easier. And it would greatly disturb the 
Muscovites and the duke of Saxony." 17 Rumors of such a possi-
ble move must have been current, for Prince Eugene's represen-
tative in Baden wrote that the French were spreading rumors of 
a corps of 3o,ooo men under Belle Isle attacking through Hesse 
into Saxony. Eugene, picking up the story from this source or 
some other, passed it on to the emperor. As Eugene saw it there 
could be an army of 25,000 under Belle Isle passing through 
Hesse into Saxony while Berwick placed his army between the 
Main and the Neckar to engage Eugene. 18 
Eel!e Isle would push the cardinal into such a project in a fu-
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ture war, but at the moment he must be content with the siege of 
Trarbach-a classic siege if a small one. 
Berwick kept his own counsel on what he intended to do. His 
subordinate, the duke de Noailles, when ordered to move to-
ward the Rhine with the army that had been supporting Belle 
Isle, told the latter that the marshal kept the plan secret but that 
he could not be prevented from guessing. He hoped it would be 
something "grand et decisif." A few days later Noailles found 
himself across the Rhine with the advance guard, moving on the 
Ettlingen Lines, while Berwick wrote to Versailles: "I began to-
day to cross the Rhine." 19 
Berwick's plan was to cross the Rhine with two armies, one 
above and one below the fortress of Philippsburg, and descend 
upon that strong point from two directions. The actual numbers 
of men involved in these operations is impossible to determine 
with great accuracy, since the actual strength of units varied 
greatly and even the numbers of units reported in different pe-
riods is difficult to interpret. In general the French forces were 
building toward the 1oo,ooo mark for Berwick's entire com-
mand. At the beginning of May about 2o,ooo were still in the 
Moselle Valley under Belle Isle. French order of battle reports 
during the last of April show more than 100 battalions and 150 
squadrons of horse in Berwick's army, including those on the 
Moselle. On 24 April there were 38 battalions at Speyer with 14 
coming from Homburg and 24 more expected, making a total of 
76 battalions available for the Rhine crossings. With the attached 
cavalry squadrons Berwick probably had up to 8o,ooo men for 
the crossings-which was the estimate made by Eugene.20 
One army at Speyer was placed under d'Asfeld, who had re-
cently arrived from Italy, and the other under Berwick himself 
began crossing the Rhine at Kehl and over a new bridge at Fort 
Louis. This latter body was the army that would confront the 
Ettlingen Lines. 
The Ettlingen Lines figured strongly in the French com-
munications, and in the months preceding the campaign French 
intelligence gleaned all the information about the lines they 
could obtain. Basically, the lines were a linear fortification that 
WAR IN RHINELAND, 1734 145 
stretched from a point on the Rhine River in or near what is to-
day the city of Karlsruhe in an irregular series of obstacles across 
the lowlands bordering the river and into the hills. They were in 
existence during the War of the Spanish Succession and had 
been broken by Villars in 1707.21 Since then, and particularly 
during the winter of 1734, efforts were made to reconstruct and 
improve the lines. In the flat country they were strengthened 
by trenches, blockhouses, and even by an area which was to be 
inundated in case of attack. In the hills there were trenches-
still to be seen today-and felled trees. In its greatest concept it 
was to be a long diagonal from the Philippsburg area, through 
Karlsruhe, to terminate in the hills near the town of Spessart. 
Actually, although there were posts along the Rhine above Phil-
ippsburg, the serious effort to create a line of obstacles which 
could be defended was limited to the fourteen kilometers from 
Daxlanden near the Rhine, across the lowlands south of Ettlin-
gen, and up into the hills. Already in January 1734 the French 
noted the improvements which had been made and a message 
from General de Quandt to Marshal Du Bourg estimated that the 
lines would embarrass the beginning of a campaign and that the 
end of the line in the hills probably could not be turned. Five 
thousand men, peasants and soldiers, were working on the line, 
he had reported. The imperials had indeed been busy. General 
Freiherr von Schmettau had worked from 26 December 1733 to 
March 1734 to put the lines into a defensive condition.22 
By 26 April Eugene had arrived in Heilbronn, some fifty kilo-
meters east of the army headquarters at Waghausel. He had come 
by way of Nuremberg to avoid, as much as possible, the Bavarian 
lands. He wrote to the emperor that he did not yet have informa-
tion on enemy movements and had not yet had the opportunity of 
talking to the commanders, Bevern and Wiirttemberg. His chief 
concern, he emphasized, was to get the promised reinforcements 
from the empire-the auxiliary, circle, and Reich troops, the ar-
rival of which he hoped to hasten by letters directly to the several 
courts involved and by the efforts of Seckendorff and Kiifstein. 
The offer of the king of Prussia to send more than his promised 
contingent of 1o,ooo men, which was mentioned as early as July 
1733, had been renewed and forwarded to him by Seckendorff. 
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According to the latter the king of Prussia suggested sending his 
entire army-which the ambassador thought meant an addi-
tional thirty battalions and eighty squadrons above the Io,ooo-
into the Moselle Valley, and he asked Eugene whether the offer 
should be accepted. Eugene's reaction, in his letter to the em-
peror, was that the promised 1 o,ooo must be started on their way 
first; this should not in any way be delayed by the possibility of 
sending a larger force. Moreover, although it would be a fine 
thing to have the king of Prussia produce such a diversion against 
the French, it was unlikely that he would allow his entire army to 
move so far while there was still animosity between him and the 
elector of Saxony and while he had difficulties with the Russians 
over the movement of artillery.23 
The next day Eugene arrived at the camp at Waghausel, near 
Philippsburg, to take command of the army. He found the impe-
rial troops stretched over a line from the Black Forest to Coblenz. 
Of a strength of sixty-nine battalions, forty-one grenadier com-
panies, and sixty-nine squadrons of horse, he had only thirteen 
battalions, eight grenadier companies, and forty-four squadrons 
in the camp as a field army to meet the French attack. After he 
had examined the situation he wrote: "In spite of all these effec-
tive troops available, they were beyond my reach by their deploy-
ment, and I had to make d~ with the 15,000 men at hand." 24 He 
awaited the reluctant sending of princely contingents, some of 
which would never come at all if their princes felt themselves 
threatened and elected to hold their forces at home. Some even 
asked for troops from Eugene, who countered with the argu-
ment that there would then be "the danger that an invading en-
emy would cut off one part of the forces from another and 
consequently one corps after another would be lost." 25 
After Eugene learned on 1 May that the French had crossed 
the Rhine he received several contradictory reports which caused 
him to delay his decision for action. But in the night of 3 May he 
had positive information that a strong French force was ap-
proaching the Ettlingen Lines from the south and ordered troops 
into the lines. However, on the morning of the fourth he made a 
personal inspection of the lines and found them untenable. The 
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troops then in the lines were ordered out and a general retreat 
began.26 
Not an impressive reaction on the Austrian side. But when 
this conflict is seen from the French side it represents a daring 
attack upon a formidable defense line commanded by the most 
feared general in Europe. It was precisely at this moment, when 
it was recognized that the physical powers as well as the influence 
of the great Eugene were slipping away from him, that a young 
and energetic leader entered the scene opposite him as an enemy 
subordinate commander. This was the opportunity for Maurice 
de Saxe, the illegitimate son of Augustus II of Saxony and later 
one of France's greatest generals, to win the recognition that he 
had been so avidly seeking. Maurice, then a colonel, was the eager 
subordinate of Noailles in the force that approached the Ettlin-
gen Lines. At some point in the day of 4 May Maurice and Eugene 
must have been quite near one another. The events of the day 
were reported to the ministry by Noailles on 8 May in a fifteen-
page message, and were dramatized in the journal of Noailles's 
command for the days 1-5 MayP 
2 May. We crossed the Rhine and camped at lphintzaim [lffezheim]. M. 
le Due de Noailles and M. le Comte de Saxe were detached with two reg-
iments of dragoons, the Hussars, 400 gardes du corps, and 14 com-
panies of grenadiers .... 
3 May. The army marched in 3 columns to a place near the Lines of 
Oethlingen. The due de Noailles had left Rastatt at dawn to reconnoiter 
the lines. Count Saxe advanced with the Hussars and a detachment of 
dragoons through the woods which cover the lines up to within musket 
range. Several cannon shots were fired at him and the Hussars carried 
away 1 ,200 sheep which were at the edge of the enemy entrenchments. 
At three in the afternoon the due de Noailles marched toward the 
mountains and stopped at the foot of them. Count Saxe used the little 
daylight left to find a passage in the mountains and a terrain suitable for 
assembling troops. With four Hussars anrl twelve dragoons he penetrat-
ed up to the top of the mountains by a tre<il where one could pass only in 
single file, and there he found a space large enough for the troops .... 
The troops climbed up in single file at dawn on the fourth by this path. 
It took them an hour to climb up and two hours to assemble ... after 
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which they began to march toward the line in good order .... Count de 
Saxe placed himself before the grenadiers sword in hand and cried, 
"Battalions, March." What a proud moment! ... Firing was heavy and 
stubborn on both sides. Finally the weight of valor and numbers carried 
and the enemy was obliged to retire in confusion .... The enemy who 
feared, with reason, that the French would arrive on the plain by the 
gorge of Ettlingen . . . abandoned all their works and retired to the 
trenches with the rest of their army. Prince Eugene himself was in 
the lines. 
5 May. Marshal Berwick entered the lines with the cavalry and took up 
his headquarters .... If Count de Saxe had not carried the lines we 
would have been obliged to have recourse to delaying expedients, per-
haps to that of retiring some leagues because the troops of Prince Eu-
gene were arriving very rapidly.28 
It is not too much to say that this exploit made the career of 
Maurice de Saxe. On 19 May, Dangervilliers sent him a letter of 
commendation, noting that his performance in the attack on the 
lines had been called to the attention of the king. On 22 May 
a short note from Cardinal Fleury to Maurice acknowledged 
his attack on the lines.29 Like Belle Isle, Maurice was wild for 
advancement. 
Farther downstream the army of d' Asfeld had crossed the 
Rhine near Mannheim. The count of Bavaria, who was a part of 
it, was surprised that there was no real resistance, but he hesi-
tated to criticize the great Eugene. He learned on the sixth of the 
success of Maurice, which he noted in his diary without com-
ment.30 We may wonder how these two generals in the French 
army regarded one another. Maurice was the natural son of the 
late elector of Saxony and Bavaria was the natural son of the 
elector of Bavaria. While their half-brothers were reigning Ger-
man princes, both these men would serve France as soldiers. 
Eugene was well aware of Berwick's strategy. He retreated 
with his outnumbered forces north to Bruchsal and then east-
ward to Heilbronn where he wrote that his enemy on the right 
bank of the Rhine now numbered over 1oo,ooo strong in two 
armies and intended to catch him between them. He had pulled 
back to Heilbronn, he explained, where there were adequate 
supplies and awaited reinforcements.31 
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Eugene had explained it to his emperor in a message of 5 May, 
noting that he had only 2o,ooo troops at hand and was facing, as 
he thought, an enemy with three or four times as many. He was 
uncertain and "in such uncertainty we remained the whole of the 
day before yesterday until during the night, about one o'clock, 
further news came that the enemy was only a half-hour from our 
lines and his troops had been issued powder for an attack on the 
following morning." Eugene was drawing troops to himself rap-
idly, he related, to protect his crossing over the Neckar and pre-
vent "what would be the worst of all, to be cut off from the still 
awaited troops." He assured his master that he had not lost spirit: 
"The greater the danger the greater attention I can give to it." 32 
The emperor responded on 14 May assuring Eugene of his 
trust and support and of his understanding of the need to con-
centrate his forces to avoid being cut off. "My confidence in you 
is complete, and in this matter I do not expect you to ask my 
prior approval." 33 
Eugene was reaching in all directions for the needed troops. 
Even the commander at Philipps burg received an abrupt and un-
mistakable order. "Mein Herr Feldmarschall-Lieutenant, as soon 
as you receive this and without the slightest delay send Boo men 
from the imperial battalions so that they arrive here today." 34 
The French were in an extraordinary position to shatter the 
emperor's only field army while it was still nearly helpless. It 
must have been difficult for many to understand why this oppor-
tunity was not taken. The Count of Bavaria could not see why a 
better attack was not made after breaking the Ettlingen Lines. 
The enemy could reassemble, he pointed out. Had the French 
proceeded to the Neckar, to deprive the enemy of subsistence, 
they could have returned to besiege Philippsburg when there was 
no more to be had. But d'Asfeld would not move although he 
admitted to his minister that the decision not to attack Eugene was 
not well taken by the younger people in his commanc.35 
There is no doubt that Eugene's situation was cntical, very 
likely more critical than his messages showed, although these re-
vealed strong concern. In one message of 20 May he asked the 
emperor not to take things too much to heart, for God had 
spared his house often in the past and would do so again. Hardly 
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a reassuring report from a commander. In another letter of the 
same date he was franker: 
I confess that in spite of all the dispositions taken to cope with an attack 
on the rear guard, I really don't know how matters would have turned 
out if the enemy had done what he could have and should have done. 
Nor do I understand why he has remained twelve days inactive, under-
taking nothing of importance, while he exacts contributions. He has 
given me time to refresh my tired men and horses, send heavy supplies 
forward, and draw troops to myself so that in a few days I will have 
about 30,ooo effectives available.36 
Did Berwick hold his hand because of the great renown of 
Prince Eugene? He wrote to Belle Isle on g May that he had 
been assured that Prince Eugene had retired to Heilbronn but 
that he wished to know positively. A few days later he wrote that 
he was sure. Does this betray more than the usual concern of a 
commander for the security of his forces? The Austrians may 
choose to lay great stress on the fear of Eugene, but Berwick's 
actions, after all, are in keeping with the plans made months 
before.37 
Berwick was still in favor of a siege of Philippsburg and sent 
his opinion to the minister and to the king. It would be a long 
affair, he said, requiring both armies under his command, one 
for the siege and one for observation. The king must decide. 
Noailles too was in favor of a siege for the reason that the troops 
were inexperienced in conditions of actual warfare. After an in-
terruption of twenty years the troops needed to become accus-
tomed again to gunfire, said the general. On 11 May the minister 
answered that the king believed the siege of Philipps burg was the 
most important but suggested that sieges of Mainz and Coblenz 
be considered as well.38 
The Ettlingen Lines were broken, the emperor's army scram-
bling in retreat, the legend of Eugene fading rapidly. The French 
might have destroyed the imperial army, cowed the German 
princes, and pushed into the Habsburg hereditary lands, even 
towards Vienna. But instead the victorious French army would 
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move a few miles north along the Rhine and begin the massive 
diggings for the siege of Philippsburg. 
Perhaps the French had forgotten how long and difficult a 
siege might be. Kehl and Trarbach had been short actions with 
few casualties and fitted in nicely with an army of cautious com-
manders and inexperienced troops. Philippsburg would remind 
them that a siege of a key fortress defended by a determined 
leader could be painfully expensive in human and material re-
sources. 
Philippsburg today is a town on the flatlands of the Rhine 
Valley halfway between Mannheim and Karlsruhe. The Rhine 
has been canalized so that the river no longer passes the town, 
and there are today no visible remains of fortifications. But in 
the eighteenth century Philippsburg with its great bastions fac-
ing north on a bend in the river, surrounded by woods and 
swamps, was one of the key defense points of the Empire. The 
site of a Roman castellum in the third century, it was besieged by 
the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War and by Marshal Turenne in 
1644, and in 1688 Vauban directed a thirty-two-day siege there 
against imperial forces. Since the summer of 1733, when the 
probability of hostilities with France became clear, work had 
been under way to put the defenses in better condition. Al-
though Seckendorff was the titular governor of Philippsburg 
and would normally have been expected to take over the de-
fense, he could not be spared from his post as ambassador in 
Berlin. General Freiherr von Wuttgenau was appointed com-
mander in the fall of 1733 and set about his task with great en-
ergy. He dug out trenches that had filled with earth and rebuilt 
ramparts and he restored the Rheinschanze, a detached fortifi-
cation on the left bank of the river connected with the main 
works by a suspension bridge. When Prince Eugene arrived in 
late April 1734 and inspected Philippsburg he reported that 
Wuttgenau had done such a splendid job in so short a time that 
the enemy would not find it easy to challenge the fortress. Wrote 
Eugene to the emperor: "[It was] difficult to comprehend how 
this work, which assures us a Rhine crossing, was carried out 
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with Berwick's camp only an hour away, when it could easily 
have been obstructed by only a few thousand men." 39 This may 
have been more of a criticism of Berwick than a commendation 
for Wuttgenau, but the fortress was in relatively good condition. 
Moreover, it was commanded by a competent and determined 
man with a garrison of 4,ooo men. 
Prince Eugene very properly regarded the French decision 
to besiege Philippsburg as unexpected luck which would give 
him time to strengthen his army with more incoming troops.40 
The French began the siege on 26 May with work on the "cir-
cumvallation" line around the fortress and a boat bridge across 
the river below the site. On the same day 150 cargo boats came 
down from Strasbourg with the siege artillery, consisting of 162 
bronze cannon, 196 iron cannon, and 123 mortars. Then came 
the diverting of the normal water supply of the garrison. After 
this the first serious effort was directed against the Rheinschanze 
as the most vulnerable pointY 
Berwick put the greater part of his cavalry on the left bank 
and divided his infantry into an observation army that remained 
outside the fortifications and trenches, and a siege army that 
manned the trenches and batteries. It was an army of over 
1oo,ooo men in all. But it was difficult for the French to believe 
that Eugene was not preparing some kind of attack or diversion. 
Noailles mentioned this to Dangervilliers on 8 June, suggesting 
that Eugene might cross the Rhine toward Luxembourg to draw 
off a large part of the French forces. But in Versailles there was 
now less caution and a desire for some achievement. Danger-
villiers wrote to Berwick that to counter what had occurred in 
Italy-by which he meant the crossing of the Po by the Austrian 
forces in early May and the subsequent retreat of French forces 
in a near rout-it was "bien necessaire" that some good news 
come from his area. Eugene was under the same pressure and 
wrote to the emperor that a "fortunate major engagement" 
either in Germany or Italy was needed to give things, which 
looked so evil on all sides, a better appearance. Until this hap-
pens we can expect only disadvantageous and "disreputable" 
peace proposals from France and her allies, added Eugene.42 
But Eugene did not make the diversionary effort expected. Did 
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he believe that Philippsburg was truly important? After all, he 
had not thought the Ettlingen Lines worth defending. Yes, he 
did, as the following message shows. "The evil consequences 
which the loss of Philippsburg will entail I understand all too 
well. It will make the Schwabisch and Frankisch circles unsuit-
able for operations. Wherever one turns he will have to leave an 
army corps to observe the garrison of Philippsburg, and he will 
have to leave even greater numbers because we can then not de-
pend upon Mannheim. After Philippsburg much will be lost and 
the enemy will be able from Philippsburg to operate against this 
army in any direction, if not this year, then in some future year, 
before we can assemble." 43 
By 3 June, Wuttgenau was forced to give up the Rhein-
schanze. He quietly withdrew the 400 men across the river dur-
ing the night. It was also on 3 June that the French began the 
first parallel against the fortress itself. But progress was slow with 
the French effort, which was directed mainly against the detached 
hornwork and crownwork. Berwick hoped that this might be the 
means of reaching the covered way, a significant step in reducing 
a fortress.44 
Detailed reports fill the files, using the siege terms that are 
now quaint or completely unfamiliar. But the intensive detail, 
the naming of units and commanders in their positions in the 
siege operations, and the careful descriptions of the small con-
flicts that took place from time to time-all these are convincing 
witness that the siege was a formalized and highly skilled opera-
tion. The count of Bavaria's diary exemplifies the patient atten-
tion to siege detail as he notes the precise names of men and units 
and their locations in the trenches. If the meeting of mailed 
knights represented the warfare of the feudal period, and the 
dogfight of fighter pilots typified an aspect of twentieth-century 
warfare, the language, expertise, and daring of the siege ex-
pressed the spirit of eighteenth-century warfare even more typ-
ically than the marching of close-packed columns of men. 
In a siege the high-ranking officer might have cleaner work 
than the soldier who dug and fought in the trenches but, if he 
inspected his troops, he was exposed to fire nearly as often since 
there were no true rear areas. On such an inspection, on 12 June 
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1734, Marshal Berwick was killed by a cannonball. Christopher 
Duffy suggests that as the besiegers approach a fortress the bat-
teries of the parallels behind could not lend close support with-
out an appreciable risk of removing the heads of their own men 
-and this probably explains how the marshal was killed at Phil-
ippsburg.45 There is a story that in Turin the dying Villars was 
informed of the death of Berwick and responded: "That man 
was always lucky." Soon only Eugene would be left of the famous 
names of the War of the Spanish Succession. 
Prince Eugene's army was increasing. The contingent of 
6,ooo from Hanover arrived in the early days of June along with 
the 1o,ooo-man Prussian force. The commander of the Danish 
troops sent assurances that he was coming in two columns to 
Frankfurt as rapidly as he could.46 By the first week in July, 
Noailles noted that the imperial army was as large as the French 
and the cavalry more numerous.47 
The reason Eugene did not make a serious diversionary 
effort as his strength increased and Philippsburg began to falter 
was, if we can believe his communications, partly the doubtful 
quality of his troops. It may have been this same lack of troop 
quality that caused the French to hesitate to exploit their victory 
over the Ettlingen Lines. 
Atrocities are a reflection of the quality of the troops. Since 
the crossing of the Rhine by the French forces in May, reports of 
atrocities were sprinkled through the communications. Those 
committed by the Prussian contingent when it passed through 
the Wiirzburg area were so outrageous that, even at a time when 
Germany was threatened by a foreign invader, there was con-
cern that a people's insurrection might occur against the "Hilfs-
truppen" of the emperor's German allies. Eugene complained 
without notable success to the king of Prussia. Eugene also had 
complained of the atrocities of the French and in a letter to one 
of his commanders on 15 May spoke of the unbelievable ex-
cesses and cruelties of the enemy troops. Reports on atrocities 
had reached the French court as well, and a 15 May letter from 
the king to Berwick asked for more rigorous measures to stop 
depredations. 48 
These atrocities were, of course, incidents that went far be-
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yond the excesses often attending the levying of contributions, 
the foraging, and the forced labor in the siege operations. For 
example, the authorities in Durlach complained to Eugene of 
marauders who had plundered all the villages between the Alb 
River and the Saal Creek (roughly the area of operations of both 
armies in May) on 8 May and committed unbelievable excesses. 
On 15 May a letter from Ignaz Koch, the privy councillor and 
secretary to Eugene, to Count Kiifstein probably describes the 
incidents which Eugene refers to as unbelievable. "The sacred 
Host thrown on the ground ... children of four and five years 
slashed in the face and, most horrible, women nailed to a cross 
with both hands and in such a cruel condition raped to death." 49 
These have the ring of atrocities from the Thirty Years' War and 
may or may not have had some religious overtones. 
There is also a recurrent tone of complaint about discipline 
from commanders in both armies and some tendency for each to 
believe that discipline is better in the opposing forces. The years 
of peace, we are assured, are at least partly to blame. Eugene ad-
mits frankly to the emperor, "I understand completely how your 
troops used to be and how they are now." He goes on to explain 
that many general officers had not served in a campaign or had 
served only as junior officers and that many had forgotten a 
great deal. And the circle troops were mostly made up of newly 
raised companies. All this imposed a caution on his decisions, 
added Eugene.50 
It is not difficult to understand how atrocities will follow 
rapidly upon relaxed discipline, given the source of the troops. 
The eighteenth-century army was composed of men largely 
from three sources: first, foreign troops who might be labeled 
mercenaries or soldiers of fortune; secondly, men recruited, 
often by force or fraud, in goodly proportion from the criminal 
or "sturdy beggar" elements of society; and thirdly, militia ele-
ments that were, usually temporarily and often illegally, hustled 
into the regular army to meet a critical need instead of defend-
ing their home areas from invasion. Some such militia units were 
serving with the French forces. There was no regular conscrip-
tion to disrupt the productive manpower of these societies, 
which were still basically agrarian at this time. The army, at least 
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below the officer ranks, was a slice of the bottom of society. The 
high rate of desertions suggests a high percentage of men who 
were either forced unwillingly into service or were thoroughly 
disenchanted by the experience. The separation of the common 
soldier from his officer (and a great many officers were needed 
to check desertions) was probably never as great as during this 
period. He had no spiritual link with his commander as he may 
have had during the religious wars, nor did he have a reason to 
feel any national sentiment during a dynastic war in an army 
where his superiors were from an international nobility and he 
himself may have served more than one sovereign. His chances 
for advancement into the officer corps were probably as low as 
they had ever been. Vagts points out that the monopolization of 
officer posts by the nobility in this century had almost put the 
noble back in the position he enjoyed in the Middle Ages.51 
This gives us a large organization of men-although by no 
means as large as modern armies-whose spokesmen for us to-
day are only the officer/noble class, since this class alone pos-
sessed enough education to write. We seek in vain for diaries of 
private soldiers or noncommissioned officers in the War of the 
Polish Succession. 52 It was all the more likely, in an organization 
so clearly separated along class lines, for the directing elements 
to have no feeling of empathy for their troops and to undertake 
without hesitation the most severe measures when they believed 
them necessary. For example, Wuttgenau was so enraged at the 
performance of one body of 112 men defending a part of Phil-
ippsburg that he wanted every twentieth man condemned to be 
shot, later altering this to have them run the gauntlet six times. 5 3 
The lack of response of the soldier class, except by desertion 
or mutiny, probably allowed the noble class to, as Friedrich Heer 
put it, play out the war-leadership ritual for the baroque period of 
European society. "It is of the essence of archaic, courtly, knightly, 
personal-subjective societies that play, feasting, celebration, war, 
cultus and art all hang together .... Prince Eugen and his oppo-
nents in the European theatre of war were still 'playingout'-with 
great intelligence-the war-leadership ritual." 54 
In a great siege, such as that of Philippsburg, we see the 
game element in full play in a monstrous theater on the Rhine 
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where the players, largely out of view of their own civilian lead-
ership, carried out their assigned roles on a stage all their own. 
In late June, Charles VI still hoped for a victory of some 
kind: "A fortunate masterstroke either in the empire or in Italy 
is the last human means to rescue me, my house, and all of Eu-
rope from the domination of the house of Bourbon." 55 
But the siege went on with only small actions. An attempt was 
made by the Austrians to burn the French boat bridge by float-
ing fireboats against it from upstream, but the scheme was poor-
ly carried out, only one of the boats reaching the bridge, and was 
unsuccessful. French artillery fire increased steadily in effective-
ness. The Rheinschanze, across the river, was now the location of 
a French battery. 
As the French efforts against the hornwork and the crown-
work intensified, Eugene moved his army, now much greater and 
representing the contingents of more than a hundred princes 
and assemblies, into Bruchsal, about fifteen kilometers from the 
French lines around Philipps burg. On 30 June he gave the march 
order to move closer on the following day. It was in great detail 
and began as follows: "Tomorrow, God willing, the army shall 
break camp at Bruchsal in six columns and march in the following 
order." The French watched Eugene's army march toward their 
lines. General de Brou wrote from Philippsburg that Eugene ap-
peared ready to attack. On 2 July d'Asfeld reported the move-
ment drawing closer to his lines and listed the measures he was 
taking. Another message of the French staff reported Eugene's 
army at Wiesenthal within sight of the French lines. 56 The great 
drama was ready for a fitting climax with a clash of the armies of 
the major commanders before probably the greatest fortress in 
Europe. But Eugene did not attack. By 3 July the French under-
stood that he did not intend to attack.57 The great moment 
passed. 
The French then continued their attacks on the hornwork 
and by the fifteenth they were successful. There were 360 men 
inside, reported d'Asfeld. They made no resistance; all had been 
killed or drowned except for 110, now taken prisoner. So after 
seven weeks the two most important forward defense works had 
been taken. There remained the inner bastions of the fortress 
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itself. And the Rhine, which had been rising since the first of the 
month, swollen by heavy rains, was now falling. 58 
Wuttgenau knew it was the end. On the seventeenth he sent 
an officer to d'Asfeld with a letter for Prince Eugene giving the 
conditions in the surrounded fortress. D'Asfeld refused to for-
ward the letter and Wuttgenau held a council of war with his 
officers. A second effort was made to arrange a suspension of 
hostilities and siege operations, but d'Asfeld insisted that there 
could be no capitulation at all if a day's delay ensued. After an-
other council of war the surrender conditions were drafted. 
They were completed at three in the morning of the eighteenth 
and sent to d'Asfeld, who in turn sent his capitulation draft to 
Wuttgenau and proposed a meeting for the nineteenth. Wuttge-
nau might have held out for one or two more days, but the garri-
son would then have been lost. 
Under the terms of the surrender, the garrison was allowed 
to march out with honors of war, taking six cannon and twenty 
rounds of shot for each man, and was permitted to retreat to 
Mainz. As a special mark of recognition for the brave defense, 
d'Asfeld gave Wuttgenau the finest cannon in the fort, a culve-
rin cast in 1521. The garrison left on 21 July. Casualties had to-
taled 1,017 men. The rest, 3,526 strong, reached Mainz on 27 
July. French casualties were considerably more. The Austrian 
staff study estimated them at 1o,ooo. The count of Bavaria de-
tailed them carefully, including 32 officers killed and 211 sick 
and wounded, 1,130 soldiers killed or died of sickness, 4,655 
sick or wounded, and 2,734 deserters.59 
Eugene and his army were literally within sight of the fortress 
when it capitulated. Since d'Asfeld refused to let any communica-
tions pass between Eugene and Wuttgenau until the garrison had 
withdrawn, Eugene had been reduced to an ignored spectator 
during the last days of the siege. What must have made it doubly 
painful for the greatest military leader in Austrian history was 
that since earlier in the month of July the king and crown prince 
of Prussia, with a number of other Prussian princes, had been his 
guests at the camp at Wiesenthal. He had hoped to use this per-
sonal encounter to draw both father and son away from their 
French sympathies and figuratively back into the emperor's 
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camp. He seemed to have struck some sympathetic chords with 
the king but thought that with the crown prince the French poi-
son had taken deep root. The crown prince, however, who was 
destined to become Frederick the Great, would cherish this early 
meeting of several weeks with the old leader as a valuable master-
student relationship that would serve him well in the future. 60 
With the fall of Philippsburg the great scene for this theater 
of war had now been played out, and the actors would show cau-
tion and fatigue for the rest of the campaign season. Eugene 
must, of course, explain his actions, or rather lack of them, to his 
emperor. 
He had weighed all the means of relieving the fort and re-
connoitered in person, wrote Eugene. A great part of the army 
was composed of inexperienced troops and this was one of the 
principal circumstances that restrained him from a general en-
gagement. This solution, if it failed, would not only lose the 
army, but under the circumstances, make it impossible to bring 
another army together, and the enemy would have four or five 
months to exercise his strength where he chose. Moreover, a 
misfortune to the army on the Rhine, with Bavaria and other 
princes ready to join the French, would require a complete with-
drawal from Lombardy and the emperor would have to accept 
blindly the demands of the enemy. He concluded: "So long as 
the army holds together, it protects the hereditary lands, holds 
Bavaria in check, opposes further progress of the enemy's cam-
paign, allows us to undertake some measures according to cir-
cumstances-all these considerations weighed so strongly with 
me that for Your Majesty's service it was better to see Philipps-
burg lost, however difficult for me, than to risk the army in a 
dangerous attack and see it lost as well." 61 
It is hard to fault this reasoning. But in his early days Eugene 
had fought and won campaigns in which he was seriously at a 
disadvantage. Many hoped in vain that he could achieve another 
such stroke at this time. It was not to be. 
But Eugene was not idle. On 23 July he already had in hand 
a requested estimate by Quartermaster General von Schmettau 
examining French intentions in the post-Philippsburg period. 
Schmettau thought that the French had the choice of attacking 
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Breisach in the south or Mainz in the north. But since the Phil-
ippsburg garrison had been allowed to proceed to Mainz, and 
since Eugene had control of the Neckar bridges, he tended to 
rule out Mainz as a French objective. It was more likely that 
Breisach would be attacked, he thought, since its fall would re-
lease a considerable number of French troops committed to 
strong points throughout Alsace. He recommended substantial 
strengthening of the garrison. Eugene agreed with him and or-
dered the commander at Freiburg to send reinforcements to 
Breisach.62 
It was a logical but incorrect conclusion. After the capitula-
tion, d'Asfeld promptly moved his army back across the Rhine 
and forwarded to the minister his own estimate of enemy capa-
bilities which suggested that he intended for the French forces 
to play a passive role. Eugene had three alternatives, thought 
d'Asfeld: 1) he may descend the Rhine to Mainz. I will position 
myself so that I am not committed to action; 2) he may remain 
opposite me to prevent my crossing the Rhine; 3) he may ascend 
the Rhine to consume the forage and cover Wiirttemberg. D'As-
feld thought that Eugene would choose to stay along the Rhine 
to observe him and to prevent a crossing at Philippsburg or Fort 
Louis.63 
But others were distressed by this lack of enterprise. Noailles, 
now also a field marshal, although he had earlier shown himself 
cautious now felt that the move of d'Asfeld back to the left bank 
would be interpreted as timidity. 64 Although Dangervilliers's 
communications initially seemed to indicate that defensive mea-
sures were uppermost in his mind, a change in attitude came 
from Versailles by 11 August, and d' Asfeld was virtually ordered 
either to move on Mainz and accept combat there or to cross the 
Rhine and march on Heidelberg and Heilbronn. The memoir of 
early 1734, which saw Philippsburg as the end of the campaign, 
seems to have been forgotten in the enthusiasm of a victorious 
siege. This must have shaken the aging d'Asfeld (he was now the 
senior marshal in the French army and would retire after this 
campaign), for he had written to the minister that it was time to 
think about winter quarters. 65 
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Nevertheless, d'Asfeld did not move against Mainz. Actually 
the campaign was sputtering to an end on both sides. Sickness and 
desertions plagued them. The only action of the fall months 
would be a brief occupation of Worms by imperial troops during 
the last days of October. In October both d'Asfeld and Eugene 
left their armies. Noailles, after a trip of inspection, also took the 
road home where he found himself named commander in Italy 
for the coming spring campaign. The armies on the Rhine, 
French and imperial, were now in winter quarters. 
CHAPTER NINE 
Military Climax and Denouement 
The War of the Polish Succession reached a climax of ferocity in 
Italy in mid-1734 and then dwindled away in all theaters, both 
north and south of the Alps, until an armistice was signed in late 
1735· Perhaps the most intriguing question is how the restraints 
which had so formalized the war up to mid-1734 could have 
failed and allowed two pitched battles to occur which were of 
doubtful value to either side. 
When Marshal Villars left his command in May, the accelera-
tion in activity had already begun with the crossing of the Po by 
the Austrian army. The emperor could be resigned, if fearful, 
over his reversals on the Rhine, since he was losing no territory, 
but it was otherwise in the Po Valley where he had been forced 
out of some of the richest land in Europe. The ten-week buildup 
of imperial forces in the Mantua area and the appointment of an 
aggressive new commander brought about the first notable ri-
poste to French progress when Mercy crossed the Po in early 
May and drove back the ill-positioned French columns on the 
right bank toward the city of Parma. 
This Austrian initiative was checked in a few days by the 
French, and there followed a period of caution by the command-
ers on both sides during which their superiors in Vienna and 
Versailles became more and more impatient. The French com-
manders found that their Spanish and Sardinian allies were of 
little value to them. The former had disappeared into the south-
ern part of Italy when the Spanish army marched away to take 
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Naples and Sicily, and the latter, King Charles Emmanuel and 
his Piedmontese army, played an active role in deflecting any ag-
gressive French strategy. With the taking of the Milanese and 
the Cremonese this sovereign had gained as much from the war 
as he could reasonably expect and saw every further French ini-
tiative as leading to a possible defeat which could lose at a stroke 
the lands he had occupied. It was a fairly obvious geographic 
problem. If the allied French and Sardinian army were commit-
ted in any serious degree on the right (or south) bank of the Po, 
then the Austrians, by a sudden shift in direction, might launch 
an attack along the left bank into the Cremonese. It would be a 
revolving-door action in which the push on the right side would 
bring about a corresponding and opposite push on the left. Ap-
parently Charles Emmanuel was governed by this strategic fixe 
and he frustrated as far as possible every French move to engage 
the Austrians on the right bank. 
Now that the Austrian crossing of the Po had been a success, 
both Eugene and the emperor expected further movement. But 
the Austrian command situation was unstable. Since March, 
Field Marshal Mercy had had recurrent attacks which left him 
blind and speechless. In May he was struck down again and re-
tired to Abano, where there were thermal baths. General Prince 
Ludwig von Wiirttemberg took over, but Mercy was not defini-
tively relieved of his command. Eugene, then in the Rhineland 
with his army, wrote to Wiirttemberg expressing the hope that 
energetic measures would be taken before the enemy had time 
to strengthen himself. 1 
Eugene maintained a certain influence over the events in 
Italy although he admitted on several occasions in messages that 
he was not always sufficiently well informed to make judgments. 
Indeed at this time he must have been almost entirely preoccu-
pied with the unhappy state of affairs in his own command area. 
But we find that there was a direct traffic between him and the 
commander in Italy throughout 1734 and 1 735· Eugene re-
mained, of course, even while in the field, the chairman of the 
Court War Council. 
The emperor too was writing to his commander in Italy, 
doubtless guided more and more by Bartenstein. He had pressed 
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Mercy to seek a decisive victory. If some decisive action is not 
accomplished soon, pointed out the emperor, the English will not 
only fail to carry out their commitments but will soon bring out 
highly disadvantageous peace proposals. "And if the sea powers 
turn to this idea it will not be an easy matter to bring them away 
from it. Later progress will not alleviate the evil as much as some 
early encouragement for their depressed spirits. Some early good 
news from Lombardy would yield a basis for hope that England, 
and then in consequence the States General, would enter the 
stalemate." 2 
At the time this message was written, the emperor probably 
had the news of the loss of the Ettlingen Lines and the with-
drawal of Eugene's army from the Rhine, with all the discourag-
ing effect this would have upon the German states friendly to 
him and the encouragement of those opposed to him, such as 
Bavaria. But that was not all. The emperor was then losing his 
two kingdoms in the south, Naples and Sicily. In March 1734 Eu-
gene mentioned the possibility of sending reinforcements to Na-
ples from northern Italy but realized that it meant giving up the 
additional strength needed to operate on the right bank of the 
Po. By April he noted in a letter to Wiirttemberg that it was bet-
ter to act with all the force possible in northern Italy.3 Of course 
the commanders in southern Italy had appealed urgently for re-
inforcements, but they could not agree on the use of the limited 
forces they already had at their disposal, a disagreement remi-
niscent of the difference between their counterparts in northern 
Italy when the French-Piedmontese invasion was imminent in 
1733. Field Marshal Prince Caraffa wished to assemble the impe-
rial forces and meet the Spanish army arriving from the north. 
General Count Traun desired to hold the strong points with gar-
risons and wait for the relief he was sure would be sent. It was 
Traun's strategy that won out and the Spanish, with a land army 
and a fleet operating unopposed offshore, were able to defeat 
the emperor's forces piecemeal.4 It took time to capture the vari-
ous fortresses but there was little doubt of the outcome. 
Naples itself, lightly defended, hastened to send the keys to 
the city to the approaching Don Carlos. It was news worth a spe-
cial messenger to the queen of Spain, and by 27 April the count 
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of Val Hermosa had arrived in Madrid from Naples with the in-
formation that the Neapolitan parliament had taken the oath of 
allegiance to Don Carlos. It had, according to the Gaceta de 
Madrid, "given expression to the love, loyalty, and devotion they 
felt for his Royal Highness." 5 
Montemar and his forces continued their cleanup opera-
tions. Near Gaeta he defeated an imperial corps of 7,ooo and 
left a force to lay siege to Gaeta itself. Here again is an example 
of the formalities of siege warfare. In July the duke of Liria de-
manded the surrender of Gaeta from its imperial commander, 
Count Tattenbach. The latter, in the presence of several of his 
officers, responded: "It is not yet time, since no batteries have 
been formed and no cannon are in place which would be a cause 
for surrender. The general must be patient for a while." 6 The 
attitude of Tattenbach was correct. The relief would never come 
and he would surrender as soon as he could-barring the loss of 
his honor. 
With the pressure of these events weighing on the emperor 
and transmitted to Mercy and Wiirttemberg, it was difficult for 
them to remain on the defensive. After considering the danger 
of exposing his communications by a move on the right bank, 
and weighing the possible advantages of an attack up the left 
bank against the strongest part of the allied forces, Wiirttem-
berg on 1 7 May began to move forward on the right bank south-
west from San Benedetto, with forty-four battalions of infantry. 
By 26 May his army, without fighting any engagements beyond 
reconnaissance clashes, had crossed the Enza River at Sorbolo 
and was only a few miles from the city of Parma with its right 
wing on the Po. Mercy, from his spa, continued to meddle in the 
strategy and wanted an attack across the Po against the allied 
flank or rear along the Oglio. Finally the emperor ordered him 
to cease his direction of the army until he recovered. Wiirttem-
berg was to command until the new commander-designate, 
Count Konigsegg, arrived. But Konigsegg was not in the best of 
health either. Although a competent and experienced soldier 
who had the confidence of Eugene, he was over sixty years old 
and was unable to take over his command for many weeks be-
cause of a severe attack of gout. In spite of the emperor's order 
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the unhappy shifting of command back and forth from Mercy to 
Wiirttemberg would continue.7 
On the French side the minister of war was by no means 
happy about the French retreat by Coigny, and his messages to 
that new commander would have a much sharper tone than he 
was accustomed to use with such senior commanders as Berwick 
and Villars. On 1 June he observed to Coigny that they had at 
the same time lost the subsistence in the Modenese and "a part 
of our reputation." "And why is it," he asked, "that after the en-
emy has been across the Po over a month we have forgotten to 
supply this location [Parma] and to put in order the limited forti-
fications it has? This is incomprehensible. You know the king 
told you to oppose the taking of Parma if you were free to act." It 
is rather strong language for a minister to use with a major com-
mander but Coigny was not, like Villars, a marshal of France 
who had carried his baton for Louis XIV. In another letter of 
the same date to General Broglie there is further criticism. The 
army is in a poor position, he emphasized; although we have a 
superior force we are reduced to letting the enemy do as he 
pleases.8 
The fears of the king of Sardinia were probably responsible 
for the inactivity that provoked this wrist-slapping from Ver-
sailles, but at last on 2 June Coigny was able to report that he had 
convinced the king to cross the Po with his whole army. The 
buildup of the Austrians before the city of Parma had become 
serious, and if the city were to be saved, something must be done. 
Coigny was afraid that the city, under a Spanish commander, 
would surrender without a stand. He had a letter from Montemar 
to the commander in Parma permitting the latter to yield the city 
when he saw cannon, and to yield the citadel when the first breach 
was made. Princess Dorothy did not want to leave and did not 
want to expose the inhabitants to pillage. 9 
On 3 June Coigny crossed the Po with his forces augmented by 
those of the king of Sardinia. They were quickly in substantial 
conflict with the Austrians near Colorno on the fourth. The next 
day Coigny was able to give details of the battle and state that he 
judged the enemy wanted to retreat. His plan was to follow the 
enemy and force him across the Enza and the Crostollo. Two days 
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later, however, he had to report that the enemy had not retreated 
back across the Enza, nor could he get the king of Sardinia to aid 
in an attack. At about this time he must have received the letter 
from the king of France dated 5 June. It reminded him that there 
was an agreement with Spain to protect Parma and Piacenza and 
expressed the king's pain that territory had been lost and that the 
enemy was still in the Parmesan. "I want you to move on the en-
emy and to attack him when you are able to do so with the superi-
ority you should have from the number of troops which have 
been given to you." 10 
Again strong language to a commander who has just taken 
charge. Is this the old cardinal speaking in the name of the young 
king? It seems a little too forthright. There are occasions when 
the fine hand of the cardinal seems to recede and the policies are 
expounded in more direct terms. Dangervilliers sent a dispatch of 
his own to Coigny on the same day, noting that he was aware of 
the message from the king. Very likely he wrote it. Dangervilliers 
obviously felt that the headquarters spirit in Italy needed reviv-
ing. When we have an "unfavorable success," said the minister, it 
doesn't mean that all is lost. Here we think it is possible to regain 
all that has been lost and that we can oblige the enemy to reenter 
the Seraglio and be sufficiently weakened to remain there for the 
rest of the year. 11 The Seraglio is the low plain between the Po and 
the city of Mantua. 
But the enemy retreat that Coigny had expected after the bat-
tles at Colorno had not occurred. The king of Sardinia took the 
position that he had crossed the Po to prevent a siege of Parma, 
but he did not want to risk a major engagement by an attack. 12 So 
the June days continued to pass without serious action on either 
side. 
The powers at Versailles had begun at last to understand that 
Coigny was doing all he could and they turned their attention to 
the king of Sardinia. Coigny was sent a sealed letter for the king. 
It will conform to your thinking, he was told. Other correspon-
dence showed that Versailles was placing pressure on Charles 
Emmanuel, but there was no evidence that it was effective. On 
18 June, Coigny admitted that he had proposed three possible 
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courses of action to the king to no avail. On 25 June, Coigny was 
instructed to examine, with Broglie, other possible measures to 
push the enemy back and, if the king remained negative, to send 
a special courier with details.13 As it turned out the movements 
of the Austrians would dictate the decisions of the allied com-
manders, and Coigny found it unnecessary to carry out these 
instructions. Happily for the French, when the moment of deci-
sion arrived on 28 June, the king of Sardinia had gone back tem-
porarily to Turin because of a serious illness of his queen. 
Looking back then, we have a mounting pressure from Ver-
sailles for roughly six weeks, and a similar pressure building up 
on the Austrian side. Both courts pressed their commanders for 
action. The Austrian army in the Parmesan was weaker than the 
allied army opposing it, mainly because it had peeled off many 
troops to man the various strong points as it moved forward. But 
by 25 June Wiirttemberg was resigned to making an attack. His 
moves up to this time had been to avoid, if at all possible, a general 
engagement. As he began his forward movements, Mercy ap-
peared unexpectedly, having had a restoration of sight, and im-
mediately ordered Wiirttemberg to march at night and attack the 
enemy at dawn on the twenty-sixth. Wiirttemberg was able to 
parry this order with a need for reconnaissance, which showed 
that a move around Parma on the north was not practical but that 
a march around the south was possible. The imperial army then 
crossed the Parma River just south of the city and camped south-
west of it on the night of the twenty-eighth. The French, uncer-
tain of both the movements and the objectives of the imperial 
army, held a midnight war council after which it was decided to 
attack. The French and Piedmontese forces began before day-
light on the twenty-ninth to move south along the Parma River to-
ward the city. By six in the morning the advance guard was across 
the Parma-Piacenza road and reconnaissance parties sought to 
discern the movements of the imperial army which they now 
knew was south of them and already west of the Parma River. 14 
On this same morning Mercy, ignoring the counsel of his 
generals, made his own dispositions of the troops for an advance 
to the north toward the allied army. "lch will selbsten den Feind 
a la tete meiner armee recognosciren; je vois clair et je ferai les 
CLIMAX AND DENOUEMENT t6g 
choses a rna mode," cried Mercy. By eleven o'clock the imperial 
advance guard came up against enemy positions. Wiirttemberg 
believed-correctly, it turned out-that this was the main de-
fense line of the allies. Mercy thought it a small corps and or-
dered him to attack. Wiirttemberg delayed, waiting for more 
units to come forward to join him. Finally, impatient with the de-
lay, Mercy ordered the advance elements to attack, leading them 
himself, and ordered Wiirttemberg to support him. Shortly 
after, Mercy came under heavy fire and fell dead from his horse. 
But now the battle, so long avoided, was joined. Mercy is sup-
posed to have said: "II faut diner a Parme ou sou per en Paradis!" 
Both sides now drew units forward and a full-scale engage-
ment followed, including four separate attacks by the imperial 
forces, until evening brought a lessening of firing. By nine o'clock 
it was over; both armies held their place and began to count the 
heavy losses. There had been virtually no terrain gained or lost, 
although the imperials had for a time threatened to break the 
allied center. According to Austrian sources, the imperials, after a 
council of war, fell back the next day to their camp of the twenty-
eighth; there was not enough ammunition to continue the attack. 
According to Pajol, Coigny and Broglie likewise held a war coun-
cil and decided to retreat the next morning, meanwhile fearing a 
night attack by the imperials, and with Coigny even sending a 
message to his king that the battle was lost. It was only after recon-
naissance and deserter reports that Coigny realized that the im-
perials were badly damaged and were retreating back across the 
Parma River. 15 
After Coigny realized the imperials were withdrawing he esti-
mated enemy losses from eight to ten thousand. They were not as 
high as that, but were finally given as 6,237 men and 8oo horses, 
more than one-fifth of the army. The French losses alone, not 
counting the Piedmontese, were in round figures 4,ooo men-
1,245 killed and 2,757 wounded.16 
The military high point of the war was reached in this battle. 
Another serious clash was to occur some weeks later but would 
only confirm the results of the Battle of Parma. If we review the 
messages and movements leading up to the battle we note a 
striking lack of eagerness among the commanders on both sides 
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to bring their armies to a head-on decisive encounter. But there 
were impatient orders from the French court in the name of the 
king, and there were equally impatient directions from the em-
peror and Prince Eugene. The king of Sardinia on the French 
side and Prince Ludwig von Wurttemberg on the imperial side 
represented the moderating forces that were finally overcome-
the king, by being absent from headquarters at the decisive mo-
ment and Wurttemberg by the wild passion of his commander. 17 
Now the French moved forward in pursuit. "The enemy has 
marched day and night since the battle, and I have followed 
them for two days. When they crossed the Crostollo at Reggio 
I held up here," wrote Coigny from Guastalla. It was to be a 
short delay while he awaited supplies, but apparently the mo-
mentum was lost, for eight days later, on 13 July, he reported 
that he was unable to cross the Secchia for lack of bread. The 
French built ovens for their bread, and Coigny probably meant 
that he was as far ahead of them as he could advance. 18 For a 
time the king of Sardinia was not the obstacle; he had returned 
to the army on 30 June following the battle, and approved the 
pursuit of the Austrians on the right bank. 19 
On the Austrian side, Field Marshal Konigsegg, appointed in 
April, finally arrived on 11 July to take command. Because of 
the losses at Parma and the hardships of the retreat he found 
that his army, apart from the necessary garrisons, numbered 
only about 2o,ooo foot soldiers and 8,ooo riders. He set up his 
camp near the mouth of the Secchia with boat bridges over the 
Po and maintained a strong reconnaissance on the right bank of 
the Secchia. 
The French forced the surrender of the city of Modena from 
the Duke of Modena, a prince who had made the mistake of re-
lying on the Austrians for protection. This left the fortress of 
Mirandola still in Austrian hands, and the objections of the king 
of Sardinia to further action reappeared. He refused to agree to 
a crossing of the Secchia and a siege of Mirandola. The French 
were again frustrated. Dangervilliers informed Coigny that 
Louis XV had written the king of Sardinia of the shame he felt 
in not besieging Mirando Ia. "You should act on your side with all 
the force possible to convince the king of Sardinia." But the king 
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was a stubborn man, and his possession of a considerable part of 
the needed artillery forced the French to submit. Even a personal 
letter from Cardinal Fleury was not enough to move him.20 
It was fortunate for Konigsegg that the French were for the 
moment unable to act. His strength continued to drop. Sickness 
and desertions increased, and his numbers probably did not ex-
ceed 17 ,ooo infantry during the month of August. On 4 August 
he wrote to Eugene: "My principal need is money," he said, 
while not neglecting to explain his other needs. He placed his 
camp at the mouth of the Secchia in order to defend Mantua 
and to use the Po and the Mincio for grain supplies coming by 
sea and by the Adige River. 21 The Austrian army's money needs 
had become so severe that he reported his officers and men in 
the infantry eating together in their misery, while the cavalry 
was reduced to plundering and stealing in order to eat.22 Appar-
ently his strong reports to Vienna brought some aid, since by 20 
August he wrote again to Eugene that a considerable sum of 
money had arrived, and if it continued to be sent, they could 
survive. As a matter of fact, as money and reinforcements began 
to arrive, Konigsegg began to think of some kind of attack on 
the enemy positions. He had noted that the actions of the forces 
opposite him were such that they obviously did not believe him 
capable of any initiative. The French had moved the greater 
part of their cavalry away for better foraging and their lines 
along the Secchia had great intervals between the battalions. "I 
have already made several reconnaissances and will again recon-
noiter the area and the banks of the river to see if it is possible to 
attack. If the thing is feasible I will make a dawn attack." 23 
The desire to attack lay not simply with Konigsegg. The pres-
sure for a victory continued from Eugene and the emperor. Eu-
gene wrote on 27 August: "To press the enemy can only have a 
good effect. In the relationship in which we now find ourselves, 
it is always a great advantage to show the enemy by a sure and 
decisive attitude that we do not fear him." 24 
But Konigsegg did not attack immediately. The French tight-
ened up their defenses again by bringing the cavalry back, in-
creasing patrols, and keeping their men under arms at night. 
Konigsegg wondered if this was prudence or if from the reports 
CLIMAX AND DENOUEMENT 
of spies (of which they have plenty, he adds) they had some pre-
sentiment of attack. But the French will relax their precautions, 
he reported. As of 1 o September Konigsegg seemed discour-
aged, complaining of the heat and new money shortages. The 
men "are so weak from sickness and so crushed by the heat, 
which is worse than ever, that both officers and men, if they are 
not actually sick are hardly able to drag themselves about." 25 
Perhaps this message was intended for interception, for Konigs-
egg must have been actively preparing for a major attack at that 
time. 
In the meantime the French continued to argue with the 
king of Sardinia. They had given up the idea of advancing fur-
ther by early September. A memoir was sent to Charles Em-
manuel outlining a plan to hold the Secchia for the winter with 
thirty-seven battalions and forty-two squadrons. The king was 
asked to supply a part in proportion to the strength of his forces. 
But the answer came back that the king did not want any of his 
forces on the right bank of the Po and would consent to all of the 
troops guarding the Secchia being French.26 
The ministry at Versailles accepted abandonment of a cross-
ing of the Secchia and of a siege of Mirandola with reluctance. If 
we cannot advance, suggested the minister, we should at least 
make some diversion in the SeraglioP 
Konigsegg was right in expecting the French to relax some of 
their precautions, and despite his own weakness, on 15 Septem-
ber at dawn he launched a strong cavalry attack across the Sec-
chia. It was a complete surprise. Marshal Broglie, in a house that 
was overrun by the enemy, was forced to flee before he had time 
to dress, but managed to save himself. The image of a high-
ranking officer running for his life in his nightshirt is one that 
delights all ranks, and the phrase "il s'est sauve en chemise" is 
repeated in the reports with relish, even by Coigny. The French 
reeled back toward Guastalla where their carefully defended 
bridges across the Po awaited them, and drew up their army un-
der the guns of the fortress of Guastalla. 
Konigsegg during the day dashed off a message to his em-
peror from Quistello where he had set up headquarters. "Since I 
have with God's help succeeded in attacking the enemy army 
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and in driving it back from the Secchia with the loss of their 
camp and much baggage, I send Your Highness the adjutant 
chevalier St. Pierre who has been constantly with me and with 
whose service I am very well pleased, to report to you orally until 
I can prepare a thorough written report for Your Highness." 28 
Coigny reported it all sadly on the 17th: "It is with sadness, 
Monsieur, that I have the honor to tell you that the enemy has 
put me to the necessity of abandoning the Secchia. You know the 
reasons which a month ago forced me to send away my cavalry 
for lack of subsistence. On the morning of the fifteenth the im-
perials surprised the house of M. the Marshal de Broglie by a 
column of grenadiers who had crossed the river by fording and 
he saved himself only en chemise, unable to be aided in time by the 
Brigade Dauphine which camped nearby. By means of the col-
umn of grenadiers the enemy put a corps of eight to ten thousand 
horse across in the interval between the Dauphine and Picardy 
brigades." 29 
After noting that the fort of Quistello was abandoned in or-
derly fashion except for fifty Piedmontese who were "forgotten," 
Coigny stated that they had lost only about 400 men killed or 
wounded and believed that the imperials had lost a like number. 
Further on in his message he remarked that he had also forgotten 
to mention two Piedmontese battalions which were unaccounted 
for and were discovered later to have been captured. Finally, 
Coigny reported that he proposed to the king of Sardinia an im-
mediate counterattack, which the king had countered with a re-
quest for a council of war. At the end of the message Coigny wrote 
in his own hand that the 'king believed it would be useless to attack 
since the principal object was to protect the Parmesan and the 
Cremonese. 
So there was no counterattack and the Austrians sought to 
press the attack further. Early on 19 September they attacked 
the French lines, before the fortress of Guastalla and a bloody 
battle similar to that at Parma lasted all through the day until 
five o'clock, when the imperials gave way and began a retreat. By 
the end of the day Coigny knew that the field of battle was his 
and he committed several units in pursuit. The losses in this bat-
tle, he thought, might be equal to those at Parma.30 
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The Battle of Guastalla was the second and last general en-
gagement of the war and the most devastating in human losses. 
For a time the French at Versailles seemed to relish their victory 
and Dangervilliers reacted with "grande joie" to the news of the 
battle and congratulated both Coigny and Broglie. But a few 
days later second thoughts must have overtaken this spirit and a 
more severe judgment came from Versailles. On 20 October, 
Dangervilliers complained to Broglie that, "our victories pro-
duce nothing but honor .... I wish with all my heart there had 
been no Battle of Guastalla, and everyone would be better off." 31 
Pajol observes that the minister was right; after two expen-
sive victories the French were in the same positions as at the be-
ginning of the campaign.32 Perhaps, but this may have been the 
definitive lesson that both sides needed to move into the period 
of negotiation, as indeed they did, although without immediate 
results. 
The losses were greater than at Parma. The French reported 
1,403 killed and 3,445 wounded, or a total of almost 5,ooo ca-
sualties. In addition, 1 ,300 men were taken prisoner. The Aus-
trian losses were given by the French as 4,400 killed and 4,6oo 
wounded, or a total of g,ooo casualties, including the second-in-
command, Prince Ludwig von Wiirttemberg, and five other 
generals.33 
Although Coigny speaks of the flight of the Austrian army 
and of his pursuit, this pursuit was evidently a very limited and 
cautious one. Konigsegg, ten days after the battle, wrote that he 
remained at Mottegiana on the right bank of the Po until 2 5 Sep-
tember, while the enemy held their positions at Guastalla. He 
was obliged then to recross the Po to Borgoforte because of lack 
of forage in an area where armies had been devouring it all sum-
mer long. The enemy did not interfere with his movement, he 
noted, and two days later they also recrossed the Po by their 
bridges at Guastalla.34 
The correspondence for the weeks following the Battle of 
Guastalla reveals that both commanders were extremely unhap-
PY· Konigsegg had time to realize that a great victory had been 
denied him by the failure of his army to pursue strongly the first 
surprise success over the French on the fifteenth. The French 
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camp had been overrun and a great quantity of booty taken. Ac-
cording to Arneth, the imperial army, instead of breaking up the 
surprised French forces, itself broke up in search for booty, giv-
ing the French time to throw in some Piedmontese to stiffen the 
positions and enable them to make a stand at Guastalla. In a confi-
dentialletter to Eugene, Konigsegg does not explain it explicitly 
as a breakdown of discipline in a search for loot, but notes that he 
left out of his official report some essential circumstances, because 
first reports are too widely read. He had been obliged to retreat 
because his forces, infantry and cavalry, had not done their duty: 
"I am sure you will agree that after surprising the enemy and 
completely routing him, taking 4,ooo prisoners without losing a 
hundred men, that I would not stop in mid-road. Who would 
believe that an army with such an advantage would lose its cour-
age before an enemy beaten and fleeing?" 35 
Konigsegg, with his army in the Seraglio, now pleaded for 
money and reinforcements. He hoped that Eugene, now back in 
Vienna, would intercede for him and explain the failure at 
Guastalla.36 
Coigny was also unhappy as the summer period of field opera-
tions drew to a close. A force under Maillebois of eight battalions 
and cavalry was sent against the last position of the Austrians on 
the right bank of the Po-the fortress of Mirandola-and was 
driven away by a relieving force of Austrians. Coigny aban-
doned an attempt on Borgoforte and by November had to draw 
his army back up the Po and take positions on the Adda. The 
enemy was gaining reinforcements, there was no support from 
the king of Sardinia, and subsistence and forage were growing 
short. Worn down by the struggle with the king of Sardinia, 
Coigny left the army in Italy to direct operations in Germany in 
the coming year. 
The end of 1734 and the beginning of 1735 brought about 
the first strategic review on the part of Austria, the combatant 
suffering the most serious losses at the present and facing the 
most serious and ominous portents for the future. The first 
clashes of 1733 were only the announcement of the struggle. 
But in 1734 the battles in Italy and the sieges and clashes on the 
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Rhine, and all that had been lost in these conflicts, must now be 
assessed. The traditional winter quarters period granted both 
sides a respite, and the military commanders could return to 
their capitals. Prince Eugene, back in Vienna since 10 October, 
saw the need for a decision in a rapidly worsening situation. 
The longer we delay, the more our situation will worsen, and it will be-
come at last completely insoluble. Our funds are insufficient by far to 
face up to such powerful resources. In spite of the personal goodwill of 
the king of England, there is little hope for help from the sea powers, 
for England insists that she can do nothing for us without the support of 
Holland, and the latter will take no part in the war. In the German em-
pire those who incline toward neutrality between the emperor and 
France grow day by day. The Saxon court does nothing, either for itself 
or for the emperor. The king of Prussia will live only a short time. The 
electors of Cologne and Bavaria are strengthening their troops through 
very substantial recruiting. Their subsidy agreement with France is con-
cluded, six months of it paid, and Bavaria begins to set aside any limita-
tion and to take measures which only too easily could bring us into open 
conflict during the winter. In Turkey only the grand vizier is with us 
against war; all the others have been won over by the French ambassa-
dor and Bonneval. 
Internally, went on Eugene, you know the difficulty, not to 
say the impossibility 
of raising such monstrous sums as are needed to carry on the war. On 
the other hand, under such circumstances, a peace can only be dis-
advantageous. For those enemy powers arrayed against us, who see the 
emperor abandoned by his allies and brought to a point where he may 
be attacked simultaneously by Turkey and Bavaria, these powers will 
certainly not give up their conquests but will perhaps put before us still 
more oppressive demands.37 
A similar assessment had come from Konigsegg in a hand-
written message to the emperor who had forwarded it to Eugene 
on 25 October. It does not appear that Eugene was aware of it in 
the message quoted above. 
Konigsegg presented a grim view of the situation and con-
cluded that the emperor could not continue alone against the 
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three allies-France, Spain, and Sardinia. He pointed out the 
isolation of Austria amid a circle of worthless allies. It was a pic-
ture similar to that drawn by Eugene, although perhaps Konigs-
egg laid more stress on the impossibility of carrying on without 
adequate funds. While the tedious steps in raising money are re-
peated again and again, the army is falling to pieces, he said. 
Officers cannot remain in service when they have not been paid 
for months; soldiers live from plunder and then desert in num-
bers. There is no question of military operations. The French 
will soon take advantage of this, and on the eastern frontier the 
Turks will soon become active. Konigsegg begged his emperor 
to make a sacrifice, even a substantial one, to save the overall 
situation. 38 
The emperor in forwarding this estimate to Eugene, asked 
that it be circulated to the Privy Council. On 6 November the 
available members-Eugene, Sinzendorff, Starhemberg, and 
Harrach-met with the emperor. Instead of being persuaded to 
a decision, the emperor asked for their opinions in writing. Per-
haps they knew he would not or could not make a decision during 
the next few weeks. It is otherwise incredible to find that, faced 
with a grave crisis, they could not finish the preparations of these 
estimates until early February 1735, by which time Konigsegg 
had been called from Italy to participate in the discussions. Both 
Konigsegg and Eugene, the two field commanders, presented an 
even stronger case for peace to the emperor and their civilian 
counterparts. Eugene's written counsel stressed once again the 
lack of money and credit, and the plight of the army. For exam-
ple, there were periods of eight to ten days when no bread was 
issued to the army in Italy. A peace is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger of a complete breakdown, went on Eugene, and the best that 
could be expected would be 1) to hold the present positions in 
Italy, 2) to prevent the junctions of French and Bavarian forces, 
and 3) to defend against a breakthrough of the French to the he-
reditary lands. Of course it would be well if some strike on a sen-
sitive position ("empfindlichen Streich") could be achieved in 
some way to show that the emperor could carry on another cam-
paign, but it would mean thousands of lives from the hereditary 
lands and millions more in debts. "Under such circumstances it 
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is impossible to hope for an advantageous peace. In the situation 
in which through the improper behavior of his allies Your Maj-
esty finds himself, any peace is better than the present war." 39 
The other members of the council agreed on the need for a 
peace, although Sinzendorff could not forget that in the War of 
the Spanish Succession they had driven the French out of Italy 
after five years of discouraging warfare. He seemed to forget, 
however, that the English and the English financial support were 
both behind Austria at that time. 
Despite this unanimous judgment and the strong representa-
tions of the two field commanders, the emperor saw the situation 
otherwise. Arneth believes that the judgment of the emperor was 
affected by the "Spanish party" at the Viennese court. Admittedly 
they had no official positions but they were close to the emperor in 
private life. These people enjoyed pensions and certain offices 
reserved to them in Naples and Sicily which would be irretriev-
ably lost if Don Carlos remained in control of the two southern 
kingdoms. They pressed the emperor for a last try for military 
success. The emperor clung to other hopes too: for example, that 
the brisk French rejection of the English peace proposals would 
lead to the English fulfillment of treaty commitments with him, 
that the reports of sickness among the French troops on the 
Rhine and the reports of misunderstandings between Spain and 
Sardinia might mean serious weakening of the enemy. Eugene 
and Konigsegg had given their counsel. The emperor made the 
decision to continue military operations, and both commanders 
must soon return to their armies to begin another campaign in 
1 735.40 As to the possibility of England joining the war we have 
the highly credible story from the memoirs of Lord Henry about 
Robert Walpole's statement to the queen: "I told the Queen this 
morning, Madam, there are fifty thousand men slain this year in 
Europe and not one Englishman." 41 
Going into winter quarters was the opposite of assembling 
the army. It was a system of dispersal and, in the case of the two 
armies facing one another in the Rhine area, one that covered a 
relatively large area. The imperial forces were in camps from 
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the Black Forest in the south northward as far as Westphalia, 
mostly on the right bank of the Rhine, except at the fortified city 
of Mainz which provided their only sure crossing point. The 
French camps stretched from opposite the Black Forest at Hu-
ningue, near Basel, north to Worms and west to Trier. In several 
major camps they recruited and trained new troops and re-
generated the spent health of others. It was also a time for pris-
oner exchange, and an agreement made on 5 January 1735 was 
carried out during the weeks following.42 
Besides the recruiting and training there were fortifications 
to build or rebuild, and each side sought to determine the inten-
tions of the other from the work done at specific locations. For 
example, the Field Marshal Duke of Wiirttemberg had seventy 
portable boats built at Freiburg, which gave credence to a possi-
ble imperial attack across the upper Rhine into Alsace.43 But pri-
marily the imperials were concerned with improving the security 
of Mainz, and work had been continuing on the fortifications 
there since the summer of 1734. On 14 January General Count 
Seckendorff, newly arrived to command until Prince Eugene 
would return in the spring, visited Mainz to inspect and hasten 
the work. By the end of January there was a garrison of 7 ,68g 
men in Mainz, of which only 5,016 were considered effective.44 
It is easier today to see that the French overestimated the capa-
bilities of the Austrians to begin a serious campaign and that the 
imperials similarly overestimated the eagerness of the French to 
launch a serious strike. There was not very much that the French 
could do that was truly useful to them. They did not want to enter 
deeper into the Empire and thus, unless the emperor's army 
crossed the Rhine, they could not conveniently engage his forces. 
Mainz was a possible target, although it involved attacking still 
another imperial elector, and it might also be an expensive siege. 
Add to this the fact that the French were increasingly conscious 
that the major benefits of the war appeared to fall to the Spanish 
and Sardinians. 
On the imperial side the campaign of the preceding year had 
been purely defensive. Now, under the pressure of a declining 
military situation, we see attempts to find military initiatives to 
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enhance the emperor's bargaining power. Thus, paradoxically, 
the side losing the war sought to find an area for offensive oper-
ations while the winning side became basically defensive. 
The events of 1734 had taught the imperials that they must 
assemble their army earlier in the spring. The fact that the 
French had let slip away from them the advantage of an early 
beginning of operations made them likewise consider an even 
earlier assembly date. Eugene predicted in his Gutachten, or as-
sessment, of 6 November a very early French assembly.45 To the 
prince whose lands lay between the French armies and Bavaria 
and who foreseeably had the most to lose from French military 
operations, the duke of Wiirttemberg, the preparations which 
he observed indicated an early opening of the campaign by the 
French. He proposed a partial assembly of the imperial forces by 
withdrawing them from the extended line of winter quarters 
into cantonments along the Rhine, Main, and Neckar rivers. 
The original cantonment project would have put the field mar-
shal duke in direct command of a large part of the army, ap-
proximately 4o,ooo men, in the area from Ettlingen to just south 
of Heidelberg.46 This was changed, however, and the battalions 
were allotted in greater strength to the commands farther north. 
Eugene remained in Vienna, keeping his finger on the prepara-
tions as closely as possible. Twice he warned the duke that his 
forces should be farther removed from the Rhine in case the 
French should make a quick strike across the river. "The troops 
in the cantonments should not be so close to Philippsburg and 
Fort Louis, but better displaced rearwards, in which position 
they can be supported by the magazines on the Neckar and 
nearby area, and will not be exposed to an enemy surprise at-
tack, and Your Lordship will have time, whenever the enemy 
moves, to assemble where necessary." 47 
Eugene's presence was needed with the forces but he did not 
arrive in Heilbronn until 13 May. Seckendorff was at sword's 
point with his superior, the duke ofWiirttemberg. The duke was 
also unable to control the Danes and Hessians, who ignored his 
orders when they chose to do so.48 It was time for Eugene to put 
his still immense influence to work. Doubtless he understood 
that all was not well among his commanders, but it was the last of 
CLIMAX AND DENOUEMENT 
his strength that he was using for a last campaign, and he me-
tered it out carefully. The messages from the emperor to Eu-
gene show that Charles VI too realized this, for at the end of his 
messages, written in German by his staff or even frequently in 
his own hand, we find almost invariably a few words in French, 
couched in friendly and affectionate terms, asking Eugene to 
conserve his health. 
Resuming command once again, Eugene reported back to 
the emperor on 15 May from Heilbronn and stressed that the 
French army was already in motion with the main army near 
Speyer being joined by another corps from Upper Alsace. It was 
too early to predict their intentions, however.49 Passing on to the 
headquarters at Bruchsal he found the duke ill but the army in 
reasonable shape with an assembled strength of twenty-nine bat-
talions and sixty-nine squadrons. The remainder of the army 
was stretched in a long, thin line from the Black Forest to Mainz. 
The enemy army he estimated at 1 20 battalions and 1 70 squad-
rons, not counting some militia in garrisons at strong points. 50 
By 24 May Eugene was examining the position of the three elec-
tors who were not cooperating with the emperor-Bavaria, Pal-
atinate, and Cologne, the three Wittelsbachs. He still saw no 
chance that Bavaria would cooperate by sending a contingent of 
troops; rather the increase in Bavarian militia suggested that the 
elector might be preparing to come to open hostilities against 
the imperials in an attack in the Tirol. Eugene was not alone in 
believing the elector might open hostilities. Marshal Du Bourg, 
on the other side of the Rhine, forwarded to Versailles an un-
signed letter from Munich stating that the elector's movements 
seemed to indicate that he would take part in the coming cam-
paign. There was also a report that made Du Bourg "die laugh-
ing" -the fortifications of Vienna were being repaired! 51 
With regard to the Elector Palatine at Mannheim, Eugene 
agreed that it was probably not feasible to prevent various sup-
plies from passing through Mannheim to the French, but it 
would not be wise to force the elector completely into the arms 
of the French. From the elector of Cologne Eugene expected a 
contingent of troops and heard that a money contribution had 
been offered in Vienna. 52 
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A few days later Eugene noted that the tempo of movement 
in the French army had increased, but that the reports were so 
confused that nothing more than marching and countermarch-
ing could be established. He stated briefly that while a number 
of choices were open to Coigny, his own responsibility was not to 
be led into some untimely movement.53 
Although on the imperial side there was no thought of mak-
ing an attack at this time, the French were alarmed from time to 
time by reports of possible attacks. Dangervilliers told Du Bourg 
on 5 April to prepare for an attack on Worms, for example. 
When Coigny arrived in Strasbourg on 21 April (a month earlier 
than Eugene) he received there a letter from Dangervilliers cau-
tioning him to report the movements of the enemy carefully. 
"Don't spare the couriers," he was told.54 
During the month of June, Coigny was in motion concen-
trating his forces and bridging equipment closer to Mainz. If 
Eugene moved down the Rhine opposite him, Coigny had suffi-
cient forces upstream to make a crossing at Philippsburg or 
Kehl. :Sut Eugene did not move from his position near Philipps-
burg. He reinforced Seckendorff, who held the forces between 
the Neckar and the Main, and except for a short visit to Heidel-
berg, held to his camp at Bruchsal. 
Coigny was under some pressure to cross the river but he did 
not do so. Instead he moved up into the Mainz area, placing 50 
battalions and 131 squadrons in three camps at Weinholsheim, 
Stadecken, and Gau-Algesheim, which formed a line across the 
corner formed by the bend of the Rhine as it approaches Mainz 
and contains that city. 5 5 But he did not undertake the siege, nor 
cross the river. 
It is clear in retrospect that Eugene, by his refusal to move up 
and down the Rhine paralleling the French movements, had used 
his smaller army to the best advantage and probably averted a 
potential disaster. The French, with their larger army, would 
sooner or later have caught him out of position had he sought to 
react to each of their movements. But he was under considerable 
pressure to undertake operations, if only to increase Austrian 
bargaining strength in forthcoming negotiations. 56 "The more 
critical on all sides matters appear so much more complete is my 
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trust in Your Lordship that you will find the ways and means to 
undertake an important operation against the enemy." So wrote 
the emperor to Eugene on 28 May 1735P 
The answer came back from Eugene in a wide-ranging dis-
cussion that was at times elementary in its approach. "To act of-
fensively means either battles or sieges. The first depends not 
wholly on my choice, but upon that of the enemy, particularly if 
his army remains on the other side of the Rhine. For if I cross 
over and he finds it not to his advantage to engage in battle, 
nothing is easier for him than to withdraw behind the most im-
pregnable lines at Speyer or pull back between his fortresses." 
One is struck by the chessboard or sandtable effect of Eu-
gene's statements and can visualize a man with a pointer over a 
great relief map of the Rhine valley. To be drawn in too deeply 
or to have an unfortunate battle could leave his army cut off 
from its bases or destroyed, went on Eugene, noting as well that 
the only sound crossing point was at Mainz, and to move north-
ward with the imperial army would leave Swabia open to the 
French and permit a junction of French and Bavarian forces. 
With regard to sieges, Eugene found that he had insufficient 
guns and other equipment to attack Neu Breisach, Landau, 
Strasbourg, or Philippsburg. If the expected Russian contingent 
were at hand, he added, a siege might be considered but it would 
come too late to permit such an undertaking this year. 58 
Was Eugene's strategy that of an old man seeking reasons 
why he should not act? It is possible that a younger Eugene 
might have been ready to take chances. But against an adversary 
with so many advantages, Eugene saw the existence of his army 
as the last defense of the entire empire, the only barrier to the 
hereditary Habsburg lands, and the fragile block that prevented 
a combined French-Bavarian army from cutting off the imperial 
forces in Italy. So the army of Eugene would remain poised but 
inactive in stage center of the Rhine theater until the last days of 
summer. 
Could the Russians be the saviors of the emperor? They fig-
ure large in the Austrian communications as they approach the 
imperial forces on the Rhine. The emperor was paying for their 
coming, of course, and the Russian court had been split over the 
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question of helping him. The elements at court friendly to the 
emperor finally had their way, and 12,000 men of a first contin-
gent were marched slowly from Poland into Silesia and Bohemia 
and were to cross the Upper Palatinate of Bavaria.59 Eugene 
feared that at this point the elector of Bavaria might use force to 
oppose their passage, and he advised the emperor to be sure that 
the proper instructions were given to the Russian commander, 
who was, incidentally, the Irishman Peter Lacy.60 Eugene was 
aware that the elector had once again proposed the marriage of 
his eight-year old son to the eighteen-year-old Maria Theresa as a 
means of settling all differences, and he was equally aware that 
this was unacceptable to the emperor. But an intercepted Ba-
varian message gave the emperor reason to believe the Bavarians 
would not attack, and he reassured Eugene.61 
The Russians arrived on 26 August, the first Russian forces 
to see western Europe. They had crossed Bavarian territory 
without incident and were visited by Eugene two days later. In a 
letter to the imperial ambassador in Saint Petersburg he spoke 
of their appearance and readiness with enthusiasm. 5 2 
The increased activity across the river brought Coigny to life 
and he began to assemble his army. He was now under instruc-
tions that permitted him to remain on the left bank of the Rhine, 
but not to refuse combat.63 Coigny noted that his infantry was 
superior to that of the enemy. He had 140 battalions and 179 
squadrons, although 28 of the battalions and go squadrons were 
detached farther back in Alsace and on the Moselle and the 
Meuse. With the Russian supplement Eugene now had 119 bat-
talions and 181 squadrons, giving him a rough equality, or even 
superiority, along the Rhine proper.64 
It was Seckendorff rather than Eugene who saw that some 
initiative must be undertaken before the summer dwindled away. 
He had proposed in July that, after the arrival of the Russians, a 
corps of thirty battalions and fifty squadrons should cross the 
Rhine at Mainz or Coblenz, march on Trier, and occupy it. Then, 
after wintering in the area, they should strike into France in the 
spring. He prepared a study of the possibilities, probing the vari-
ous maneuvers by which a detached corps could be supported by 
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the movements of the main army on the Rhine. This was reviewed 
at a 19 August meeting of generals which took place at Eugene's 
headquarters at Bruchsal. Eugene was not ready for a major en-
gagement, but he was willing to approve a limited offensive in the 
Moselle Valley. He did so and left for Vienna while the operation 
was under way. This may have been because he thought it was 
bound to fail. More likely he left for personal reasons; he had only 
six months to live.65 
On 20 September the operation began with the crossing of 
the Rhine in the Mainz area and by 28 September there were 
forty-one battalions and eighty-five squadrons of imperial forces 
across the river, reported by Seckendorff as 23,327 infantry and 
12,840 cavalry in serviceable condition, rather than simply in as-
signed strength. There were no Russians included; imperials, 
North German, and Danish troops made up the totals.66 
Coigny had had a council of war on 3 September and decid-
ed to concentrate in the Speyer area if Eugene united all his 
army. If Seckendorff moved toward the Moselle with 25,000 or 
3o,ooo men, then Belle Isle would be detached with sufficient 
forces to meet them at Trier. When the latter alternative oc-
curred, Belle Isle formed a corps and marched west on 1 October, 
passing Kaiserslautern on 2 October, and arriving with some ad-
vance forces in Trier on the fourth. But Belle Isle's forces when 
fully in place were still considerably smaller than Seckendorff's, 
which were now in the Moselle Valley where they were aug-
mented by troops from the garrison at Luxembourg.67 Coigny 
then brought up further reinforcements and took command 
himself in Trier. On 20 October the two armies made contact 
along the Moselle River near the abbey of Clausen, twenty-five 
kilometers below Trier. Without coming to a decisive battle the 
French, assessing their position as untenable, retreated to Trier. 
Seckendorff moved after them, but carefully.68 
In the midst of these cautious movements the two command-
ers were overtaken by what both may have expected daily-the 
suspension of hostilities. The agreement had taken place on 3 
October in Vienna, and on 10 October Wiirttemberg, the impe-
rial commander after Eugene's departure, was informed. But it 
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was not until 31 October that Coigny informed the duke that he 
had been notified of the ratification of the suspension of arms 
agreement, and it was 4 November before Coigny and Secken-
dorff agreed to a suspension of arms with the Moselle River be-
tween their forces. 69 The last meeting of forces in the north 
occurred thus in the corridor into France that concerned Belle 
Isle at the beginning of the war. It was a corridor that would pro-
vide entry for German armies in the future. 
It had been a complete campaign year without any engage-
ment large enough to be called a battle. Every move or threat-
ened move had canceled out the moves of the other side even to 
the end in the Moselle Valley. Many of these moves were foraging 
expeditions undertaken to sustain one army while simultaneously 
denying food to the other as, for example, when Coigny carefully 
consumed the forage in the Mainz area in late spring without at-
tacking the city. 70 Indeed, the matter of foraging was so painful to 
the small states in the path of the armies that a considerable body 
of correspondence exists regarding the complaints. Since the sov-
ereigns themselves often signed the complaints, and had consid-
erable justification for doing so, the responses could not be simply 
ignored. The Elector Palatine, for example, was pillaged by the 
soldiers of both sides while trying to remain neutral.71 
The movements of the armies during the campaign were 
basically cautious ones. Still, a commander could have made an 
error and found himself abruptly at a serious disadvantage be-
fore his opponent. But the actions remained within the expected 
range of professional military activity, and there was no place for 
such ingenuities as new weapons, as one example indicates. A 
French officer and a small detachment were taken prisoner after 
crossing the Rhine and being cut off from their boats. After Eu-
gene learned that they had in their possession a fire bomb ("or-
dentliche Brandkugel"), he no longer considered the officer an 
honorable ("rechtschaffene") man and wrote a letter of com-
plaint to Coigny. A satisfactory reply came back in which Coigny 
denied that he was aware of or responsible for the fire bomb. 72 
So the war along the Rhine was over and the armies would 
negotiate directly with one another until the suspension of hos-
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tilities acquired a more permanent character and the disbanding 
of units could begin. 
Meanwhile in Italy, after the heavy losses at the Battle of 
Guastalla in September, neither side wished to force another en-
gagement. The French were in winter quarters from 30 Decem-
ber and many troops were hospitalized. Marshal Broglie, then in 
command, wrote on 3 January from Cremona: "Since the depar-
ture of M. de Coigny I have been working on the lodging of 
troops in this garrison. There is an infinite number of sick. Many 
die every day." 73 
The allies held the right bank of the Po, including the Mod-
enese, Guastalla, Parma, and the Tortonese. The imperials held 
the Oglio from its mouth to Ostiano, as well as Revere and, 
across the Po, Mirandola. 
The French, still behind the Oglio after two campaign sea-
sons, were ready to try another commander. Villars had angered 
Charles Emmanuel by his character and the indiscipline of his 
troops. 74 Nor did Coigny and Broglie do very much better. The 
new commander, Marshal Noailles, had found it intolerable ser-
ving under d'Asfeld and had been consoled by the promise of 
the supreme command north of the Alps for the following year. 
But he later objected to the task of forcing contributions in the 
occupied areas and was forced to defend himself against crit-
icism of his operational decisions during the campaign year. 75 
Arriving at court in January 1735 he found that he was to com-
mand in Italy. It was thought that he could deal better with 
Charles Emmanuel; and he was a captain general in the Spanish 
service and outranked Montemar. 76 
Noailles arrived in Turin in March and received flattering 
treatment. He wrote to the minister on 1 2 March that he was 
happy over his reception but noted the great sickness among the 
infantry. One could not count on more than 250 men in a bat-
talion, he discovered. 77 Not that nothing had been done. Con-
siderable effort had been undertaken to make up the heavy 
battle losses of the preceding summer: an amnesty for deserters 
was given in exchange for service in Italy, 7 ,ooo militia were sent 
188 CLIMAX AND DENOUEMENT 
there, and officers' commissions were given out on a more liberal 
basis to men who would bring recruits with them. Some 1o,ooo 
men were gained in this manner and the minister asked in 
March why units were still weak in strength. 78 According to the 
Noailles memoirs, abuses and corruption were a good part of 
the answer. For example, losses had been greater than reported, 
allowing captains to make profits on their companies by keeping 
them incomplete. A kind of anarchy reigned. Dangervilliers sent 
a strong letter to Noailles with a royal dispatch authorizing him 
to use his authority to remedy the situation. By 6 April Noailles 
was able to tell the minister that he had made some progress. 
But he was not yet ready for operations and ordered Savines, 
commanding in the Modenese, to avoid action. 79 
While the marshal was struggling with the condition of his 
forces, he was also involved in meetings to determine strategy. 
When he arrived in Italy, Broglie presented him with a plan by 
which the French and allied forces would attack head-on across 
the Oglio and force the Austrians back on Mantua. It was a plan 
to finish the war in one major drive. Noailles, cautious as usual, 
expressed reservations. In answer to the king of Sardinia, who 
asked for ideas on a campaign, Noailles prepared a memoir 
which was more a statement of principles than a military plan. 
Noailles noted the presence of a difficult terrain with many ca-
nals, streams, and closed fields, and put forth the following: 
1) The enemy can be reduced more easily by ruse and maneuver 
than by force. Combat will be unavoidable and it will tend to be 
lively and frequent. 2) The enemy must be pressed as much as 
possible to prevent him from concealing his movements, and 
from finding subsistence. 3) Diversions and feints are to be used. 
The greater numbers on the allied side permit this. 4) Operate 
so as to be always ready to assemble. Do not hazard separate de-
tachments in adventures. Be ready to attack when an advantage 
occurs.80 
It was hardly a plan for annihilating the enemy army, but a 
reasonable prescription for military action by a professional 
officer of the eighteenth century whose objective was to defeat 
his opponent, not to destroy him. 
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The king of Sardinia approved the ideas in principle during 
the last of March, but lack of forage and poor cooperation from 
the Spanish blocked any immediate operations. The Spanish 
army had returned to the north and Broglie had already asked 
Monternar to provide fifteen battalions in the Modenese, which 
the latter refused to do on the ground that there would be inad-
equate subsistence before May. Noailles then held conversations 
with Monternar in April and could do little better. Monternar 
would hold his forces to the south in the Bologna area and near 
the Tuscan border for forage and subsistence and would give 
aid if the imperials attacked. Noailles found that he could not 
refute the Spanish arguments; the matter of subsistence was crit-
ical enough with his own forces. 81 
At last in May the three armies were ready to cooperate, after 
a fashion. On 1 2 May the French and Sardinian forces crossed 
the Po and established a headquarters at Guastalla. Konigsegg, 
strongly entrenched at San Benedetto, had about seventy battal-
ions and ninety squadrons. It was more than the French and Sar-
dinians could field but less than the three allied forces combined. 
Spanish support carne at last, and the combined operations of the 
allies forced Konigsegg to abandon the Po and retreat toward 
Mantua during june. By the end of the month he had left a garri-
son in Mantua and moved north into the mountains with the im-
perial cavalry in the Tirol and the remainder of his army in the 
Trentino. As Dangervilliers wrote to Noailles, Konigsegg had 
taken the "debris of his army" into the Trentino.82 
But Noailles would not follow the imperials into the Trentino 
as Dangervilliers recommended. Nor was he ready for a siege of 
Mantua as the Spanish urged. The weakness of the imperial 
army permitted the allies to dispute among themselves. As late 
as 14 October, Noailles was still trying to mobilize action among 
his allies and, apparently unaware of the agreement in Vienna, 
spoke of his preparations for the next year's campaign. Happily 
another solution carne in November when the minister advised 
him of the suspension of fighting. "I add that it is already in ex-
ecution on the Rhine and the Moselle and it is time to do the 
same in Italy." 83 
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The hostilities were over-that is, they were suspended by a 
preliminary agreement. There would be relief for the emperor's 
forces backed up into the Alps. A period of military negotia-
tions-or rather gentlemanly meetings-would ensue before an 
armistice could be signed among the field forces. The final step, 
a peace treaty, was far in the future. It is now time to investigate 
the diplomatic negotiations that were carried out, partly in the 
open, partly in great secrecy, during the period of hostilities-
negotiations that brought about finally the suspension of hostili-
ties and indicated the main points of the peace agreement. 
CHAPTER TEN 
The Negotiations 
The ritual of military operations must have seemed an end in 
itself to many participants in wars of the eighteenth century 
-certainly to those officers who, like La Motte, were lifelong 
professionals. They were used to long campaigns; they were not 
impatient; they felt no particular rancor toward their oppo-
nents. Valor they knew well and it was seldom lacking. The lists 
of high-ranking casualties after the battles is proof enough. But 
they saw no reason for heroic efforts against impossible odds, 
such as the attack on Danzig, nor could they see the need for 
head-on clashes and senseless massacres such as occurred at 
Parma and Guastalla. These were aberrations not of their choos-
ing. But they must do their duty. The 1735 campaigns, rather 
than those of 1734, were for them the correct and appropriate 
use of military forces. 
Another ritual paralleled the military operations-the diplo-
matic negotiations, which were almost always active in some form 
at some level. A contestant who was not seeking the destruction of 
his opponent found it reasonable to establish negotiations as soon 
as some military advantage, or disadvantage, was evident. The 
negotiations were normally as long and tedious as the sieges and 
the marching and countermarching of the military operations. 
While the top figures were the hereditary sovereigns and their 
high-ranking nobles, a less visible professional group acted in 
their names. Ignaz Koch and Johann Bartenstein had their op-
posite numbers on the French side. The participants in the nego-
NEGOTIATIONS 
tiations could be patient and secretive, for they were not subject 
to a demanding press and volatile public opinion. 
In the summer of 1734 Austrian fortunes were very low. 
Southern Italy was lost; Lombardy was lost. But the Battle of 
Parma was equally expensive for both sides. So the emperor did 
not regard his gloomy situation as truly desperate, and he was 
not ready for major concessions. But Prince Eugene, as noted 
earlier, saw the fading military situation more clearly, and he was 
already feeling carefully in several areas through his contacts. 
He made at least two attempts to reach the British sovereign 
through particular individuals. 
The Hessian general Ernst von Diemar was at that time in 
England and it was hoped that he could use his good relations 
with the king of England.1 Eugene's letters to him are bitter over 
the refusal of England and Holland to assist the emperor. One 
must also read into his letters to Diemar a willingness to think in 
terms of an eventual accommodation. "Abandoned by everyone, 
the emperor will have to yield in spite of himself. To save his 
lands he must bring himself to decisions that he would never 
have considered." 2 
Eugene had another correspondent in whom he seems to 
have placed some hope, an Englishman continually predicting 
the early fall of Robert Walpole. This was Henry Davenant, an 
English diplomat who had gone over to the Austrian service and 
was at this time in Brussels. Although his letters smack of the 
sycophant and usually terminate with a whining request for 
money, Eugene sought to send him to see the king of England in 
London. The king refused to receive him, however. A second 
project to have Davenant see the king at Hanover was blocked by 
the emperor. Davenant continued to predict a change in English 
policy with a fall of the Whig government and sent Eugene let-
ters from English informants to prove his close contact with af-
fairs in England.3 
These approaches were ineffectual and were really efforts to 
bring England into the war, as was the offer made through 
Count Kinsky to appoint George II the commander of the impe-
rial army on the Rhine.4 One has the general impression that the 
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Austrians cannot quite accept the diminished and still diminish-
ing influence of the English king over governmental decisions. 
What the English offered was their "good offices." It was the 
least they could do. 
The first firm contact among the great powers which brought 
about serious peace discussions originated with Horatio Wal-
pole, who had been sent as ambassador to Holland in August 
1734. He wrote on 19 August to Gedda, Swedish ambassador in 
France, stating that he wished jointly with the Dutch govern-
ment to come to an agreement with Cardinal Fleury and M. 
Chauvelin. The letter was taken to Cardinal Fleury. Fleury an-
swered on 4 September. He was ready to treat with the same 
open-hearted manner as when they had worked together in ear-
lier days and would confer with any person at any time, or if de-
sired, he would send a confidential representative. But since 
France had allies from which it would not be separated, there 
must be inviolable secrecy in these preliminaries. "We accept 
without difficulty the mediation and good offices of the mari-
time powers on the basis of their profession of a complete im-
partiality." The cardinal pointed out that he had used the term 
"profession" because he felt it would not be in good faith if he 
did not retain some doubt or suspicion as to the rightness of the 
intentions of the maritime powers. The cardinal was not yet 
ready to outline his specific terms, but he protested that France 
did not wish to increase her territory by even a "single village" 
although she had been accused of secret designs to extend her 
frontiers and destroy the equilibrium of Europe. 
The cardinal then added a postscript saying that he pre-
ferred to deal directly with Walpole in order to maintain secrecy 
and not to be involved with the British ministry. 5 
After an intermediate exchange of letters, during which time 
Walpole informed his king of the negotiations, he replied to 
Fleury on 2 October that he accepted the proposal of a 
confidential representative and that he and the pensionary of 
Holland were ready to confer with such a man. He pointed out 
that the spring would bring on another military campaign and 
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that they must act quickly to prevent this. The cardinal replied 
on 7 October, emphasizing again the secrecy of their relation. As 
to his own representative: "I will think from now until Tuesday 
to name a reliable man." The cardinal was not yet ready to men-
tion specific matters, but he noted that the three powers in-
volved were the only ones that did not seek additional territory 
and could thus be impartial. The only interest of the king of 
France, he insisted, was in the Polish affair. 
Walpole advised the cardinal to send his man to a hotel in 
Delft, informing him in advance the day of his arrival and the 
name he would use. Walpole would see that matters would be 
conducted secretly from this point. Fleury would send Jannel, 
who had been secretary of the Congress of Soissons some years 
earlier. Again the cardinal stressed secrecy and added that if no 
accord were reached he would not make use of anything that oc-
curred. "You have the right as of now to deny anything that I 
might let escape of our negotiations." 
Then on 24 October Fleury became more specific. First he 
wished to assure Walpole in general terms regarding his com-
mitments to his allies. "I can tell you that our treaties have to do 
with the Two Sicilies in favor of Don Carlos and the Milanese in 
statu quo for the king of Sardinia. There are no other stipula-
tions regarding the other lands of the emperor, not even Man-
tua." There was no desire on the part of France to aggrandize 
herself, said Fleury, and only the matter of Poland interests her. 
France is against the Pragmatic Sanction which it regards as 
against its interests and a threat to the liberty of Europe.6 
"I begin with Poland," wrote the cardinal, admitting that 
there was little hope that Stanislas could be replaced on his 
throne. But this may depend to what extent England is involved. 
If your court, he told Walpole, has no commitments, there 
should be a way to save the honor of France. 
With regard to Spain, the cardinal found this a difficult area 
because of the inflexibility of the emperor on the one hand and 
of the queen of Spain on the other, over the two kingdoms of 
Naples and Sicily, the Two Sicilies. One solution might be for the 
emperor to give his second or younger archduchess in marriage 
to Don Carlos. The Two Sicilies could be given her as a dowry 
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with reversion to the older sister if the younger had no children. 
But the emperor probably would not agree, and the queen of 
Spain would not wish that the Two Sicilies, taken by conquest, be 
subject to reversion to Austria if Don Carlos had no children. 
There is also the fact that the other states of Europe might be 
alarmed by the possibility of all the lands of the emperor in Italy 
falling under the rule of a Bourbon prince, one who, in addi-
tion, could inherit the crown of Spain. The cardinal went still 
further. He was convinced that it would be better if the emperor 
had no lands at all in Italy because as long as he kept a foothold 
he would always be occupied with recovering the territory he 
had lost. Was this intended as a humorous comment? 
Then came one of the smaller points that are always on the 
edge of discussions over the larger ones. The port of Leghorn 
should not remain Austrian or Spanish, thought the cardinal; it 
should be a free port open to all nations and be either a republic 
or ruled by a weak prince. The English had no trouble agreeing 
to this. 
With regard to the third area of importance-namely, how 
to satisfy Sardinia-the cardinal admitted that he was leaving 
out this article for the moment. One does not put all the cards on 
the table at once in a diplomatic exchange. 
Fleury then turned to an accusation that obviously embar-
rassed him from time to time-that he was working to bring the 
Turks into hostilities against the emperor. The cardinal was ever 
aware (and his later correspondence with the emperor made this 
more obvious) that he was a Christian and a churchman dealing 
with a Christian opponent. The French embassy in Constantino-
ple did not compromise the emperor, said Fleury; the proposals 
had been for the Turks to act against the Russians, who were ap-
parently to the cardinal not quite the same kind of Christians. 
However, complained the cardinal, the emperor did not scruple 
to use the barbarian Cossacks and Kalmuks to ravage Poland. 7 
Walpole responded a few days before the arrival of Jannel. 
His first item was to seize upon a remark made by the cardinal 
that England was augmenting its troops to be able to put some 
on the continent. Walpole was "astonished" at this accusation 
and felt it necessary to justify his country's policies in a some-
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what injured tone, educating the cardinal regarding their rela-
tive military situations. In times of peace, he said, we do not have 
active troops, sur pied. When there are wars in which we have 
allies, and to which we are not indifferent, we must augment our 
forces for our own defenses and to be ready to help our allies. 
These prudent measures, thought Walpole, should not reflect 
on the rightness of our intentions; France is always prepared to 
take umbrage against those who make provision for their own 
security. 
It was obvious that both parties were volleying back and forth 
on minor points, while touching the major ones very cautiously. 
Jannel arrived in Holland and the meetings began. They 
were pleased with his candor and frankness, said Walpole later 
to the cardinal. Jannel was less happy over the cover story used 
to explain his presence. He was identified as a Frenchman who 
had been involved in an unwholesome affair which required him 
to seek refuge in Holland.8 
No substantive issues were raised in the first meeting on 5 
November. On the sixth Jannel sat down with Walpole and the 
high pensionary, Slingelandt, and from their silence saw that it 
was up to him to begin. He opened with a little preliminary fenc-
ing, mentioning a claim by the Habsburg court that mediators 
must propose nothing that had not already been ratified by that 
court. Walpole and Slingelandt denied the existence of any such 
agreement. Jannel then touched on the Polish question under 
three headings: to sustain the honor of the king of France, to 
assure the security of the state of Poland, and, lastly, to protect 
the liberty of the Poles. 9 
In the third conference on 7 November they began to touch 
the more specific issues. Walpole suggested that Stanislas be rec-
ognized as king by the emperor, the elector of Saxony, and all 
the powers. He would then abdicate and call upon his son-in-law 
to cease his efforts in his behalf. Then Stanislas would be given a 
pension befitting his dignity. J annel noted that these external 
items did not compare with the possession of a great kingdom 
and that Stanislas had a legitimate title. They were unable to ad-
vance on this point and turned to Italy and the overall question 
of equilibrium. When asked what he claimed for his allies, Jan-
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nel answered that for Don Carlos he wanted all that he was in 
possession of-namely, Naples, Sicily, Parma, and Piacenza, and 
the eventual possession of Tuscany. The two ministers thought 
this entirely too much. 
On the subject of what was to be given to the king of Sardinia 
Jannel said that this would be obvious if you gave Parma, Pia-
cenza, and Tuscany to the emperor, meaning, of course, that 
there would be nothing left for the king of Sardinia but lands in 
the Milanese. The question was whether the emperor could be 
satisfied with Parma and Piacenza for the loss of lands in the 
Milanese. The ministers of the maritime powers felt that the em-
peror must also be given Tuscany. In addition, they argued that 
he was so angry at the conduct of the king of Sardinia that it 
might be difficult to get him to cede any of the Milanese. 
When the matter of the Pragmatic Sanction came up it was in 
connection with Lorraine. Walpole said that England would not 
consent to have Lorraine under a prince who would become em-
peror. The Pragmatic Sanction thus could not be accepted pure-
ly and simply. Jannel went further, saying that France could 
accept the Pragmatic Sanction, but only provided that the Lor-
raine would never be in the family of the emperor. After a meet-
ing on the eighth, Jannel returned to Paris and explained his 
differences with Walpole to the cardinal. 10 
The principal points had now emerged regarding the claims 
made for Spain and Sardinia. It would be a question of gradual 
adjustment to bring the sides together; nothing new would be 
added. But the satisfaction of Stanislas and the honor of the king 
of France were not yet brought within range of specific articles. 
The cardinal fenced a little more with Walpole in his letter of 
22 November in which he indicated that he wished to sendjannel 
back with new instructions. Fleury protested again the matter of 
increased armaments on the part of England and Holland, noting 
that they were also allies of France. He recalled that when En-
gland would not give France reassurances when France wished to 
send a fleet to the Baltic, France did not take the risk of enlarging 
the war. Finally he responded to a remark by Walpole regarding 
his age, a remark which presumably questioned the assurances in 
a treaty with a man who might abruptly depart the scene. Fleury 
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may have been a little nettled by this and protested his good 
health. "The young, like the old, can never count with certainty 
on the length of their days, but when God wishes to terminate 
mine, I shall have the consolation of leaving the king with senti-
ments of justice, truth, and love of peace, which should be the 
spirit of the conduct of princes. I must add to this that the keeper 
of the seals, whom the king has given me as an assistant, thinks as I 
do and holds the same principles." 11 The old cardinal, at eighty-
two, still had eight years to rule as first minister. 
At last, on 3 December, Fleury outlined the provisions that 
might be acceptable in the Polish situation. These form the ex-
pedient, said the cardinal, which seemed to him most natural 
and most reasonable to save the honor of the king and satisfy at 
the same time the emperor and the tsarina. 1) Stanislas is to be 
recognized as king of Poland by all the powers after he has been 
notified of his election; 2) he will then ask his son-in-law to per-
mit him to abdicate; 3) in consequence he will publish universals 
to assemble a Diet for abdication, which will accept the abdica-
tion and will then announce the free and unanimous election of 
the elector of Saxony; 4) Russian and Saxon troops are to be 
withdrawn from Poland; 5) the Republic of Poland will send a 
deputation to Stanislas regretting his abdication; 6) there will be 
an amnesty for all past actions-notably Danzig will be reestab-
lished with its rights; 7) all the acts of Stanislas will be recognized 
as legitimate; 8) Stani~las will retain the rank and title of king of 
Poland and grand duke of Lithuania; g) troops will be forbidden 
to enter Poland in a future election; 10) the emperor will send 
Stanislas a solemn embassy to congratulate him on his sacrifice 
for the peace of Europe; 11) Stanislas's estates will be given back 
and he will be given a pension for life by the Republic. 12 
In both substance and theatrics it was enough to keep Euro-
pean courts busy for months. If it seems strained and over-
wrought, it must be remembered that, although the cardinal was 
confident of his ability to maintain his relationship with the 
young king (and intimated this strongly to foreign diplomats), 
he must nevertheless from time to time satisfy the members of 
the Council of State. 
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The cardinal was also forthcoming on the question of Italy. 
Give the emperor Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and most of 
the Milanese, he recommended; but, of course, the emperor 
must take care of the damages to the Duke of Guastalla if Man-
tua is not returned to him. Finally, the cardinal counseled the 
maritime powers as to procedure. Nothing should be proposed 
to the emperor or to Spain as coming from France. That would 
compromise us, said Fleury. Rather they must form a general 
plan of peace as coming from the maritime powers. 
Thus, two understandings were involved. First a secret one 
between France and the maritime powers, and second a peace 
plan ostensibly prepared though the good offices of the mari-
time powers for submission to all the powers in the conflict. This 
would be the Plan of Accommodation.13 
Jannell then went back to Holland with two basic principles 
in his instructions. There must be no increase directly or indi-
rectly in Austrian territory, and Lorraine must not be in the 
hands of the emperor or his family. And there was the admoni-
tion from the cardinal that yielding to the Pragmatic Sanction 
must not come lightly .but in the sense of a great sacrifice. After 
all, as he pointed out in a message, a guarantee of the Pragmatic 
Sanction by the king of France tends to make the empire heredi-
tary. Perhaps in the back of the cardinal's mind was the claim of 
the elector of Bavaria as a likely candidate for the imperial 
crown, a claim he would seek to exercise in a few years. 
In summary, it may be said at this point that France had 
placed the pieces of the Italian puzzle on the table. They might 
be pulled together in any way subject only to the proviso that the 
emperor must suffer a net loss. Now the cardinal could shift his 
attention to the terms required to satisfy France rather than 
those required for his allies. 14 
At the Hague the conference proceeded with firmer posi-
tions and a seriousness and urgency evidenced by meetings on 
24, 25, 26, and 27 December. On the question of Poland the car-
dinal's points would have to be scaled down. It was impossible to 
have Stanislas abdicate before the Polish senate or have a new 
election. The maritime powers would not go beyond their for-
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mer position. On the Italian questions they were closer. Don 
Carlos must give up Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany if he holds 
Naples and Sicily, and the emperor must have damages for Tus-
cany during the life of the grand duke. 15 
A package was now taking shape. Actually, the question of 
Lorraine was still open, but Walpole assured the cardinal in a let-
ter of 28 December that something would be done for France if 
the duke of Lorraine became emperor, but he would not go so 
far as Jannel demanded, namely, that the house of Lorraine be 
forever excluded.16 
Walpole now proposed that they proceed to the Plan of Ac-
commodation but it was about this time that the negotiations fal-
tered. The documentation does not indicate precisely what went 
wrong, but one thing was clear-the cardinal felt that he had 
overcommitted himself and sought to retract some of his posi-
tions. The negotiations continued but never recovered from this 
setback. 
Waldegrave, the British ambassador to France, was brought 
into the talks to keep them alive; he had been only partly in-
formed on the details up to this time. He reported a session with 
the cardinal on 8 January 1735 and felt that the cardinal was 
now sensitive to criticism for being too compliant on matters 
touching the king's honor, that is, on the Polish quesiton. How-
ever, the cardinal did not insist on Lorraine, said Waldegrave, 
only that the duke not be emperor and at the same time hold 
Lorraine. The cardinal also told him that the emperor and Spain 
were seeking accommodation and that a monk had been sent by 
the emperor to Spain in secret. He had died on the way, passing 
his secret to another monk, from whom France learned of itY 
Fleury had already answered Walpole on 6 January. He ad-
mitted they were in agreement on the principal points but want-
ed the Polish article more precise and wanted the elector of 
Saxony proclaimed king a second time. This, of course, would 
imply that the original proclamation was invalid. Fleury also 
backed away from an agreement on "reciprocal neutrality." This 
was a concept to put greater leverage on the belligerent powers 
to accept the Plan of Accommodation when it was submitted to 
them. Under such an agreement France would become neutral 
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if her allied belligerent powers rejected the plan, provided that 
the British, in turn, would remain neutral if the emperor re-
jected the plan. Then the cardinal added a remark that may 
have been the key to it all-that he expected to have trouble with 
the Council of State in a meeting on the ninth. 
The conferees at the Hague, including Jannel, were sur-
prised. According to Le Dran, Chauvelin had participated in this 
reply. J anne I had been given authorization to sign the articles but 
they had been reworded in much more succinct form. Walpole 
and the pensionary were very unhappy; they found the new arti-
cles unintelligible, susceptible to an infinity of questions, and very 
dangerous; further, they contradicted the cardinal's previous 
promises. Walpole wrote saying they were surprised and morti-
fied at the changes. A further exchange took place during the 
new few weeks, including a new set of articles written by Chau-
velin and forwarded on 2 February. 18 
The English were unhappy but they did not want to abandon 
the Plan of Accommodation and thus submitted it to the several 
belligerent powers on 17 February without the French agreement 
on the articles discussed above. Royal instructions to Waldegrave 
ordered him to tell the cardinal that his letter of6 January contra-
dicted his instructions to his envoy and raised questions of the 
cardinal's sincerity. Try also, said the London instructions, to find 
out what changed the cardinal's mind: whether he had originally 
no design to come to a conclusion or whether his good intentions 
were defeated by the credit and influence of M. Chauvelin. 19 
Waldegrave replied on g March that he had been three times 
to Versailles to confer with French ministers. He thought the 
cardinal looked a little ashamed. In their conversation he was 
finally able to bring him away from pleasant general comments 
but found that the cardinal retreated behind the argument that 
he must consult with his allies. "I own I had much ado to keep 
my temper," said Waldegrave, telling the cardinal that if he were 
determined to support Spain right or wrong, there would be a 
general war and he would be responsible, and that apparently 
his actions up to that time were to amuse the king of England 
who, on the other hand, placed confidence in the cardinal. But 
he could not move the old man. "His last resource was in AI-
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mighty God, whom he said we must all pray to, to avoid a gen-
eral war." 20 
The cardinal told Waldegrave that Chauvelin was still un-
aware of the negotiations on 9 March, although Jannel had 
admitted privately that Chauvelin had been brought in. The car-
dinal had succeeded in the past by difficult and tortuous nego-
tiations but this time he had fumbled. He had admitted more 
to Walpole than he admitted to Jannel and was faced with op-
position in the council and from Chauvelin and was trying to 
scramble back to safer ground. Wilson believes that Walpole was 
duped in the exchange.21 
But the English did not give up on Fleury. They continued to 
put pressure on him while the Spanish, Austrians, and Sardin-
ians considered the plan. Walpole himself came to Paris on 29 
March and after a meeting reported that he was sure Chauvelin 
was behind the cardinal's change of direction. "It is as dangerous 
to negotiate directly with M. Chauvelin, for fear of being cheat-
ed, or betrayed, as it is to negotiate directly with the cardinal for 
fear of being disappointed by the intrigues of Chauvelin." 22 
In the meantime the Plan of Accommodation was rejected by 
the "three crowns." The emperor's refusal, according to Arneth, 
was because of the influence of the Spanish party at the Vien-
nese court and because of reports of sickness in the French 
army.23 Eugene had hoped the emperor would accept and on 6 
April wrote to Philip Kinsky, "There is no other solution in the 
position in which we find ourselves than that of accepting purely 
and simply the plan; it is only to be feared that Spain and France 
will not accept it." 24 Another explanation for the emperor's re-
fusal could have been the belief that a strong rejection would 
bring the maritime powers to some realization of their respon-
sibilities to him.25 This, of course, did not happen. 
The English continued to negotiate with the French but with 
meager results. Waldegrave thought that the French had now 
begun to reveal their true objective. "Your Lordship I fancy will 
be of opinion from this account that France has an eye upon 
Lorraine, and that it is her principal aim tho the ministers have 
hitherto had modesty enough not to mention it directly as being 
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diametrically opposite to their repeated declaration in public 
and private that France would have nothing for herself." 26 
In a long letter to Eugene written 28 May 1735 the emperor 
reviewed the matters that had taken place since Eugene had 
gone to take command of the army on the Rhine once again. He 
noted that the most recent efforts had been to achieve some sort 
of armistice rather than a peace treaty. One of his enclosures was 
a proposal from France and her allies in the form of an armi-
stice. In general the emperor was discouraged. "Now from all 
that remains Your Grace sees that there is little hope of arriving 
at a bearable or consequently even a precarious peace through 
the good offices of the two sea powers." The emperor goes on to 
discuss the military situation, which he admits is very bad.27 
There had already been in the first part of 1735 a great num-
ber of efforts by various mediators to bring Versailles and Vien-
na together for negotiations. Some mediators were working on 
their own initiative; others had the blessing of the emperor or 
Cardinal Fleury. But the two courts were suspicious of one an-
other. One curious episode came from an ostensible effort of the 
cardinal to draw out the emperor at the end of 1734. The cardi-
nal had sent a season's greeting note to the emperor in Decem-
ber. Such a formal communication was normal even in wartime. 
But the cardinal added a handwritten note that invited a re-
sponse. After due consideration among his advisers the emperor 
responded with a careful note in his own hand, which passed to 
Fleury via the papal nuncio in Brussels. Word came back even-
tually from the nuncio that the cardinal in opening the packet 
had accidentally dropped the emperor's note in the fire. 28 This 
particular exchange went no further. 
But in April 1735 there began a complex passing of messages 
and visits among a half-dozen persons, and this finally established 
the definitive channel for peace negotiations. It centered in the 
small German principality of Neuwied in the Rhineland, where 
the sovereign count of Wied employed a Swedish Baron Nierodt 
as his councilor. Nierodt had dealt with the French in contribu-
tion matters and in March 1735 had an audience with Cardinal 
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Fleury in Paris. He returned to Neuwied with authorization to 
make contact with the emperor and the count sent his son to 
Vienna at the end of April to convey certain proposals to the 
court. The son returned with a cautious response from Count 
Sinzendorff, and Nierodt took this to the cardinal.29 
The cardinal accepted this barely proffered hand by a letter to 
the emperor dated 16 July. He drew up a set of negotiating in-
structions and had a man on the road to Vienna before the first of 
August. The road to Vienna in this case lay through Neuwied, 
and Nierodt would accompany the negotiator, M. de La Baune, 
who traveled under the name of St. Jean. In his instructions the 
cardinal admitted that he did not know the situation in Vienna, 
but since the contact was made in the name of Count Sinzendorff, 
the envoy should attempt to negotiate with him. Absolute secrecy 
was imperative. "No one must know that we have a man in 
Vienna. Better to do nothing than to be found out." 
Sinzendorff will start directly or indirectly with the English 
plan, said the cardinal in his instructions, and you will call atten-
tion to the fact that we and our allies have rejected it and that 
other more equitable principles are needed. If you are pressed 
for conditions, use the following: 1) reestablishment of the king 
of Poland or at least an agreed satisfaction; 2) an acceptable 
share (partage convenable) for Don Carlos; 3) a reasonable share 
for the king of Sardinia in the Milanese; 4) justice for the house 
of Guastalla if obliged to cede Mantua. 
These will let the count know more advantageous terms are 
needed for our allies. And above all you must disabuse him of the 
idea that I have gone over to the English, added the cardinal.30 
But while the cardinal's right hand wrote this letter in answer 
to the contact through Baron Nierodt, his left hand had already 
caused the opening of another channel of communication with 
Austria. On the day of the cardinal's letter to the emperor, 16 
July, Count Friedrich Harrach, the emperor's representative in 
the Austrian Netherlands, wrote to his father, the elder Count 
Harrach, who was then a member of the Privy Council in Vienna. 
An approach has just been made to me desiring to know if I can seek 
authorization to negotiate a treaty between the emperor and France in-
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dependent of the British court. The channel by which this proposal has 
come is the Count de La Marc, who commands the French armies on the 
frontiers and who has been in conversation on three occasions with the 
papal nuncio from here who was taking the waters at Saint Amand. I 
feel that there is a danger that the French are setting a trap in order to 
sacrifice us later to the English, but I think I have found the means to 
appear to listen and sacrifice them later to the English in turn. 31 
Harrach the Younger then continued the contact through the 
nuncio and Count de La Marc, who is also referred to as Count 
Marek. 
At some point the cardinal must have seen that the negotia-
tions were proliferating unduly and getting out of hand and 
would soon involve him in unexplainable contradictions. He 
then wrote directly to the emperor once again, sending his letter 
through Count Marek and through the suspicious Count Har-
rach in Brussels.32 The cardinal's letter, dated 28 August, is a 
masterpiece and cleared the air. 
Sire: 
It is from duty and from the honesty that I owe to Your Majesty that 
I have the honor to inform him about that which was taking place for 
more than a month at Brussels without my knowledge, and of which I 
have just learned in detail. The nuncio of Flanders and Count Marek, 
lieutenant general of the armies of the king, having met some time ago 
at the spa of Saint Amand, the conversation turned, as it naturally 
would, to the present war, and the count assures us that the nuncio 
made some approaches to see if he could not find a way to arrive at a 
peace. They have met twice since then, and the last time the nuncio told 
him that Count Harrach, because of the several conferences that had 
been held, gave an accounting to Your Majesty, which by no means de-
parted from the reasonable conditions which should be offered to you 
to arrive at a peace. I omit all that took place regarding this since Your 
Majesty has been amply informed. Count Marek adds that the matter 
has gone so far that if we should wish to send a man in complete secrecy 
to Brussels with full powers to negotiate with Count Harrach, there 
would be hope for a happy result. 
This same count adds further that Your Majesty had some doubts as 
to our intentions because having already undertaken two negotiations 
with us, one through the Pretender, and the other through the Count of 
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Wied, who was traveling in France, there has been no result except to 
have prevented Your Majesty from making other arrangements which 
might have suited you. It seems by this that Your Majesty suspects me of 
having used artifice and bad faith, and nothing touches me more at 
heart than to remove such a suspicion from your mind. Here is literally 
the story of the two negotiations, which I swear to be true. 
It is true that the Pretender contacted me through an agent he has 
in Paris, the first time in general terms, and the second time in more 
specific terms, giving even the name of the person through whom the 
matter had come, but with the condition that we did not dare yet to 
speak of it to Your Majesty. My reply has always been that the king will 
never draw away from a solid and honorable peace and would enter 
with pleasure into all the means which might lead to it, but that the pro-
posal for us to send a man to Rome to treat there on this important mat-
ter seemed to me subject to many inconveniences. Moreover, O'Brien, 
the agent for the Pretender, offered himself to go to Vienna for us. 
I confess frankly to Your Majesty that this triangular negotiation of 
Rome, Vienna, and Paris seemed to me subject to long delays and, al-
though I was not in any way disheartened, I did not expect of it any sig-
nificant result, the more so since I saw no positive assurance on the part 
of Your Majesty. It was at this point that the Swedish Baron Nierodt 
brought me a letter of the count of Wied with the two pieces which I 
have the honor of sending you .... 
However, the character and birth of the Count of Wied, and all the 
particulars which the Baron Nierodt told me of his trip to Vienna, left 
no doubt of the facts he alleged, and I did not hesitate to inform the 
king, who found it well that I follow up this matter. Your Majesty knows 
the rest so that I will say no more about it. I have heard nothing from de 
La Baune and I await news with great impatience.33 
The cardinal concluded by offering to use any of the chan-
nels mentioned above, but the result of the letter was to elimi-
nate all but the direct negotiation carried out by La Baune. 
The British ambassador Robinson was feeling a coolness in 
the Viennese court at this time. He reported a conversation with 
Sinzendorff in which he was asked if his king still would do 
nothing. "Did England have any proposal to make?" I said no. 
"What," he said, "no proposal, no assistance, no hope, not one 
mark of the king's friendship?" 34 
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It was strong language. Meanwhile the negotiatiOns were 
finding a single channel between France and Austria. 
La Baune had traveled with the count of Wied and arrived 
on 13 August in Vienna. On the sixteenth he reported to the car-
dinal that he had had a three-hour conference in the Convent of 
the Trinitarians at the edge of the city. He had taken a place at a 
long table in the library of the convent with Sinzendorff and 
Bartenstein opposite him, the former doing most of the talk-
ing. 35 Things did not start off well. On the first point, that of 
finding a satisfaction for Stanislas, Sinzendorff tried to equate 
Stanislas's position with that of James II of England. La Baune 
began to use stronger language. Sinzendorff said they could 
make him king of Hungary, but La Baune did not take this se-
riously. When the two imperial negotiators at length said they 
had nothing more to propose on this point, La Baune said that 
his voyage was useless and made a gesture to leave. Sinzendorff 
and Bartenstein held a fifteen-minute conference and all three 
sat down again. 36 
Now the matter of actually ceding Lorraine was brought up. 
The throne will be vacant, said La Baune, and the king of France 
cannot have the emperor in possession of an area in the middle 
of France. The matter was resolved in the following manner. 
Stanislas would become the sovereign of Lorraine and Bar, and 
the duke of Lorraine would be given Tuscany, to take possession 
when the reigning Medici duke died. In the meantime Spain 
would be required to pay the duke of Lorraine revenues equiv-
alent to those he would receive from Tuscany when he came into 
possession. At the death of Stanislas the province of Lorraine 
would revert to his daughter, the queen of France, thus becom-
ing a part of France.37 All this was agreed upon only after pro-
longed and bitter talks, with a last minute threat by La Baune to 
leave Vieilna.38 
Before agreement was reached, La Baune's presence became 
known, and this further urged both parties to come to agree-
ment. The English ministry in London was aware early of a se-
cret French envoy, even his name, and asked Robinson to verify. 
But Robinson replied rather loftily that there was no trace of se-
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cret negotiations and was skeptical of the report. A few days 
later he discovered his mistake. La Baune, wearing false hair, 
was passing as an Englishman in the company of Baron Nierodt. 
Robinson demanded an explanation from the imperial ministers 
who gave him half-hearted assurances that no treaty had been 
signed. This was true, but it was late September and agreement 
was very close.39 
The preliminaries to what would be called the Third Treaty 
of Vienna were signed on 3 October 1735. Except for the article 
on Lorraine they were very close to what had been offered in the 
Plan of Accommodation which came out in February. Don Car-
los was given the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the king of Sar-
dinia was given two territories in the Milanese, and the emperor 
was given back Parma and Piacenza and the fortresses in the 
Rhineland taken by the French. The French guaranteed the 
Pragmatic Sanction.40 These articles had been agreed upon in a 
few weeks, although England and France had bargained for 
over a year without success. Both sides were ready. Chauvelin 
knew this when he told La Baune: "Don't worry about your stay 
in Vienna in any case; it can only be extremely short." 41 
The sudden signing of the preliminaries between France and 
Austria left three areas of uncertainty. 
First, the Spanish army in Italy found itself deserted by its ally 
and facing the emperor's superior army. Both sides were ready to 
find a solution, however, and no serious fighting occurred. 
Second, La Baune signed the preliminaries with a reserva-
tion. He could not get clear agreement for immediate possession 
of Lorraine by Stanislas and the matter was tied to the indemni-
fication for the duke of Lorraine. The French ministry refused 
the offer of an "expedient" to circumvent this problem, and La 
Baune said he was not authorized to sign without a reservation. 
Nevertheless the cardinal approved the ratification of the pre-
liminaries and thereafter the Austrians used this to drag out 
more than a year of painful negotiations over the legal posses-
sion of Lorraine by Stanis las. 42 
The third area of uncertainty is historical. The acquisition of 
Lorraine was of such importance that France actually was the 
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country which acquired the most from the war. Was the cardinal 
such a wily statesman that he could work for this result for near-
ly three years of diplomacy and war without acknowledging his 
objective until the very last? Wilson believes he could and did. 
On the other hand, was it possible that the cession of Lorraine 
was a last-minute device that had suddenly occurred to the 
French? It hardly seems likely. It was no secret that the French 
had had their eyes on Lorraine for a great many decades. Lord 
Henry's memoirs suggest that the cession of Lorraine was a si-
lent part of the agreement when the Plan of Accommodation 
came out in February.43 But none of the remarks made by the 
British ministers give this impression. What seems more likely is 
that the French were willing to stand by their protestations of a 
no-aggrandizement policy until they were surer of the outcome 
of the fighting and until the device of giving the duke of Lor-
raine compensation in Tuscany was discovered. After all, if Lor-
raine were kept out of the hands of the Habsburg family, France 
could have waited for an appropriate moment to acquire this al-
ready surrounded island of territory. 
The war and its negotiations were essentially at an end. The 
final treaty would not change the preliminaries. The war had 
followed the old pattern of the victorious power taking his ad-
vantages in Italian property; the dignities of hereditary sover-
eigns, even the defeated ones, were preserved; and the side that 
was getting the worst of the military action was allowed to cut its 
losses and withdraw. Both victor and vanquished knew that an-
other round might be played in a few years and the forces and 
alliances might be reversed, as well as the fortunes of war. The 
reverence for hereditary rights mingled with playacting here. 
Stanislas is still king (momentarily), the honor of Louis XV is 
saved, the old cardinal's position at Versailles is secure, the em-
peror has his Pragmatic Sanction, Count Sinzendorff maintains 
his dignity, the army commanders on both sides are dining to-
gether amicably as they work out details. We are reminded of 
the final lines of Thackeray's great novel: "Come children, let us 
shut up the box and the puppets, for our play is played out." 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
The most complete published account of military activity in the War of 
the Polish Succession is in the Feldziige des Prinzen E ugen von Savoyen, 21 
vols. (Vienna, 1876), referred to in this work as FE. A product of the 
historical section of the general staff of the Austro-Hungarian monar-
chy, it gives considerable detail on military dispositions and strengths, 
particularly of the Austrian forces. The information is principally from 
the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna. Many of the messages of Prince Eugene, 
which for this period exist in documentary form only as virtually illegi-
ble drafts, are reproduced in print in a supplement to each volume. The 
work of Alfred Arneth, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1858), 
is based ostensibly on a complete freedom to search through the Habs-
burg archives and describes mainly the diplomatic and higher-level gov-
ernmental aspects of the war touching the Austrian side. The more 
recent biography of Eugene, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, 5 vols. (Munich, 
1963-65), by Max Braubach, also covers mainly the diplomatic side of 
the war and the relations among the leaders in the imperial ruling 
group. It is more critical than the Arneth work and is based on the 
Staatsarchiv. Les Guerres sous Louis XV, 7 vols. (Paris, 1881), by C. P. V. 
Pajol, is based principally on the Archives du Ministere de Ia Guerre and 
reproduces many important messages. It is mainly concerned with mili-
tary strategy, army strengths and dispositions, and battle outcomes for 
this and later French wars. The work of Pierre Boye, Stanislas Leszczynski 
et Ia troisieme traite de Vienne (Paris, 1898), describes a large segment of 
the diplomatic activity during the war period and represents a very wide 
search for French documentation throughout France and even in some 
archives in Poland. V. Cere's Borba za PolskiiPrestolv 1733 godu (Moscow, 
1862) is not an annotated work and is concerned only with events lead-
ing up to the election of Stanislas. But a number of Russian diplomatic 
messages are printed here in an annex. Two of the finest works covering 
the period are studies of the foreign policy of Fleury; Arthur M. Wil-
son's French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 
1726-1743 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), and Paul Vaucher's Robert Walpole 
et Ia Politique de Fleury (Paris, 1924). 
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